THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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Daniel Pipes

Drift & Mastery, Bush-Style
Owen Harries

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Why Gorbachev is Cracking Down
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

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Contents

LEADS

Drift and Mastery, Bush-Style
Owen Harries ____ 3

What Kind of Peace?
Daniel Pipes ____ 8

THE SOVIET CRISIS

The Coming Resurgence of Russia
Bruce D. Porter ____ 14

Crackdown
John B. Dunlop ____ 24

The Secret History of Perestroika
Frederick Kagan ____ 33

Getting to Market
Charles Wolf, Jr. ____ 43

ARTICLES

All Rise for Chairman Powell
Kurt M. Campbell ____ 51

A Primer for Conservatives
Burton Yale Pines ____ 61

The Churches and the War
Robert P. Beschel, Jr. and Peter D. Feaver ____ 69

Fault Lines and Steeples
Max Beloff ____ 76

LETTER FROM PARIS

America on Their Minds
H.J. Kaplan ____ 83

BOOKS

Showing His Age
Frank Johnson ____ 90

A Morality Tale
Martin Krygier ____ 96

How Gorbachev Saved Reagan. . .
William C. Bodie ____ 101

SHORTS

Northern Exposure
Alvin H. Bernstein ____ 105

Of Bishops and Redskins
James Bowman ____ 109

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Drift and Mastery, Bush-Style

Owen Harries

IT IS SAID that one cannot argue with success. On the contrary, one can and one should, for euphoria and complacency are the enemies of sound judgment. Before August 2, 1990, George Bush received high praise from the American foreign policy establishment for doing very little in relation to the collapse of communism. Since then he has received even more generous praise for being spectacularly activist in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. First masterly inactivity, then masterful engagement: How sound are these judgments?

For a recent example of an admiring account of George Bush's passive response to the end of the Cold War, consult Michael Mandelbaum's article in the current "America and the World" issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Professor Mandelbaum's conclusion that the president deserves high marks is based almost entirely on how well he believes George Bush played the role of the dog that didn't bark. The president "kept the United States in the background"; he "steered clear" of the pitfalls and blind alleys of interference; he "refrained from," "avoided," and "declined" to do this and that; he "correctly calculated" the wisdom of letting things "run their course," without either collaborating with or confronting Moscow.

Mandelbaum suggests that the president's performance in this respect has gone "underappreciated," but I don't think so. True, some conservatives have chided Bush for being insufficiently exultant in victory, and for inadequate zeal in pressing America's advantage over an adversary in crisis; and true, some liberals, gamely ready to embrace yet another hero on the Left even as the pillars of the temple are crumbling, have complained that not enough was being done to "help Gorby." But in the think tanks, editorial offices, and schools of international relations in which wisdom is made conventional, the bulk of opinion has approved the Bush administration's passivity. Professor Mandelbaum is expressing an orthodoxy, not a challenging reassessment.

On the whole, and with a qualification I shall come to, I agree with the orthodoxy. To adapt the old saw, if something you don't like is broke or breaking, don't feel obliged to fix it. And don't feel compelled to hasten a process that is proceeding nicely of its own accord; at best your efforts will be superfluous, at worst counterproductive.

More specifically, the case against Bush's conservative critics is that blatant attempts to exploit the crisis in the Soviet Union, either in propaganda terms or by attempting to influence events there, would in all likelihood weaken the reformers and strengthen the reactionary forces by allowing the latter to exploit Russian national pride. Expressions of conservative outrage at the use of Soviet force against the Baltic

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peoples and other nationalities, especially when accompanied by demands that the Bush administration must respond punitively, are not convincing. What we are witnessing in the Soviet Union is the collapse of the last great empire of the twentieth century. The earlier collapse of empires—including those of the democratic powers—was accompanied by much violence and bloodshed. The British departure from the Indian subcontinent, Kenya, and Malaya; the French from Vietnam and Algeria; the Dutch from Indonesia; the Belgians from the Congo; the Portuguese from Timor—millions of deaths accompanied these vast adjustments in the international system. So far, the collapse of the communist empire has been surprisingly parsimonious in blood, particularly given the regime's demonstrated taste for violence. Who would have predicted that fundamental challenges to the integrity of the Soviet Union would result in deaths measured only in dozens and scores? This may well change of course—indeed it will be surprising if it does not—but until it does, protestations of shock and horror ring rather hollow.

Another observation suggested by earlier examples of imperial collapse is that whether or not the Soviet republics achieve independence will depend overwhelmingly on their own determination and staying power. Except as a side effect of a major war, there are few examples of outside intervention being decisive.

Liberal criticism of the Bush administration's passivity is also unpersuasive. That criticism has usually taken the form of complaints that the United States is being insufficiently supportive and generous with aid. But the gap between what would be required to make a significant difference to the Soviet economy and what the United States, even at its most generous, could conceivably give is very large. Further, there is no evidence that the Soviet system could make good use of any aid given to it. A country that wastes its own record harvest because of failure to gather, store, and distribute is hardly likely to use foreign aid effectively. The only exception to this inefficiency is the Soviet military-industrial complex, which almost certainly *could* make good use of Western material aid and technology. But aiding it would obstruct rather than facilitate reform. Indeed, arguably, *any* economic aid that was not entirely wasted would have that effect, in that it would lessen the incentive to change.

The liberal stress on the importance of material aid is quite mistaken. The most important thing the West, and particularly the United States, has to give—or to withhold from—the Soviet regime is *legitimacy*. This commodity is as scarce as soap and hypodermic needles in Moscow, and even more valuable. As a discredited ideology is no longer able to confer legitimacy, good relations with the world's major powers, particularly with the only authentic superpower, become increasingly important for the leaders in the Kremlin. So far, the Bush administration has been prepared to satisfy that need in a sober and moderate way, and in return for limited Soviet cooperation on matters of importance to Washington—particularly the Gulf Crisis.

It is true that Bush was given a good hand to play by the departing Reagan. It is also true that Bush would have been wiser to spread his bets, rather than to have put so much of his money on the personal future of Mikhail Gorbachev. On the whole, however, the praise given to Bush for his handling of relations with the Soviets in crisis has been well earned. But—and this is the qualification I signaled earlier—a policy that was appropriate when things were going very much as we wanted them to go, and when a good deal of cooperation on bilateral and international matters was forthcoming, may not continue to be appropriate if, as now seems evident, reactionary forces are gaining the upper hand in Moscow. While the United States will still have an interest in ensuring that events in the Soviet Union and Central Europe do not lead to a dangerous systemic instability, it should also be

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concerned to prevent the suppression of reform. But even then it should proceed with a clear sense of the limits of its likely influence, and of the dangers of unintended and counterproductive results.

PRESIDENT Bush's response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has been enormously popular with both the foreign policy establishment and the American public. His unhesitating commitment; the unwavering demand for complete and unconditional withdrawal; the marshaling and holding together of a great international coalition; the use made of the United Nations; the smooth and rapid assembling of a huge military force in the Gulf and its subsequent successful deployment—all have been generally acclaimed for the decisiveness shown, the sense of control and authority conveyed, and the skill in implementation.

In the early stages of the crisis, I subscribed to this assessment. In a piece written for an Australian audience in early October, for example, I described the administration's handling of the crisis as "superb." Since then I have had second thoughts. While I certainly continue to support the opposition to the Iraqi aggression, and while much of the implementation of policy has been impressive, the policy itself now seems to me to be deeply flawed.

The first mistake made by President Bush, I believe, was the immediate, unqualified, and unilateral commitment of American power to achieving the complete, unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. By this premature commitment, the president deprived the United States of the leverage necessary to get other countries to play their part, thus ensuring that the United States would play the leading role and bear most of the burden. If the president had really wanted to establish that the old way of doing things was yielding to a "new world order," as he insisted he did, he should have made it clear at the outset that the days of leaving it to the United States to bear the burden of responsibility and leadership—to "do the hard work of freedom"—were over.

This could have been done without jeopardizing the security of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. The United States should have put enough air power in place, together with a small trip-wire force on the ground, to ensure that Iraq's aggression would not immediately extend beyond Kuwait—and then should have turned to the Europeans and the Japanese and said: "Given your greater dependence on its oil, you have much more at stake in the Gulf than we have, so *you* call the shots. The United States will support you, but the initiative must be yours." This would have established a new "ground rule" for the post-Cold War "order" with a vengeance. It would have been a true "defining moment," one that would have concentrated the minds of the Germans and Japanese wonderfully.

It would also have broken the unhealthy American habit, acquired during the Cold War years of absolute dominance, of assuming control without consulting anyone, and then complaining bitterly that others were not backing it up and sharing the burden. The time to get other countries to do some burden-sharing is before making commitments that lock one in, not afterwards. That President Bush chose to take virtually the whole burden on his country's shoulders, and that his choice was so popular with his fellow countrymen, may reveal one of the important secrets of contemporary America: Despite complaints and grumbles about burdens, and professions of relief that the tensions of the Cold War have now relaxed, the country has become much more attached to its role of superpower and leader of the free world than it cares to admit—and it would feel seriously deprived if it ever lost that role.*

More than inadequate burden-sharing is involved in the feeble performance of Germany and Japan during this crisis. A year ago it was being predicted confidently—indeed, stated as an obvious fact—that these two

*On this point see Michael Vlahos in *America's Purpose—Toward a New Vision of U.S. Foreign Policy*, edited by Owen Harries (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991), pp. 43–52.

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countries were about to join the ranks of the truly global powers. The pronouncement was made simply on the basis of a crude economic determinism: these countries now have huge economies and are very rich; therefore they will inevitably be leading players in world politics. Americans who asserted and accepted this were forgetting their own history. The United States had the strongest economy in the world for about fifty years before it chose to become a fully active world power, and then it took Pearl Harbor to force the choice. Economics is not destiny. Wealth makes it possible to be a global power, it does not make it inevitable.

There are those, of course, who argue that it is better that Germany and Japan should remain politically quiescent, and that we should be prepared to put up with their freeloading as a necessary price for their remaining so. It is an understandable point of view, but it really will not do. Given our experience with both countries, there must be real concern that if they do not overcome the effects of their mid-century traumas and steadily acquire the habits of responsibility and participation in the company of others, their future history will consist of an unpredictable and dangerous lurching between extremes: timid and reticent one day, demanding and domineering the next.

Another, and more obvious, weakness of the Bush administration's handling of the crisis has been the opportunistic importance it has attached to the role of the United Nations as the authorizer of policy. While this has had obvious short-term advantages—mainly in disarming potential critics who still believe, or profess to believe, that the UN represents "morality"—it should be equally obvious that it stores up trouble for the future. In any dispute involving one or more of the veto-owning permanent members of the Security Council as the perpetrators of aggression—that is to say, in the most serious disputes—the moral patina of a UN resolution authorizing effective action will never be available. By pandering to and exploiting illusions about the UN, instead of exposing them and taking the trouble to make its own moral case for acting, the administration has encouraged the belief that UN approval is a necessary condition for the legitimate use of force. It is now commonplace for commentators on talk shows and op-ed pages to explain that certain courses of action or objectives (for instance, the removal of Saddam) exceed the limits of what is authorized by the UN, that they are not part of "the mandate"—as if that settled the matter. We shall live to regret this much-trumpeted "UN success."

The most serious fault in the Bush administration's Gulf policy is its disproportion. In terms of the original provocation and its perpetrator, there is something grotesquely inappropriate in the scale of response—as if, say, Muhammad Ali in his prime had been sent in against a promising lightweight. If anyone had predicted on August 2 that in six months' time there would be half a million American troops in the Gulf, as well as five American aircraft carriers, a huge air force, and sizable allied contingents; if anyone had predicted that in the first year of the new world order more bombs would be dropped on Iraq and Kuwait in three weeks than were dropped on Germany by the American and British Air Forces during the period of the most intense bombing of World War II—surely he would have been thought very peculiar indeed. All other items on America's political agenda have been put on hold—or compromised—in order to concentrate on the problem of bringing a country of seventeen million people to heel. During a critical period in the evolution of the crisis in the Soviet Union, Washington's Soviet policy has been subordinated to the need to maintain Moscow's support for U.S. Gulf policy. (Indeed, a persuasive case can be made that the magnitude of the U.S. military response to Saddam Hussein has been a factor in hardening the Soviet military's outlook and making it more assertive and resistant to reform.)

All this has been justified by President Bush in terms of "a defining hour" and the importance of creating a decisive precedent

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for the new world order. In other words, the whole thing transcends Saddam Hussein and Kuwait. But the irony is that the very size of the reaction to the invasion of Kuwait ensures that it cannot be a convincing precedent. This kind of behavior is simply not replicable on a regular basis, and cannot therefore establish a rule. If there is another act of blatant aggression in Latin America or Southeast Asia in six months' time, it will be beyond the means and the will of the United States to respond in similar fashion.

Some would answer this by saying that if the action against Saddam is successful it will not be necessary to repeat it, that the terrible lesson taught him will be an effective deterrent to other potential aggressors, and that, in any case, *they* will not know that it cannot be repeated. Perhaps, but it is dangerous to base policy on the assumption that other people are dumber than oneself. The strong-arm men and bully boys of the world have many intellectual shortcomings, but one of the things they are normally fairly shrewd at—it is a necessary talent for success in their line of business—is the calculation of power realities. If we can see that the United States cannot sustain a series of Gulf-like operations to deal with regional aggression, it is safer to assume that they too will see it.

Another effect of the gigantic scale of the operation has been to flatter, and magnify the importance of, Saddam Hussein, even as it destroys him. It may yet confer on him an heroic stature in Arab eyes. (One says this with some trepidation. So many contradictory things have been asserted about "the Arab mind" in recent months that any claim concerning it is unlikely to be significantly more persuasive than its opposite.) To be defeated—even to be killed—by such a stupendous force, one which has inflicted such heavy casualties on Iraq, will not necessarily be a disgrace. It could well be taken as proof of Saddam's seriousness as an adversary and validate his pretensions; and revered dead men can be formidable enemies.

As conservatives should be the first to recognize, Walter Lippmann's famous warning about the importance of keeping ends and means in balance cuts both ways: while it is important to ensure that the means used are sufficient to secure the ends, it is also important that they should not be wildly excessive. For excessive means are the producers of collateral effects and unintended consequences, and these can be particularly unfortunate in a region like the Middle East.

With the United States having won a decisive and spectacular military victory at a very low cost in American lives, it is likely that criticism of President Bush will fall on deaf ears. That will not in itself invalidate that criticism, and it will not be the first example in history of military success serving to disguise political error—at least for awhile. From Napoleon to Anthony Eden, it is difficult to recall a modern Western statesman who, in the end, enhanced his reputation by taking initiatives in the Middle East. It will be a surprise—though a pleasant one—if George Bush turns out to be the exception.□

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What Kind of Peace?

Daniel Pipes

IN THE EXCITEMENT accompanying the liberation of Kuwait, dramatic issues concerning military and diplomatic tactics have eclipsed larger questions of policy. This results from a combination of rapidly changing circumstances and the euphoria of an unexpectedly easy victory. But even as Americans celebrate, it is important that they prepare for a less bloody yet possibly more difficult undertaking—the political struggle to win the peace. There are two main reasons for believing that the U.S. government will find it hard to translate military victory over Iraq into a lasting political success.

First, traditional American instincts in time of war militate against the delineation of a long-term strategy. Americans see war not as a continuation of diplomacy, but as its replacement. We tend to believe that war should be used only as a last resort. (For the same reason, American generals and admirals have often preferred to have nothing to do with policy issues, believing that they have no role during time of war.) We have a tradition of wanting total war, regardless of political considerations. Moreover, our leaders often let emotions hold sway, with expensive consequences. It was gratifying in World War II to impose unconditional surrender on the Germans. But this indulgence extended the war, cost innumerable lives, and permitted the Soviets to grab Eastern Europe.

The second reason for concern about American planning regards the specifics of the war with Iraq. The build-up to the war included little thinking about long-term goals. By all accounts, the hurly-burly of managing the Gulf Crisis—formulating a response, building a coalition, holding it together, exploring diplomatic options, devising a war plan, and winning domestic support—prevented the president and his advisers from thinking much about the aims of the enterprise.

This vacuum became embarrassingly evident when President Bush addressed the country just two hours after launching the war. Speaking to the largest American audience in television history, he used the occasion only to go over familiar territory, justifying the administration's actions and explaining why war was necessary. He did not define U.S. goals or describe the circumstances in which American troops would be brought home. At a news conference on January 19, the president further revealed the vagueness of his thinking. Asked what he hoped the war would accomplish, he replied: "When this is all over we want to be the healers, we want to do what we can to facilitate what I might optimistically call a new world order." This alarming statement, heavy with mystical and even New Age

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overtones, seemed to confirm an absence of serious political and military analysis.

When the administration finally got around to articulating its goals, the results remained too vague to be operational. On February 5, Secretary of State Baker offered five desiderata for the Middle East—a new security arrangement, an arms-control agreement, a program of economic reconstruction, a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a reduction of American dependence on Persian Gulf oil—but he offered no specifics and, like Bush, indulged in pie-in-the-sky talk of achieving "real reconciliation based on enduring respect, tolerance and mutual trust" between the Arabs and Israel.[1]

Outsiders offered variant lists of U.S. goals. Marvin Feuerwerger of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy published six points of an "essential framework" to win the peace; Representative Lee Hamilton of Indiana presented a seven-point "agenda" to achieve stability in the Middle East; and so forth. But none of these lists answered the two basic questions: How can the war against Iraq best be made to serve American national interests? And what military strategy best advances those interests?

THE OVERRIDING American interest in the Gulf is stability. The factors which prompted the U.S. engagement—the threat to oil, the build-up of nonconventional offensive capabilities, the unacceptable precedent, the humanitarian catastrophe—point to the need for quiet and security. Once stability is achieved, other desirable goals like low oil prices, a more equitable sharing of the petro-wealth, and democratic elections can be addressed. Translated into specifics, stability implies the territorial integrity of Iraq; as moderate and non-bellicose a government in Baghdad as possible; a balance between Iraqi and Iranian power; the al-Sabah dynasty's return to Kuwait; and the future security of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the other per-capita income giants.

How can the war that began in mid-January lead to stability? The allies' overwhelming military superiority offers a choice from an unusually wide range of options; picking the right one is not easy. After the liberation of Kuwait, what next? Merely reduce Iraq's offensive threat (the huge army and the Republican Guard)? Destroy the nonconventional capabilities (the chemical weapons and missiles, the biological and nuclear facilities)? Topple Saddam Hussein? Eliminate the Ba'ath regime? Establish a democratic government? Occupy Iraq? Divide the country among its neighbors?

The American instinct, honed by over fifty years' experience, is to go for total war, total victory, and military occupation. (This explains why official American thinking often portrayed an orderly Iraqi retreat from Kuwait as a "nightmare scenario.") Occupation entails a complete overhaul of the defeated country's institutions, with American forces staying on until a new leadership has been fostered. To guarantee the defeated country's security, a military alliance is formed with the United States. Germany and Japan underwent this process on the grandest scale; more recently and more modestly, it was the turn of Grenada and Panama. The familiarity and past successes of the total-victory-and-occupation model make it popular; *Time* reported on February 4 that 72 percent of Americans sought an unconditional Iraqi surrender, while 92 percent insisted on Saddam's removal from power. President Bush's semi-explicit goals—unconditional surrender, Saddam's ouster, and the formation of a new government—also pointed to this model.

How would total victory fare in Iraq? Here we leave the lofty heights of strategic planning and confront the hard realities of Persian Gulf politics. The unhappy truth is that a military occupation of Iraq lasting for

[1]Nor had anyone else from the administration filled the lacuna by the time of this writing in late February.

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more than some months would probably lead to one of the great disasters in American foreign policy.

This dire prediction is prompted by a sense of the region's political culture, especially the attitudes fostered by Islam. Much has been said about Islam's impact on politics and how this shapes attitudes toward American soldiers in the Gulf, but for our purposes three quick points are worth making. First, Islam emphasizes a world divided between Muslims and non-Muslims, with other considerations (language, geography, skin color) being far less important. Second, the law of Islam requires Muslim self-rule; when non-believers have sovereignty over believers, Muslims usually find the situation intolerable and instability results. Finally, Middle Eastern Muslims have exceptionally acute sensitivities about Muslim rulers serving as the agents of Western powers; indeed, the puppeteer's strings are commonly discerned where they do not exist.

For these and other reasons, the Iraqi populace can be counted on to resent a predominantly American occupying force. Occupying troops would find themselves victimized by suicide attackers, car bombers, and other acts of terror; the scene in Iraq would recall, on a much grander scale, the depredations suffered by the multinational forces in Lebanon during 1983–84. The Syrian and Iranian governments would actively sabotage the foreign presence (again, as they did in Lebanon). The populations of Saudi Arabia and Egypt would probably force their governments to turn against their non-Muslim allies. As the ignominy of sniper fire buried the prestige of high-tech military superiority, the famous victory achieved by Tomahawks, Tornadoes, and Patriots would quickly become a dim memory. The brilliant General Schwarzkopf would turn into a humiliated Schwarzkopf Pasha.

Were large numbers of U.S. troops to remain in Saudi Arabia, results would be nearly as bad. Even though President Bush seems to have ruled this out ("U.S. forces will leave as soon as their mission is over"), the temptation remains. When Secretary Baker first spoke of a "security structure" for the Persian Gulf, it sounded like another attempt at a Middle Eastern NATO. This has been tried before (Eisenhower's Baghdad Pact, Reagan's "strategic consensus") and it has always failed. As Henry Kissinger correctly noted in congressional testimony in November 1990, the contrast with Western Europe and South Korea, where American troops have been stationed for forty years, is profound: "There, American forces contributed to domestic stability; in Saudi Arabia they would threaten it."

The phobia about non-Muslim forces makes the Middle East fundamentally different from other foreign regions in which the United States has fought large-scale wars; it presents the greatest single obstacle to American efforts to stabilize the region. These considerations lead me to conclude that the first imperative of U.S. strategy is not to keep large numbers of American ground troops for long periods in the Persian Gulf region. There must be no American occupation of Iraq, no NATO-like alliance with the Saudis and Kuwaitis, no permanent military bases in their countries.

This said, Muslim antagonism toward non-Muslim powers is far from absolute. Turkey has been a staunch member of NATO for forty years, while a network of discreet alliances tie Muslims from Morocco and Indonesia to Washington. However strong the elemental Islamic antagonism, countervailing influences also exist, and need to be taken into account. Cultural proclivities have their limits as indicators of political behavior; ideologies count too, as do interests. In addition, several other factors are currently important in the Gulf region.

First, a mood of apathy prevails in the Arabic-speaking countries. It has been many years since their populations have been willing to give up their lives for abstract causes; they take matters into their own hands only when an issue is of direct personal concern. Arabs are so prone to riot against currency adjustments, subsidy cuts,

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and other austerity reforms—as shown by disturbances in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, the Sudan, and Jordan—that they have earned a reputation at the IMF for an unwillingness to tolerate the most modest economic adjustments. But symbolic causes are another matter. By now, Arabs are a much-disappointed people, stuck in what Hisham Sharabi terms a condition of "paralyzing trauma."

Second, today's regimes have immense coercive power despite their crises of legitimacy. While Iraq has the most notoriously repressive apparatus in the Middle East, comparable institutions exist in nearly all Arabic-speaking countries. Even such apparently fragile governments as those of Saudi Arabia and Jordan engage in what Michael Hudson has dubbed "monarchy by *mukhabarat* [security apparatus]." Their power permits considerable leeway in pursuing unpopular policies.

Finally, there is a deep respect for the winner, indicated in a revealing Arab proverb: "Kiss the hand you cannot bite." Today, that is the American hand. Far from being enraged at Washington's victory over Iraq, Arabs will respect it for doing what it threatened—at least for a while. But this respect will dissipate. It might happen slowly (the West Bank under Israeli rule remained quiescent for twenty years) or quickly (the Israelis received a hero's welcome in southern Lebanon in 1982 and despairingly fled just three years later).

Assuming allied forces prevail, the U.S. government can count on a period of months, but not much more, to stabilize the Persian Gulf. Washington must seize its moment of great but transient influence; it should not squander this opportunity by haring off to another issue. The point bears making, for Western analysts widely agree that the postwar period provides the ideal setting to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Henry Kissinger sees victory in the Gulf as "a historic opportunity" to deal with this issue; the usually sensible *Economist* goes so far as to argue that "America's main job in the postwar Middle East will be to act as honest broker between Israel and the Palestinians." Douglas Hurd, the British foreign secretary, has promised a return to the Palestinian issue "with renewed vigor" once the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait is over; the French government is even more eager for linkage. Saudi and Egyptian authorities see the Palestinian cause as the ideal vehicle to burnish their national credentials; and, if past patterns hold, the U.S. government will not resist Saudi pressure.[2] Indeed, as early as October 1990, President Bush signaled some willingness to link the two issues.

But this would be a terrible error. A precipitous turn of attention from Iraq and Kuwait to the Arab-Israeli conflict would forfeit a rare chance to overhaul the politics of a key region. It would be like neglecting Germany and Japan in late 1945 to solve the Irish problem. Actually, something like this happened in 1982, when Washington's inability to keep its eyes off the West Bank led to the loss of a unique chance in Lebanon. Here is the story:

ISRAEL had attained its goals in Lebanon by the end of August 1982—getting the PLO out, reducing Syrian military strength, having a friendly government installed. Although these were Israeli achievements, not American ones, Israel's close association with the United States caused U.S. prestige to soar in tandem with Israel's. Washington could have seized that moment to restructure the Lebanese polity by changing the communal balance of the government,

[2]Two regimes, those of Saudi Arabia and China, enjoy a uniquely privileged place in American foreign policy. Although both have repeatedly proved themselves unfriendly to U.S. interests and values, Washington illogically feels indebted to them. In the present crisis, such sentiments translate into official U.S. gratitude to the Saudis for allowing American troops on their territory to crush Saddam. This in turn may lead Washington to put the squeeze on Israel.

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carefully reducing the Christians' power in favor of the Muslims.[3]

Instead, Washington pushed Lebanese issues to the side. Noting that the Lebanon War "has left us with a new opportunity," President Reagan on September 1, 1982 offered a plan to resolve the West Bank conundrum, suggesting Palestinian association with Jordan. King Hussein of Jordan mulled over the idea for seven months, then decided against it. Rebuffed, Secretary of State George Shultz returned his attention to Lebanon, but by then American diplomacy no longer could prevail. The Syrian military was again strong and a new Lebanese president had taken office. Shultz prodded the Lebanese and Israelis into ending the war between their two countries; but his victory was Pyrrhic. Less than a year after the May 17, 1983 agreement was signed, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad had forced the Lebanese government to renounce it. Washington had missed a fleeting chance to make a difference in Lebanon.

Eight years later, this unhappy episode has sunk down the memory hole. The Bush administration appears ready to travel the same path—skipping from Iraq, the problem of the moment, to the Israeli-Palestinian morass. Yet, it plainly makes no sense to ignore Iraq just as a very costly investment is about to pay off. Moreover, shunting aside the relatively simple problem in the Persian Gulf in favor of the notorious difficulties a thousand miles to the west is illogical. But then, as Irving Kristol has observed, "Whom the gods would destroy they first tempt to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict."

CLEARLY, the U.S. government should concentrate on the Persian Gulf. Planners should consider these specific steps in pursuing American interests:

- Explicitly affirm the territorial integrity of Iraq within its present borders and impress this commitment on potential aggressors (Syria, Turkey, Iran).
- Announce that the U.S. does not intend to bring down Saddam. This step, however distasteful, has two major virtues: it renders much less likely an American occupation of Iraq and it enables a new ruler of Iraq to establish himself as an independent figure—and not just an agent of the U.S.
- Announce a willingness to deal with the Ba'ath Party. Having liquidated alternative leaderships (with the single exception of the Kurds, who cannot rule Iraq), the Ba'athists cannot readily be replaced. Ousting them probably implies an occupation of Iraq by American and allied forces—or, in their absence, by the Iranians.
- Insist that the Iraqi government reduce its armed forces to about 200,000 soldiers, enough to defend the country from its neighbors but not to act aggressively.
- To assure this diminution of Iraqi power, reach an agreement with allies about maintaining a military embargo after the war. Because the allies might default on their promises, keep the open option of further military action.
- Plan for a speedy reduction of American and other non-Muslim troops from the Persian Gulf. No more than 50,000 or so infidels should remain in the region.
- To deter future Iraqi or Iranian aggression, initiate discussions with Muslim leaders about their forming a multinational force in the Gulf.

Some of these steps are counterintuitive and others are painful or difficult to achieve. But all are necessary if America is to emerge from the Kuwait Crisis with gains commensurate with its sacrifices.□

[3]This is what the Syrians eventually pulled off in the Ta'if Accord of 1988. Back in late 1982, when I was working on the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, I proposed such a plan to the U.S. government. So thoroughly was this idea rebuffed that I readily received permission to publish my idea as an article. (It appeared in the Summer 1983 issue of *Foreign Policy*.)

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
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The Coming Resurgence of Russia

Bruce D. Porter

LET US BEGIN by recalling one of the most celebrated predictions in political literature. In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville published the first volume of *Democracy in America*. The book concluded with a short, persuasive analysis of why America was fated to become the greatest power in the world. Among the factors Tocqueville cited were its immense geographical size, abundant natural resources, vibrant national character, and growing population. The French nobleman then added, almost as a footnote, that one other nation was destined for similar greatness, and for many of the same reasons: Imperial Russia. While conceding the stark political differences between America and Russia, Tocqueville closed with a sentence destined to become famous: "Their starting-point is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."

At a time when many pundits have already relegated Russia to the rank of a second-class power and regard its decline as final and irreversible, Tocqueville's wise comments about the essential ingredients of state power over the long run provide a much needed corrective, for these ingredients ultimately matter more than economic fluctuations, political crises, or near-term shifts in the military balance. When measured by such "objective factors," to purloin a Leninist phrase, the future of the Russian state—quite apart from its empire—does not appear nearly so bleak. In fact, the most likely prognosis for Russia's future is not its retreat from the world scene, but its resurgence both as a global power and as a continuing obstacle to Western interests.

Tocqueville's prediction, made more than a decade before *The Communist Manifesto* was published and eighty-two years before the Bolsheviks seized power, does not hinge on the Soviet state. He did not presuppose the existence of an ideological force that would fuel Russian expansionism, nor did his conclusion require the existence of a Soviet Union or a Warsaw Pact. The USSR might evolve into a wholly new system, or even dissolve into its constituent parts, without affecting the validity of Tocqueville's observation. For regardless of what happens to the Soviet Union, Russia will remain, and—because it possesses those essential ingredients—will continue to carry great weight in world affairs.

This point was recently acknowledged by another Frenchman, then-Minister of Defense Jean-Pierre Chevènement, in a memorandum to senior military officers. "Russia does not need to be an empire to be the strongest military power in Europe," he

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wrote. "The Russian population itself is more than 150 million, which is easily the largest population on the continent. Russia's territory is 30 times as large as the next largest country in Europe, which is France." Though Chevènement's views go against the grain of strategic thinking elsewhere in Western Europe, where Soviet power is now largely discounted, they appropriately echo the thinking of his great fellow countryman.

One of Gorbachev's unheralded accomplishments has been a sharp rise in the casualty rate of Western predictions about Russia's future. But at least one forecast is quite safe: By the turn of the century, Moscow will still be the seat of some kind of government. That government—whether communist, democratic, fascist, nationalist, autocratic—will control at least the current territory of the Russian Republic (three-fourths of present Soviet territory) and probably the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan (a Central Asian republic where the largest ethnic group is Russian). If it succeeds in holding together this "Slavic core," it will have inherited nearly 92 percent of the territory and over 80 percent of the population of today's Soviet Union. It will also be in possession of most of the USSR's current military capacity, including the largest nuclear arsenal in the world and the biggest, best-equipped army in Europe. Even though arms control measures may lead to reductions in absolute numbers, they will not greatly change the *relative* balance between Russia and the West. Moreover, some 85 percent of the USSR's military industry and 90 percent of its military R & D facilities are located in Slavic republics, percentages that will only increase if efforts are made to transfer the most mobile assets.

For these reasons the proposition that Russia will remain a great power ought to be a truism. Yet it receives scant recognition in the current strategic debate in the West. I will go further: By the year 2000 we are likely to witness a significant resurgence of Russian military power in both relative and actual terms. For the regime that governs Russia at the turn of the century will not merely inherit the existing Soviet military establishment, it will actively build on that foundation to ensure Russia's place as the predominant power in Europe and the military equal of the United States. In doing so, Russia will simply be pursuing the logic that has impelled Russian statecraft since Peter the Great.

Geography, Culture, and Autocracy

FOR CENTURIES, Russia's foreign policy has been shaped by three main factors: geography (the absence of natural frontiers, open plains that are difficult to defend, and the quest for warm-water ports); culture (an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the West, an idealistic sense of national mission, and a pervasive xenophobia); and autocracy (reinforced by deeply ingrained feelings of political insecurity). These factors in turn have created powerful tendencies toward territorial expansion, high levels of military spending, and dictatorial government propped up by military and police power. More than seventy years of Soviet rule have only reinforced these tendencies, and they are likely to persist whatever the fate of communism and the multinational Soviet Empire.

Throughout history, new city walls have been built on the foundations of earlier ramparts. Similarly, if there is a regime change in Moscow, the new government will be built on the foundations laid by both czarist and Soviet rule. The two strongest elements of political continuity in any such transition will be the professional military and the secret police. This is because neither the present regime nor any probable successor could survive politically without support from these two institutions. They are entrenched, powerful bureaucracies with stable personnel systems: most Russian officers who are under age fifty-five will still be serving in the year 2000, regardless of what government issues their orders.

The military and the secret police are always portrayed as "conservative" in the Western press, and rightly so. But their

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conservatism is based less on ideological devotion than on deeply held institutional values and Russian traditions whose antecedents predate the October 1917 Revolution. Just as a majority of the czarist army and secret police readily adapted to Bolshevik rule, so could the Soviet officer corps and KGB accept, and perhaps even support, the demise of the current regime. But they would only do so *provided* that the successor government (whether communist or not) was committed to high levels of military spending and to maintaining political controls at home. Since the new regime could not survive without Soviet military and secret police support, it would have to be so committed. That is the unavoidable bargain the future holds, and its elements are already becoming increasingly evident in Gorbachev's transitional regime.

Thus, our hypothetical government of Russia in the year 2000 is likely to remain a political rival and potential military adversary of the West. It is likely to pursue policies of weapons acquisition, force structure, and arms control not dissimilar to those now advocated by the Soviet General Staff (including its predilection for large strategic nuclear forces). The only two future scenarios that definitely would *not* lead to such an outcome would be the establishment of a genuine Russian democracy or a devastating civil war. For reasons that I shall discuss, neither outcome seems likely.

The good news is that a future resurgence of Russian power does not automatically imply a return to the stark Russian-American rivalry of the Cold War. Marxism-Leninism is so thoroughly discredited that any future Russian government will almost certainly be less ideologically driven than past Soviet regimes, even if it retains a notional commitment to an undefined "socialism." Russia's relations with the West, though still adversarial, are likely to be characterized by greater realism and calmer rhetoric than during the Cold War. In the Third World, prospects for Russian-American confrontation should be drastically reduced, as Moscow ceases its automatic support of anti-Western regimes and Washington sheds some of its own anxiety about Russian intentions. We are already witnessing this effect in many regions of the Third World, including southern Africa, Indochina, and—most dramatically—the Persian Gulf.

The bad news is that Marxist-Leninist ideology will be replaced by Russian nationalism. For over half a century, the Western world has regarded ideological regimes, both fascist and communist, as the ultimate threat to peace. We have tended to forget that from the French Revolution to World War I, nationalism was the principal source of conflict among nations. Zbigniew Brzezinski and others have recently argued that "post-Communist nationalism" is today emerging as a dominant force in international affairs. Certainly nationalism is on the rise throughout the USSR, in Russia as much as in the non-Russian republics. It suggests a future relationship between Russia and the West resembling that which prevailed between Imperial Germany and the rest of Europe for several decades after 1870. In short, while the Cold War will be over, the necessity of maintaining a balance of power will remain.

CLAUSEWITZ observed that it is human nature to exaggerate the strength of an opponent. Certainly that tendency prevailed throughout most of the Cold War and not least in the early 1980s, when concern about "the window of vulnerability" and the shifting military balance precipitated the largest peacetime build-up in American history. Evidence of a crisis in the USSR—infant mortality rising, male life expectancy plummeting, economic growth stagnating—was mounting in the late Brezhnev years. But the signposts were largely discounted as Washington coped with the invasion of Afghanistan, the INF challenge, and sundry Third World trouble spots. Today we have gone to the opposite extreme and greatly underestimate the potential strength of the Soviet Union. We are like the drunken man that Martin Luther once saw trying to mount a horse: first he fell off one side, then, leaping

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back on and overcorrecting, he fell off the other.

The news reports from Moscow are of little help in correcting our balance. Invariably written in the style of weather reports, they are at best barometers of Gorbachev's personal standing, revealing little about the underlying forces that will shape Russia's future. The impression in the West that Russia has entered into permanent decline is based on three assumptions: First, the Soviet economy is in such bad shape that it will take years to recover and will never again provide an adequate base for a military threat to the West. Second, the loss of Eastern Europe confirms the USSR's decline and greatly reduces its influence in Europe as a whole. Third, rising nationalist strife inexorably will pull the Soviet Union apart, leaving Russia a mere rump of its former empire. All three assumptions deserve scrutiny, for they ignore critical reserves of Soviet economic, political, and military strength.

The Economy and the Military

THAT THE Soviet economy is in very bad shape is beyond dispute. But the picture of utter disaster that is now routinely drawn is exaggerated. Glasnost, the need to make the case for reform, and the wish to attract Western aid all combine to produce horror stories disproportionate to the actual decline. The inordinate publicity given to Soviet food shortages is a case in point. Such shortages are a perennial fact of Soviet life, but despite the much freer access they now enjoy, Western diplomats and journalists have been unable to find any evidence of starvation or severe deprivation in Gorbachev's Soviet Union. The fact that the 1990 grain harvest was the largest in Soviet history makes the point that much of the trouble stems from the deterioration of the Soviet transport system, a non-systemic problem susceptible to remedy by targeting investment.

Second, Moscow has certain substantial economic assets that make it absurd to treat it as one of the world's out-and-out basket cases, and make the outpouring of official and charitable food aid from the West—and even India!—seem strange. These assets include massive diamond and gold reserves, the latter alone estimated by the CIA as around $34 billion. Combined with a relatively low level of hard currency debt (some $54 billion), these assets give Moscow considerable borrowing potential in international credit markets. Further, the USSR has the world's largest natural gas reserves, and produces nearly as much crude oil as the United States and Saudi Arabia *combined*. The recent jump in oil prices and the decision to put oil deliveries to Eastern Europe on a dollar basis will strengthen Moscow's hard currency position significantly.

Third, the Soviet Union has always had two substantially separate economies—the consumer and the military-industrial. The latter is in much better shape than the former, enjoying first claim on both human and material resources. The Kremlin asserts it has cut defense spending by 10 percent a year for the past two years. U.S. intelligence agencies concede there has been a decline, but believe it is far smaller, perhaps 4 to 5 percent at most. Given the changing security outlook and other pressing needs of the Soviet Union, it would be logical to expect some reduction. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that such reductions, even if they continue, must result in the comparative military weakening of the Soviet Union. For one thing, the rate of defense spending in most Western countries is dropping as fast or faster (the U.S. defense budget declined by 4.5 percent in real terms in 1990). For another, the Soviet Union started its cuts from a much higher level than its Western rivals. Thus, even after cutting its output of tanks by half, the USSR still produces twice as many battle tanks annually as all NATO countries combined. And in 1989 it easily outproduced the United States in a range of important categories: ICBMs, 140 to 9; SLBMs, 100 to 21; SLCMs, 1300 to 600; artillery pieces, over 1500 to 100; fighters and fighter-bomber aircraft, 625 to 470; military helicopters, 400 to 280; armored fighting vehicles, 5,700 to 650. Soviet strategic weapons testing

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and modernization programs, as well as its research and development of ASAT and ABM systems, are accelerating, not declining. Despite Moscow's announced intention to convert military to civilian production, not a single major weapons facility has yet been converted. In short, the Soviet military-industrial economy remains intact, and retains the potential for rapid expansion of output.

Whether the Soviet economy can be reformed successfully in the next few years remains an open question. But whatever Gorbachev's shortcomings, he has already accomplished one important thing: the Soviet economic debate has been de-ideologized and is currently being conducted in more rational economic terms than in the past. It is now widely accepted that the only workable economic system, at least in the consumer sector, is a market economy. The small businesses or cooperatives legalized under Gorbachev have flourished and now engage over five million employees. Their rapid growth suggests that the rest of the Soviet economy, freed from its ideological straightjacket, can grow rapidly. But it is important to stress that the Soviet leadership need not achieve a Western-style consumer cornucopia in order for economic recovery to take place. The number of Soviet-produced luxury sedans, VCRs, microwaves, and upscale fashions will be no measure of prowess in the military arena. The USSR need only improve its consumer economy enough to maintain the modicum of public support necessary for internal stability. It appears increasingly evident that Gorbachev and his political allies intend to couple a liberalized consumer economy with an authoritarian political system and a command economy in the military-industrial arena. From their vantage point, this is the ideal formula for a resurgent Russia.

Abandoning Eastern Europe

EVEN MORE than Soviet economic problems, the loss of Eastern Europe has been widely interpreted as a portent of Russia's decline. Yet the political, economic, and strategic benefits that Moscow gained by leaving Eastern Europe and consenting to a reunified Germany have far outweighed the region's value as a buffer zone against a Western invasion that was never going to happen. Soviet diplomatic stature in Europe has increased, not diminished, as a result of the withdrawal, and Moscow has gained access to vital Western credit, economic aid, and high technology. By settling in one stroke its most long-standing issues with the West, the USSR enhanced its own security—a point Soviet defenders of the withdrawal make again and again. Shevardnadze put it bluntly in July 1990: "What is best, to be facing a half million soldiers from the *Bundeswehr* or, let us say, an army of half that size in a united Germany?"

Even by 1980, when labor strikes in Gdansk gave birth to Solidarity, Eastern Europe had lost its economic utility to the USSR and become a diplomatic albatross. Illegitimate governments propped up by the threat of Soviet intervention faced unruly populations and deepening economic troubles. To preserve regional stability, Moscow was forced to subsidize the Eastern European economies, particularly in the energy sector. Despite these costs, the Brezhnevite leadership, suspicious of any change, clung to its security blanket. It took a younger leadership to recognize the advantages of a European settlement and abandon the region in 1989–90 with hardly a whimper.[1]

Throughout the postwar period, the Soviet Union has had three long-standing policy objectives in Europe: 1) American military withdrawal from Europe; 2) the dissolution of

[1]Official Soviet statements during the first half of 1989 make clear that the decision to abandon Eastern Europe and accept an eventual reunification of Germany was made before the dramatic autumn of 1989. For a review of those statements, see Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbachev and German Unification: Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power," *Problems of Communism* xxxix, no. 4 (July-August 1990): 4–7.

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NATO; and 3) the neutralization of Germany. Ironically, by yielding Eastern Europe, the USSR is closer than ever to obtaining all three objectives. The level of American troops in Europe is declining already, with few likely left by the end of the decade. The recent European settlement undermines the *raison d'être* of NATO, whose vitality will surely diminish as the decade proceeds. As for Germany, though not yet neutral, its relations with Moscow have become exceptionally warm, reminiscent of the diplomatic pattern created by the Rapallo Treaty in 1922.

The Soviet loss of Eastern Europe has also contributed to the current decline in Western defense spending, which, as already noted, is keeping pace with the reduction in Soviet military spending. Barring drastic and disproportionate unilateral defense cuts by Moscow, which seem entirely unlikely, Russia in the year 2000 will remain the dominant power on the Continent even if resurgence never occurs. From this perspective, the retreat of Soviet troops from 3 percent of the territory controlled by Moscow since 1945 does not appear quite so consequential.

Pandora's Nationalities

THE MOST critical problem facing Gorbachev's government is the Pandora's box of nationalist strife unleashed by glasnost. Western scholars such as Alexander Bennigsen and Hélène Carrère d'Encause have long argued that the USSR cannot be the only multinational empire in modern history immune to nationalism's centrifugal forces, that rising national sentiment would ultimately strain and perhaps tear the empire apart. The scholars certainly had foresight: ethnic strife has claimed several hundred lives and created as many as 500,000 internal refugees. Many of these refugees live in squalid conditions in tent cities or other temporary shelters in Central Asia and the Caucasus; others have flooded into Moscow, straining the capital city's already overburdened housing and social facilities.

Despite the fury with which "post-Communist nationalism" has struck, there is no reason to believe that the disintegration of the Soviet federation is either inevitable or even likely to occur quickly. A recent multidisciplinary study at Harvard University concluded that most large empires have fallen apart only in response to some massive external blow. Moreover, unlike most multinational empires in history, the Soviet Empire is territorially contiguous, a more "natural" political entity than past overseas empires hammered together by Atlantic sea powers. A fairer comparison could be made with the Ottoman Empire; but, unlike "the sick man of Europe," which relied on diverse types of government in different geographical areas, the USSR employs a uniform administrative system across its entire territory. It is thus closer to being a true nation-state than most empires. It is also worth recalling that most Soviet territory was part of the Russian Empire for more than a century prior to the 1917 revolution. This familiarity may not have led to affinity, but it did forge political, social, and economic bonds that paper resolutions alone will not dissolve.

Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader since Lenin never to have served in the provinces. From the early months of his tenure, he grossly underestimated the depth of national feeling in certain republics and failed to anticipate how glasnost and a relaxation of totalitarian controls would fan it. The senior officer corps had fewer illusions, however, and is known to support preservation of the federation strongly and by all means necessary. There is much evidence to suggest that Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, former Chief of General Staff Sergei Akhromeyev, and General Boris Gromov (popular hero of the war in Afghanistan) lobbied for months prior to the January 1991 crackdown in Lithuania for precisely such a show of force. That Gorbachev went along indicates his realization that the Baltic states cannot be freed without setting a bad precedent for other restless republics, despite the attraction of settling the last major political issue with the West. The events of January have left

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little doubt that the Kremlin is prepared to fight for union, as it was not prepared to fight for Eastern Europe.

In that fight, the Soviet leadership has several points of leverage. Virtually all republics depend heavily on the RSFSR for various raw materials and commodities, and most Soviet republics have large, extremely loyal Russian populations. Moreover, outside the Baltic states the most virulent nationalist enmity has not been directed at these Russians, but has flared up between smaller ethnic groups who harbor deep-seated historical grievances. The Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute is the most extreme example, but communal violence has also resulted between Meskhetians and Georgians; Tadjiks and Uzbeks; Kirgiz and Uzbeks; Caucasians and Kazakhs; Abkhazians and Georgians; Ossetians and Ingush. Tribal violence of this nature dramatizes to the public the advantages of union and centrally enforced political order: for most republics, independence would only be a prelude to serious bloodshed.

Public opinion polls conducted by Soviet institutes show that a majority of Soviet citizens now consider the re-establishment of order a higher priority than economic or political reform. This is especially true in the Russian Republic, where there is a traditional fear of chaos and a proclivity for an "iron hand" at the center. Such sentiments favor the Kremlin and will bolster public support when force is used to ensure the union's survival. Though events could yet force Moscow to yield autonomy or independence to certain republics, the odds seem to favor its retaining most of the present federation.

Regime Scenarios

GIVEN THE tumult of the past five years, it would be foolhardy to rule out almost any scenario of Russia's future. Let us consider the five most frequently mentioned ones, their likelihood, and the consequences of each for the future of Russian military power.

Scenario #1: A palace or military coup by conservative, "old guard" forces bent on restoring the pre-Gorbachev status.

Such forces presumably would seek to reimpose Brezhnevite political controls and censorship; crush nationalist movements; and perhaps reassert Russian control over portions of Eastern Europe. A conservative leadership would inevitably mean increased military spending and at least a short-term resurgence of Russian power. Ironically, the long-term prospects for Russian power would probably be worse under old guard leadership than under the present regime. A conservative regime could undermine all that Soviet diplomacy in Europe has recently accomplished, galvanize Western defense spending, and repudiate the reforms essential to sustaining military strength over the long run.

The idea of a conservative takeover has been a constant theme of both Western and Soviet speculation for some five years now. Gorbachev's nemesis was presumed first to be Yegor Ligachev and then Ivan Polozkov, the new first secretary of the Russian Republic. There is, however, almost no evidence of an organized right-wing coalition forming around either man. Though the old-line apparatchiks bear grievances against Gorbachev, and hardline speeches sometimes win spirited applause in the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev consistently prevails over his right-wing opponents in actual votes, usually by healthy margins.

Because any such coup would require the support of the military, this scenario is highly unlikely. Though the military press is rife with grumbling these days, most criticism is aimed not at Gorbachev, but at various liberal-minded institutions and publications (such as *Komsomolskaya Pravda* and *Ogonyok*). The military is unhappy with its declining prestige and obviously would prefer that its budget were not shrinking; but the top officer corps, many of them hand-picked by Gor-

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bachev, understand that internal reforms are essential to Russia's capacity to compete technologically with the West. The word perestroika, in fact, may first have been used in a political context by Marshal Ogarkov in 1982, when he wrote of the importance of restructuring "the entire economy, [as well as] political, social, scientific, and other institutions" in order to enhance Soviet military preparedness. As for the Soviet military's own painful perestroika, one senior officer has declared pointedly, "We've never reorganized anything to make it weaker."[2]

One sobering footnote: Since at least the Twenty-Eighth Party Congress in July 1990, Gorbachev has been moving to the right. Last November he granted local military commanders expanded power for maintaining public order; in December he reorganized the Interior Ministry (responsible for internal security) under two well-known hardliners; also in December, Shevardnadze resigned and warned against the threat of a new dictatorship; in January Gorbachev invoked additional emergency powers and began a military crackdown in Lithuania, Latvia, Moldavia, and other republics. It appears that the Soviet president may himself become godfather of a "creeping coup" against reform communism, just as General Jaruzelski declared martial law in Warsaw in order to save his own regime in 1981. This would make a right-wing coup quite redundant.

Scenario #2: Extreme Russian nationalist forces take power.

There has long been an extreme variety of Russian nationalism that manifests all the characteristic features of an ideology. Often neo-fascist and anti-Semitic, always chauvinistic, this form of Russian nationalism appeals to many elements in the military and has outspoken advocates in the Supreme Soviet. Several widely circulated newspapers such as *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, *Molodaya Gvardiya*, and *Nash Sovremennik* espouse stridently nationalist views, as do numerous political organizations of this persuasion. Of these, the notoriously reactionary *Pamyat* is most prominent. The "United Council of Russia," an umbrella organization set up with the help of conservative officials in 1989, unites many of these groups.

Despite such organization, however, Russian nationalist groups have not fared well in the few democratic elections held in the USSR. In the March 1990 elections to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, a coalition of Russian nationalist and neo-Stalinist groups called the "Bloc of Russian Public-Patriotic Movements" failed to capture any seats in the first round of voting, qualified for only 16 run-off races out of 65 contested, and captured only about 10 percent of the total vote.[3] In view of such numbers, the chances of a Russian nationalist takeover by legitimate means are quite small. There are, however, numerous and growing links between Russian nationalist groups and the old guard in both the party and the military. These suggest the possibility of a conservative-nationalist putsch, combining features of scenarios one and two. The odds of such an eventuality are small now, but could increase if the present regime missteps badly.

Even the remote prospect of a hyper-nationalist or proto-fascist Russia is alarming. Russian nationalist writers often declare that their first priority would be to jettison the non-Russian republics ("to secede from the USSR"), but their nostalgia for the old Russian Empire suggests this promise might be honored in the breach. With or without the republics, however, a nationalist Russia would be strongly committed to the expan-

[2]The Ogarkov quote is from *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva* ("Always ready for defense of the Fatherland") (Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defense, 1982); the quotation from an unnamed senior Soviet officer is from Ilana Kass and Fred Clark Boli, "The Soviet Military's Transcentury Agenda," *Comparative Strategy* 9, no. 4 (1990): 333, footnote 64.

[3]John B. Dunlop, "Moscow Voters Reject Conservative Coalition," *Report on the USSR* 2, no. 16 (April 20, 1990).

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sion of its military power and would pose security problems to the West only slightly less onerous than to those we have faced since 1945.

Scenario #3: Power is assumed either through a palace coup or via more orderly political processes by left-wing forces determined to hasten the pace of economic and political reform.

Boris Yeltsin, the reform-minded president of the Russian Republic who resigned from the Communist Party in 1990, would be the most likely leader of such a change. So far, Yeltsin has challenged Gorbachev on specific issues, but has shown no willingness to make a serious bid for power. More often than not, on crucial votes in the Supreme Soviet he has thrown his support to Gorbachev at the last minute, perhaps mindful of the general secretary's proven capacity to rally a majority in a "parliament" consisting largely of appointed functionaries. Even in Yeltsin's own Russian Congress of People's Deputies, detailed analyses of voting patterns indicate that in a political showdown his radical reform wing would win only about one-third of the votes.[4] The odds of his coming to power are further reduced by the likelihood that both the military and the KGB would oppose his accession. There will be no left-wing coup in Moscow.

In the unlikely event that Yeltsin or some other radical reformer did somehow attain power in the Kremlin, would this set Russia on a course of demilitarization and retreat from world power? Only if a left-wing government could emasculate the military and dismantle the secret police without triggering a counter-revolution—a dicey proposition at best. Nor should we assume that a left-wing government would be immune from traditional Russian patterns. Yeltsin himself has said that the first step of his 500-day economic program will be "the imposition of discipline,"[5] which hardly sounds ringingly Jeffersonian in its implications.

Scenario #4: A popular, democratic revolution.

Might the Soviet Union go the way of Poland and Czechoslovakia, with mass demonstrations and popular resistance bringing on the government's collapse and the establishment of democratic rule? Alexander Solzhenitsyn has long maintained that democracy will come to Russia only by careful shepherding from above, while Alexander Yakovlev, a close ally of Gorbachev, has opined that it will take generations for Russia to develop democracy. The two Alexanders reach a similar conclusion from opposite points of view. Many Western specialists would agree: Russia is not ripe for democracy. The cultural basis for popular, democratic revolution is simply absent. Even though many Russian intellectuals and professionals are committed to democratic ideals, for the most part the agrarian population and working classes lack any democratic tradition. Popular revolutions have historically occurred during or shortly following periods of rising expectations—usually when per capita incomes are increasing, not falling. The current economic situation in the USSR and profound political apathy of its population does not bode well for a revolution from below.

This does not mean there is no hope for the future. Russia's most likely road to democracy would be to abandon Marxism-Leninism (a process well underway), move toward a more conventional authoritarian system, and from there evolve in stages to a genuine liberal democracy. But this process takes time and probably will come too late to avert the resurgence of Russian military power postulated here.

Scenario #5: A full-scale civil war.

This is the one scenario that would definitely rule out a resurgence of Russian power. A full-scale civil war in the USSR

[4]Regina Smyth, "Ideological vs. Regional Cleavages: Do Radicals Control the RSFSR Parliament?" *Journal of Soviet Nationalities* 1, no. 3 (Fall 1990).

[5]*Demokraticheskaya Rossiya*, no. 3 (1990), cited in *RFE/RL Daily Report*, no. 190 (October 5, 1990).

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would be devastating. Nuclear weapons might even be used. Various countries on the Soviet periphery—China, Poland, Romania, Iran, possibly some Western powers—might become involved. The Soviet federation would almost certainly be torn apart and a long period of reconstruction within the Russian heartland would follow. But how likely is such an event?

Though public unrest already exists in some republics, internal conflict will reach catastrophic proportions only if the Russian center itself divides into warring factions. Nationalist strife may multiply and even cause selective losses of Soviet territory, but it cannot engender full-scale civil war, provided the political center remains intact. An outright war between outlying republics and the Russian center is a virtual impossibility since no republic could field an effective army without access to the RSFSR's military-industrial might. Individual republics could at best wage wars of attrition or civil disobedience (Lithuanian-style) against central authority. More probably, they will only engage in symbolic acts of defiance, while straining to cope with their own internal cleavages, ethnic and otherwise. All this will vex, but not vitally threaten, the powers-that-be in Moscow.

A sense of historical proportion helps. In 1716, General-Admiral Apraxin, an enthusiastic supporter of Peter the Great, sent a letter to the czar's personal secretary in which he confided deep foreboding about Russia's future:

> Verily, in all affairs we wander like blind men, not knowing what to do; everywhere there is great agitation, we do not know to whom to turn, or what to do about it for the future; there is no money anywhere, and everything will come to a stop.

In fact, everything did not come to a stop. Peter's reforms, though painful, laid the foundation for Russia's emergence as a great power. For centuries, visitors to Russia have seen the poverty and squalor of its people and concluded that the Russian state was near collapse, its military power an illusion. Yet consistently, despite deprivation, revolution, and war, Russia has advanced militarily, fulfilling Dostoyevsky's vision of a "fatal troika dashing on in her headlong flight."

Within the next five to ten years, Russia will resolve many of the internal contradictions now plaguing it, and the world will witness the resurgence of its military and industrial power. The most probable midwife of that resurgence is the current government, freed of its ideological fetters. But neither a new regime nor a break-up of the Soviet federation will necessarily alter this outcome. When it occurs, we will look back with chagrin at today's casual assumptions about Russian decline. As Winston Churchill said in 1942: "Everybody has always underrated the Russians."□

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Crackdown

John B. Dunlop

WITH AMERICA at war, its citizens have been understandably fixated upon events in the Persian Gulf. But that should not blind us to a development of even greater magnitude currently taking place: namely, the Soviet regime's concerted attempt to roll back the liberalization of the 1980s. We appear to be witnessing the beginning of an ambitious rolling coup, which threatens to spread from the Baltic to the remaining twelve Soviet republics. The Gorbachev "center" seems to have launched a kind of slow-motion civil war against the constituent republics and such pro-democracy elected bodies as the Moscow City Council. In the economic sphere, the Soviet leadership has taken a decisive step away from market reform back toward Brezhnev-era central planning.

How could this have happened? And what does it signify for the future of East-West relations in the 1990s? Clearly much of the explanation lies in the elusive personality and actions of the Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev. Those who follow Soviet politics closely have been aware almost from the beginning that the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party is not the luminous "democrat" and "champion of peace" touted by the legion of Western Gorbophiles. Nevertheless, important changes have been evident in the recent positions embraced by the Soviet leader, and he has moved steadily toward a restoration of authoritarian rule.

The reasons for this reversal are not too difficult to identify. An exceedingly poor strategist—though at times a brilliant tactician—Gorbachev has repeatedly seen his policies yield results directly opposite to those he intended. Thus glasnost led not to a reinvigoration of Marxism-Leninism and a return to 1920s-vintage idealism and fervency but to a complete discrediting of the ruling ideology, widespread desecration of monuments to Lenin, and a harsh questioning of the wisdom of the "socialist path" taken in 1917. *Demokratizatsiya*, with its sponsorship of competitive elections, resulted not in a cleansing and strengthening of the Communist Party but in a widespread defection from its ranks, the abolition of Article Six of the Soviet Constitution (which mandated the party's leading role), and the emergence of anticommunist opposition parties. The "popular fronts in support of perestroika," which were supposed to marshal public support in the Baltic and in other republics for Gorbachev's program of "within-system" reform, have in fact led to the emergence of vast nationalist and separatist movements seeking sovereignty, and in certain cases full independence, for their republics.

After the initial four years of Gorbachev's leadership, therefore, the Soviet

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Union had come to resemble an ungainly centaur, half proto-democracy and half entrenched totalitarianism. It was inevitable that these polar and mutually exclusive tendencies should ultimately clash—they had, of course, been sparring vigorously throughout the Gorbachev period—and the "civil war" which the Soviet president has now launched against the republics and the democrats represents an attempt to bring this long-simmering conflict to a head.

Already in 1989, there were signs that an increasingly disillusioned and embittered Gorbachev was beginning to backpedal. The massacre of twenty-one Georgian civilians by Soviet paratroops in April 1989 in Tbilisi was a precursor to "Bloody Sunday" in Vilnius nearly two years later. The bloodshed in Georgia was clearly intended to intimidate growing pro-independence sentiment in that republic. As has since become his established practice, Gorbachev denied any connection to the massacre, but an independent Soviet parliamentary commission has established that only he and Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov had the authority to order paratroops into action. The Georgians' vigorous, at times hysterical, response to the massacre and the firm support for their position by democrats throughout the Soviet Union may have helped postpone the big crackdown in the USSR for two critical years. In January 1990, however, Gorbachev had another limited go at control by bloodletting: tanks were sent into Azerbaijan to suppress a burgeoning Azerbaijani Popular Front. This operation was conducted under the cover of saving Armenian and Russian lives, but in fact those ethnic groups had for the most part been moved from Azerbaijan before the tanks went in.

Similarly, the current assault on glasnost has a precedent. On Friday, October 13, 1989—now known as "Black Friday" among Soviet democrats—Gorbachev summoned leading editors and cultural figures to the Kremlin for a two-hour tongue-lashing and dressing down. During his harangue, Gorbachev pointed specifically to offending articles and singled out editors by name for vilification. He unambiguously suggested that Vladislav Starkov, chief editor of *Argumenty i Fakty* (a weekly with the largest circulation of any newspaper in the world), resign his post. A concerted attempt was then made to oust Starkov and Yevgeny Averin, chief editor of the reformist *Knizhnoe Obozrenie*, from their jobs. Democrats rallied to the cause of the embattled editors, and their positions were saved. At the same time, Gorbachev's close ally and party secretary for ideology, Vadim Medvedev, exerted himself mightily to emasculate a new law on the press that was being drafted by the Soviet parliament; democrats managed to obtain passage of a liberal bill only after a hard fight.

A Matter of Choice

DESPITE such periodic lurches to the right, it was only in the late summer of 1990 that Gorbachev appears to have finally decided to turn his back on reform. The defining moment, as numerous Soviet democrats and Western journalists have observed, was his decision not to support the so-called "Five Hundred Days" program of economic and political reform. This ambitious and far-reaching program—which both Gorbachev and his arch-rival Boris Yeltsin initially supported—would, if adopted, have moved the USSR rapidly along in the direction of a market economy and democracy. Factories and state farms would have been sold off, private enterprise fostered. Real power would have devolved to the republics, and something like the loose, informal grouping of the British Commonwealth would gradually have come into being. Gorbachev's decision to renege on his agreement with Yeltsin and come out firmly against the Five Hundred Days program is likely to be seen by historians as one of the critical turning points of the 1990s.

Western Gorbophiles would have us believe that Gorbachev sided with the reactionaries because he had no choice. Indeed, it is true that Soviet hardliners had been breathing fire during the summer of 1990. The

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rapid evolution toward a commonwealth of sovereign republics and the economic reforms advocated by the Five Hundred Days program were seen by these elements—described variously by Lithuanian President Landsbergis as "old-style Bolsheviks," "worshippers of Great Russian imperialism," and "red Fascists"—as a mortal threat not only to their belief systems, but to their livelihood and privileges. An adoption of the reform program would have threatened the military and the military-industrial complex with massive budget cuts. The remaining communist true-believers were appalled at the rank heresy of a projected transition to a market economy.

Another major force resisting change was the KGB, whose chairman, Vladimir Kryuchkov, is an unreconstructed hardliner. With the weakening and demoralizing of the Communist Party under perestroika, the KGB has steadily emerged as an independent political actor. As Kryuchkov's recent high profile on Soviet television demonstrates, his power has been growing markedly and may already rival that of Gorbachev. The tumultuous years 1989–90 showed conclusively that the KGB was serving not as a force for modernization but rather as a tool of reaction, working tirelessly to undermine all authentic democratic groupings within the USSR. The KGB, a potent totalitarian holdover from the Brezhnev era, could hardly have viewed the future devolution of power to the republics or the Five Hundred Days program of economic reform with equanimity.

A factor frequently cited by Western Gorbophiles to justify his movement away from reform was the perceived weakness and disarray of the reformers. This view ignores the aggressive "divide and rule" strategy being pursued by the KGB, presumably with Gorbachev's knowledge and approval. The KGB was bringing numerous fictitious political parties with democratic-sounding names (for example, the "Andrei Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces") and indeed whole political blocs (the so-called "centrist bloc") into existence. Aware of the threat of disunity, authentic reformers in the Russian Republic joined together under the "Democratic Russia" umbrella to do battle with the Communists and hardliners.

Real as the pressures on Gorbachev were, they alone did not compel him to come down on the side of the hardliners. If there were heavy risks entailed in ignoring the vehemently held views of the old guard, there were equal dangers in siding with them against both the republics and the democrats. For one thing, it put any kind of feasible market reform—and therefore economic recovery—in grave jeopardy. Understandably, talented pro-market economists like Nikolai Petrakov and Stanislav Shatalin have departed Gorbachev's team, while aggressive central planners like the new prime minister, Valentin Pavlov, are now charting a course into the past. A move back to communist orthodoxy has also put billions of dollars in Western aid and technical assistance in doubt, and it is difficult to see how the Soviet Union can extricate itself from the morass without such Western assistance.

One strongly suspects that personal motives played a key role in Gorbachev's decision. As perceptive observers like Milovan Djilas noted early on in the Gorbachev period, the Soviet leader is a fervent, true-believing Marxist-Leninist. Western Gorbophiles have heatedly denied this fact, but to no avail. In his recent speeches, Gorbachev has spoken with great passion of his visceral attachment to "socialism" and of his aversion to the concept of private property. He has bitterly attacked the Lithuanians for attempting to establish a "bourgeois republic." When it came to the sticking point, the deep-seated Marxist in Gorbachev must have recoiled at the prospect of embracing a reform program that would set the USSR irrevocably on the path of democracy and a market economy.

And then there was personal hubris, the fact that Gorbachev has, in Stanislav Shatalin's words, become "obsessed" with power. An adoption of the Five Hundred Days program, while manifestly beneficial to the Soviet populace, would have led to an inexora-

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ble diminution of Gorbachev's personal power. Even worse from his perspective, it would have fortified the positions of such hated rivals as Boris Yeltsin and Vytautas Landsbergis. For a Gorbachev desiring to cling to power it made better sense to side with the hardliners rather than with the fifteen republics and the democrats. In making this decision, Gorbachev's monumental ego probably allowed him to believe that he could ultimately outwit and outmaneuver the hardliners, even while forming an alliance with them.

The Willing Captive

IN MY OPINION, Gorbachev's decision will turn out to be a definitive and irreversible one, drastically limiting his future freedom of action and perhaps making him superfluous. Once it became known, the domestic "correlation of forces" in the Soviet Union immediately changed dramatically, and a powerful upsurge of the hardline antireformers became noticeable as early as September of last year. This surge continued unabated until the time of the January 13 massacre in Vilnius, after which a brief pause set in. It has become apparent that, in forming an alliance with the hardliners, Gorbachev has to a considerable extent been taken captive by them.

In September 1990, a kind of "dress rehearsal" for the January coup appears to have occurred. Six regiments of airborne troops, including at least one that would subsequently be employed in Vilnius, mysteriously converged on Moscow. A rumor was spread that democrats were seeking to mount a coup in the capital. True to character, Boris Yeltsin responded vigorously to this looming threat—and was then taken out of action in a suspicious automobile accident in which he suffered a concussion. The reformist Ukrainian newspaper, *Komsomolskoe znamya*, noted that rumors that Yeltsin would be involved in a car crash began to circulate the day *before* the accident occurred.

During November and December, the resurgent communists, sensing their political clout growing day by day, stepped up the heat on a president who, in any case, was himself steadily moving in their direction. On November 13, a meeting was arranged between Gorbachev and eleven hundred hardline military officers who had been elected to federal and local legislatures. Adherents of the reformist "Shield" movement in the military were pointedly not invited. Gorbachev was reportedly jeered and heckled during this meeting, especially when he mentioned the need for military reform.

Four days later, on November 17, a forty-year-old air force engineer from Latvia, Colonel Viktor Alksnis, attracted world attention when, at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, he gave Gorbachev thirty days to turn the country away from reform or face removal from office. Alksnis is a leading spokesman for the anti-reform *Soyuz* (Union) faction in the Soviet Congress, which claims a quarter of that body's membership. Former Gorbachev economic adviser Nikolai Petrakov has reported that Alksnis' threat made a dramatic effect on the Soviet leader and that he began seriously to plan the imposition of "presidential rule" on the same day.

During December, the muscle-flexing of the old guard increased dramatically. In that month, *Soyuz* succeeded in achieving the removal of two Soviet ministers whose policies it despised. Moderate Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin was forced out of office and replaced by former KGB General Boris Pugo, with General Boris Gromov, the last military commander in Afghanistan, installed as his deputy. On December 20, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze—who had been excoriated by *Soyuz* for pursuing allegedly pro-American policies—announced his resignation from office and cited attacks from *Soyuz* as one of the factors that led him to make that decision.

Through December, KGB chief Kryuchkov and Defense Minister Yazov repeatedly warned that the unity of the Soviet Union was in grave danger. In the middle of the month, there came the "Letter of the 53" which politely but insistently urged Gor-

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bachev to effect a clampdown in the country. Among the signatories of the letter were the Soviet military chief of staff, the deputy defense minister, the commander of the Soviet navy, and the head of the Interior Ministry ground troops.

By the time of the attempted putsch in mid-January, Gorbachev found himself virtually alone amid a sea of hardliners and reactionaries. Speculation was rife in the Western press concerning the extent to which the Soviet president remained in control. But as leading democratic spokesman Yuri Afanasyev has commented, such speculation is essentially irrelevant: "Either Gorbachev will rule through the army and the KGB," he asserts, "or they will rule without him."[1] In having decisively sided with those forces, Gorbachev had committed himself to their agenda, though he could continue to finesse some issues on the margin.

The Old Tricks

WHEN IT occurred in the middle of January, the putsch proved to be a sobering lesson for a West mired in residual Gorbophilism and distracted by fast-moving events in the Persian Gulf. Chillingly, the attempted coup—whose aim was unquestionably to remove the democratically elected parliaments and the presidents of the three Baltic republics—recalled the classic *modus operandi* of Stalinism. Gorbachev and his generals reached deeply into a sordid bag of totalitarian tricks—front organizations, national salvation committees, suppression of the press, double speak (whereby repression becomes "salvation"), violent anti-American rhetoric—that had been used in the past to facilitate and justify the absorption of the Baltic region in 1940 and the installation of puppet regimes in Eastern Europe following World War II, as well as the subsequent invasions of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979.

The fact that the regime, after nearly six years of glasnost, was able to summon the will to attempt a classic communist putsch is proof that the totalitarian energies of the system are very much intact and that they have merely been lying dormant, concealed from all but the most perceptive observers. On "Bloody Sunday," January 13, elite KGB airborne troops sent in from outside the republic attacked the Vilnius radio and television station. According to a report subsequently issued by the Lithuanian procurator general, 14 were killed and 580 wounded. In the course of the attack, loudspeakers announced that power had passed into the hands of a mysterious "Lithuanian National Salvation Committee." "This is the power of working people," the loudspeakers trumpeted, "of workers, peasants, and servicemen. The power of people like you. . . . " In a well-coordinated effort, Soviet central television, the official Soviet news agency TASS, and *Pravda* all announced the assumption of power by the newly emerged salvation committee. In Latvia, where a similar attack on the republic's interior ministry by MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) special forces on January 20 had left four dead and eleven wounded, a "national salvation committee" also came forward to claim that it had taken power. This assertion was also supported by the regime-controlled media.

The regime's return to well-tried totalitarian practices was underlined by those shadowy front organizations which now claimed power in both Lithuania and Latvia. In Lithuania, the membership of the alleged ruling committee was kept a deep secret, purportedly out of fear of popular reprisals. One spokesman for the committee was identified—Juozas Jermalavicius, chief of the ideological department of the Moscow-loyal Lithuanian Communist Party—but he claimed not to know who the committee's other members were. He received documents from the committee, he explained, "by courier." Jermalavicius readily admitted that a majority of Lithuanians did not support the committee but maintained that they were

[1] *Los Angeles Times*, January 14, 1991.

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suffering from "national psychosis and euphoria."

The activities of the "Lithuanian National Salvation Committee" were also defended by such high luminaries as Defense Minister Yazov, Interior Minister Pugo, and President Gorbachev himself, though none of them claimed to know the names of the committee's members. This evil farce, which took one back to the Orwellian practices of high Stalinism, demonstrated the extent to which the regime had retrogressed both politically and morally. Latvia's version of a national salvation committee did announce the name of its main leader; not surprisingly, it turned out to be Alfred Rubiks, head of the Latvian Communist Party and a member of Gorbachev's Politburo.

There was a black humor in the attempts of Gorbachev and his generals to distance themselves from responsibility for the bloodshed. Lacking the discipline of Stalinism, the perpetrators could not keep their story straight. Colonel Alksnis of the *Soyuz* parliamentary faction, who admitted to having close ties to the Baltic salvation committees, gave a number of interviews to Soviet and Western newspapers in which he asserted that Gorbachev had been intimately involved in preparations for the putsch. Alksnis bitterly reproached Gorbachev for having failed to institute "presidential rule" in response to appeals from the newly formed salvation committees; that, Alksnis said, had been the plan. Gorbachev, significantly, has not attempted to refute these damaging claims. In a sense, indeed, it is irrelevant whether Gorbachev called the shots. For as former Gorbachev adviser Vyacheslav Dashichev aptly commented, what happened in Latvia and Lithuania was "a logical consequence of his policies."

Boris Pugo, the new head of the MVD, insistently disclaimed any knowledge of the actions of the Black Berets—elite MVD forces—who were systematically terrorizing Latvia, and whose maraudings later spread into Lithuania and Estonia. Another example of what Western journalists quickly dubbed the return of the Big Lie was the claim by Gorbachev, Pugo, and Yazov that the massacre in Lithuania on January 13 had resulted from a personal decision taken by the military commander of the Lithuanian garrison. This assertion was manifestly untrue. In fact, the assault was apparently conducted by the Vitebsk and Pskov airborne divisions of the KGB Border Troops, and the responsibility for the bloodshed lay therefore with the KGB and not the army. Significantly, in the language of the condemnation of Soviet repressive actions in the Baltic which Boris Yeltsin attempted to have passed by the Russian Supreme Soviet (he narrowly failed in the effort), KGB leader Kryuchkov and MVD head Pugo, and not the military leadership, were singled out for censure.

Gorbachev and his generals appear to have been surprised by the vigorous Western response to the attempted suppression of the Baltic states. The European Community decided to delay consideration of $1 billion in food aid and indicated that it might also reconsider a $540 million technical assistance program. The U.S. Congress sent a clear signal that it, too, would be receptive to a cut-off of all aid to the Soviet Union if the repression continued. Canada took action and suspended a $150 million line of credit to the USSR.

Gorbachev and his men may have miscalculated in believing that the West's preoccupation with the Persian Gulf conflict would provide the USSR with a useful cover, as the Suez crisis of 1956 helped partially to shield the regime from Western recriminations at the time of the invasion of Hungary. If this was the regime's calculation, it turned out to be wrong. Probably out of fear of losing Western credits and technical assistance, the regime quickly called off its assault on the Baltic and the defiant Lithuanian and Latvian parliaments were not stormed. The Lithuanian and Latvian "National Salvation Committees" returned to the swamp bogs whence they had emerged.

Since the subterfuge of employing Stalin-era front organizations appeared to have

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failed, and indeed to have been held up to ridicule both in the West and the Soviet republics, the regime may have decided to dispense with them in the future and to impose "presidential rule" directly, without the fig leaf of appeals from so-called national salvation committees. There are indications that such a course may already be underway: On January 25, it was announced that, beginning on the first of February, Soviet army troops would be joining the regular police in patrolling all major cities in the USSR, allegedly to combat crime. The following day, January 26, a decree was issued which extended to the KGB and the police the draconian right to search any apartment or building in the country (except foreign embassies) at any time, without a warrant and without the owner's permission. These decrees may be seen as tantamount to the beginning stages of "presidential rule."

What will be the future course of the crackdown? Prognostication is always risky, especially in the case of a seething multiethnic entity such as the Soviet Union. Given the enormous size of the USSR—one-sixth the land surface of the globe—it seems probable that a crackdown will be a protracted process, conducted in stages and with occasional pauses, such as the one that ensued after the bloodshed in Lithuania and Latvia. The regime may decide first to pacify the core Russian Republic and only then move on to the periphery. MVD chief Pugo has announced the removal of the police chief of Moscow, who was appointed by the democratically elected Moscow City Council. This may represent a first step toward dissolving the legitimate, elected bodies of the Russian Republic.

On the other hand, the regime may decide that it is necessary to take on the most threatening situation first and order the pacification of heavily armed and defiant Georgia, where even the local KGB has apparently sided with the republic against the center. Crushing Georgia's independence, probably at the cost of thousands of lives, would provide a stern warning to the remaining republics. There were indications that an assault on Georgia was being planned for the winter of 1990–91.

It is particularly difficult to predict the regime's future stance vis-à-vis the Baltic states. It is possible that they may be cut loose, as a bone thrown to the West and to its perceived obsession with these small republics. Conversely, the Baltic states might be suppressed, though perhaps at the end, rather than at the beginning, of the crackdown process.

Along with a rolling coup, there will almost certainly be a harsh reversal of the liberalization associated with glasnost. Soviet central television has already been largely pacified by the new head of *Gosteleradio*, Leonid Kravchenko, and the immensely popular television program *Vzglyad* (Viewpoint) has been suppressed for attempting to air a segment on Shevardnadze's resignation. The independent news agency, Interfax, has been expelled from its offices. A vigorous attempt is currently being made to remove a leading democrat, Igor Golembiovsky, from the post of first deputy editor of the major newspaper *Izvestia*; the paper's chief editor is loyal to the regime.

If present trends continue, 1991 will probably witness a purge of the remaining democratic press, such as the daily newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* and its weekly supplement, *Sobesednik*, the feisty *Moscow News*, and the weekly *Novoe Vremya*. Yeltsin's new radio station, Radio Russia, may well be forced off the air, and his plans to launch an RSFSR television station scuttled. There will likely be a return to Brezhnev-era "unanimity."

The Burnt-Out Star

USSR legislator Vitali Goldanski recently commented to David Remnick of the *Washington Post*: "We are watching the end of the Gorbachev thaw, and it is even more dramatic and terrible than the end of the reforms under Khrushchev." Goldanski's assessment strikes me as accurate. If the present rolling coup does succeed,

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it will almost certainly exceed the coercive results of the pacification campaign conducted by Brezhnev and his colleagues in 1965–66. Pro-democracy sentiment has gotten out of Gorbachev's control under perestroika, and republican legislatures, many of them enjoying strong support from their electorate, have been provided with popular legitimacy. To roll back such developments will require the brutal will of a totalitarian regime. It should not therefore come as a major surprise if in the comparatively near future we witness the arrest and trial of outspoken democrats like Boris Yeltsin, Gavriil Popov, and Sergei Stankevich, and the execution of former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin. The Gulag Archipelago could soon be back in business.

The crackdown, carried through with ruthlessness, cunning, and determination, could well succeed; and if it did, the consequences would be long lasting. Former Gorbachev adviser Nikolai Petrakov has warned that if power is successfully appropriated by the opponents of reform, the result will not be a temporary retreat but a "rout" lasting "not one year, and not five years."[2] Indeed, ten years of harsh dictatorship represent a feasible scenario. During such a period of intense repression, one likely aim of the regime would be the abolition of the fifteen Soviet republics and their replacement by forty to sixty meta-ethnic, American-style states. Such a program of ethnocide has been favored by important Gorbachevites for some time; I recall its being discussed by influential Soviet visitors to the Hoover Institution several years ago.[3]

There is, however, another scenario which has been recently discussed by Western analysts: the possibility that the army and the security forces will split, and that something like the "Romanian variant," which led to Ceausescu's removal and execution, could occur. This convulsive process, which might entail army regiments battling the security forces or even the security forces fighting among themselves, should certainly not be discounted. Sixty-four KGB officers from Sverdlovsk recently wrote Yeltsin a letter expressing their support for him and for democratization. On January 18, Yeltsin reported that a group of ten Soviet generals had approached him and stressed the need for the creation of a separate Russian army. Even parliamentarians from such relatively conservative areas as Byelorussia and Central Asia have expressed support for the Lithuanians in their struggle against the "center"; the issue of republican rights is seen as being at stake.

At the time of his dramatic resignation on December 20, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze prophesied that "the dictatorship will not succeed" and that "the future belongs to democracy and freedom." Nobel prize-winning poet Czeslaw Milosz concurred when he affirmed after the bloodshed in Lithuania that "naked force, after ideology disintegrates, is doomed to failure." Lithuania, he wrote, had been hit by "the thrashing tail of a wounded totalitarian beast."[4] It is to be hoped that the predictions of these two perceptive men come true and that the crackdown does indeed fail. At the same time, the cry of despair of a recent emigre reverberates in one's mind: "There is no hope. We are going to see a thousand-year socialist Reich."

What position should the West take toward the current Soviet crackdown? The first and essential conclusion is that the time to "help Gorby" has long passed. As the noted Soviet democrat Tatyana Zaslavskaya recently put it, Gorbachev "has exhausted his resources as a reformer. . . . He doesn't want those changes that are the logical extension of what he started."[5] Gavriil Popov, the reformist mayor of Moscow, expressed it more

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[2] *Trud*, December 27, 1990.

[3] While leading Soviet officials avoid discussing this controversial scheme in public, it has been aired in several major articles in the Soviet press. See, for example, the pieces by Vladimir Sokolov in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, August 2, 1989, and Vladimir Tarasov in *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, November 30, 1990.

[4] *New York Times*, January 15, 1991.

[5] *Wall Street Journal*, January 28, 1991.

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graphically: "There is an effect in astronomy known as the burnt-out star. After the star burns out, planets far away still receive its light and believe it is still there."[6] Gorbachev will not again emerge as a reformer, and the West must cease paying homage to the author of a bloody crackdown. Rather than "helping Gorby," it should be helping those republics committed to democracy and market reform in their severe struggle against a resurgent neo-totalitarian center.

The West understandably welcomed the reforms associated with glasnost and democratization, and it was proper to help an innovator perceived as moving his country in the direction of pluralism and the free market. It is just as logical that the West should penalize a dictator who has now turned his back on his own reforms. In words which Andrei Sakharov penned during the last year of his life:

> . . . the West should encourage the process of perestroika, cooperating with the USSR on disarmament and economic, scientific and cultural issues. But support should be given with "eyes wide open," not unconditionally. The opponents of perestroika should understand that their triumph, and a retreat from reform, would mean the immediate termination of Western assistance.[7]

The ranks of these opponents now include Gorbachev.

As the short-term prospects for democracy in the Soviet Union look grim, it is all the more important to stress that the historical tide is strongly in favor of liberalization. Given any serious measure of resolution on the part of the West, the chances that Milosz's "wounded totalitarian beast" can prevail are slight. Not only will its commitment to a command economy ensure a deepening impoverishment, but it will also be a totalitarianism built around an ideological void. On August 25, 1968, following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, seven brave dissidents conducted a sit-down demonstration on Execution Place in Red Square. Six of them were promptly arrested and a seventh was given a forensic-psychiatric examination and declared to be of unsound mind. On January 20, 1991, by contrast, a crowd of 100,000 marched to the Kremlin to protest the Baltic bloodletting, shouting "Dictatorship won't do!" The populace has unquestionably come a long way since 1968. It is the moral and creative forces which have been released in the Soviet Union over the past six years which represent the ultimate pledge of renewal and which must eventually emerge supreme.□

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[6] *Boston Globe*, January 30, 1991.

[7] *Moscow and Beyond, 1986–1989* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), p. 13.

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The Secret History of Perestroika

Frederick Kagan

WHEN MIKHAIL Gorbachev took power in 1985 almost no one in the West suspected that he would embark immediately upon a sweeping reform program, let alone that within three years that program would have developed a life of its own beyond his control. Subsequently, there have been various attempts to explain the appearance of perestroika—in terms of a worsening of the economic crisis, or Gorbachev's character and intentions, or the impact of the Reagan arms build-up—but they all see it as having appeared suddenly and essentially without antecedents. Indeed, the idea of the Soviet system having the capacity for radical self-reform—self-transformation even—was foreign to Western thinking, which tended to be very impressed by the system's capacity for, and will toward, self-perpetuation. It was commonly believed that only dissidents—who were, by definition, outside the system—advocated systemic reform of the Soviet Union.

Yet evidence is now accumulating that, independent of the dissidents, a group of party apparatchiks with powerful sponsorship began working to effect reforms from within the system over thirty years ago. The advent of glasnost and the publication of memoirs and interviews by the people who surround Gorbachev have made it clear that perestroika itself was merely the most dramatic expression of the long-standing desires of the intra-party reform group, or perestroikists, and that the chaos that has followed is, in part, their legacy.

The most important of the new documents are the memoirs of Fyodor Burlatsky, now editor of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, and a set of interviews given by Ivan Frolov, the editor-in-chief of *Pravda*, and Georgi Arbatov, head of the Institute of the United States and Canada. Their testimony shows that Gorbachev is in fact the heir of Yuri Andropov, former chairman of the KGB, general secretary of the CPSU, and leader of the intra-party reform movement. As Frolov told the Italian newspaper *La Republica* in April 1989:

> The section [of the Central Committee Secretariat for relations with fraternal socialist countries] headed by Andropov was [a] training school for future Gorbachevites, and it was Andropov himself, many years later, who introduced Gorbachev—newly arrived in Moscow from Stavropol—to some of those later to become his close aides, including Shakhnazarov, Bovin, and Arbatov.[1]

Burlatsky supplies a more detailed account of Andropov's long sponsorship of and participation in the intra-party reform movement.

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[1]Reported in FBIS-SOV–89–74: April 19, 1989, p. 83.

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Voices of Glasnost by Stephen Cohen and Katrina vanden Heuvel quotes Burlatsky as follows:

> Andropov was absolutely a reform-minded person. He was a man of the Twentieth Party Congress. I remember the first speech he gave after Khrushchev was removed. He said, "Now we shall move more firmly and consistently along the road charted by the Twentieth Congress." It turned out that he was wrong. But that was his hope. Even back in the mid–1960s Andropov expressed in his speeches and articles reformist ideas about modernizing the economy and changing the way the party and state functioned. He understood the need for major reforms as well as his group of young advisers, which I headed. But unlike us, he knew even then how hard it would be to carry out such reforms. When he finally became general secretary in 1982 it was too late. His health failed him. Even so, look at how much he began in that short time.[2]

Similarly glowing descriptions of Andropov and his importance in bringing about perestroika are provided elsewhere by Alexander Bovin, a political commentator for *Izvestia*, by Arbatov, who worked with Andropov in the Secretariat, and by Vladimir Kryuchkov, who assisted Andropov for twenty-nine years in various posts.[3]

These new documents—particularly Burlatsky's memoir, *After Stalin*, which appeared in 1988 in *Novy Mir*—make clear that perestroika is the fruit of a much older movement, born of the Khrushchev "thaw" in the late 1950s. Burlatsky reveals the whole story of the birth of the intra-party reform movement in the Soviet Union.

Leninist, Stalinist, Reformer

THE STORY really goes back much further than Andropov. It begins as early as 1881 when Otto Wille Kuusinen was born in a small village in the Autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland, then part of the Russian Empire. Kuusinen grew up during the reigns of Czars Alexander III and Nicholas II and passed the early part of his life in the peaceful, western land of Finland. He received an excellent education culminating in 1905 with a degree in history and philology from the University of Helsinki. He read Adam Smith and Rousseau, among other Western philosophers, but he became particularly enamored of Hegel. He saw in Marxism the appropriate development of Hegel and joined the Finnish Social Democratic Party, part of the All-Russian Communist Party, or Bolsheviks, in 1905 (some say 1904). By 1907 he headed *The Worker*, the Finnish Communist Party's official organ, and in 1908 he was elected to the Finnish Diet as a deputy for the Social Democrats.

In 1912 Kuusinen began what was to become a lifetime involvement with the international communist movement as a party delegate to the Socialist International Congress at Basel. He served as Lenin's man in Finland during the October Revolution and as People's Commissar for National Education in the Finnish Soviet Republic in January 1918. He helped found the Finnish Communist Party when Finland was separated from Russia. When this attempt to create a communist Finland proved abortive, Otto Wille Kuusinen became Otto Vilgelmovich Kuusinen and moved to the Soviet Union. He was present as a delegate and speaker at the founding congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1919, and by 1921 had become general secretary of that organization. He remained a leading figure in it until he himself signed the act dissolving that body in 1943.

Kuusinen served Stalin loyally throughout his reign, and Stalin rewarded him with security. Stalin hoped that Finland would one day fall into the hands of the Soviet Union, and Kuusinen, a respected member of

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[2] *Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1989), pp. 182–3.

[3] For Bovin see *Voices of Glasnost*, p. 214; for Arbatov see his interview in *Nedelya*, March 23, 1988, as reported in FBIS-SOV–88–73: April 15, 1988, p. 19; for Kryuchkov see FBIS-SOV–89–201: October 19, 1989, p. 45.

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the Finnish intelligentsia, was designated to be its head. When the Red Army attempted to impose communism on Finland by force in 1939, Stalin created an alternate communist government and named Kuusinen its president. The Finnish armies resisted bravely, however, and Stalin had to make do with a much smaller piece of Karelia, on which he established the Karelo-Finnish Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, with Kuusinen as its first president from 1940 until 1956.

The first important date in the history of perestroika is 1940. That year, Yuri Andropov was transferred to the Komsomol in the Karelo-Finnish Republic and met Kuusinen. The two men—later to become the most powerful progenitors of reform—had come together. Born in 1914 in what is now the Stavropol Krai, Andropov, unlike his Finnish mentor, did not receive formal higher education. Between 1930 and 1932 he served as a telegraph operator and boatman on the river Volga. In 1936 he graduated from the Rybinsk Water Transportation Technicum and went to work in the Komsomol as a secretary in the Yaroslavl Oblast. He rose rapidly through the ranks, benefiting in part from Stalin's purges, and became first secretary of the Komsomol in the Karelo-Finnish Republic. Andropov remained in this party apparatus, rising to become second secretary to Kuusinen in 1947.

Kuusinen's power enabled him to promote the careers of his protégés, especially Andropov. It was almost certainly Kuusinen who engineered Andropov's transfer in 1951 to the Central Committee Secretariat, presumably to serve under him in the International Department. In 1952, Kuusinen reached the pinnacle of his career when Stalin made him a full member of the Politburo. The triumph was short-lived, however, for when Stalin died in March 1953, Khrushchev and Malenkov purged this loyal servant of the dead tyrant from the Politburo and the Central Committee. Kuusinen's setback cast a shadow on the career of Andropov who was shunted off to Hungary in 1953, and soon became ambassador there.

Andropov's time in Hungary proved important for his career, because the Khrushchev leadership was satisfied with his performance during the crisis of 1956. Meanwhile, Kuusinen, though down in the Kremlin power game, was still important enough to help Khrushchev defeat the "anti-party" group in 1957, and Khrushchev rewarded him with his old post in the Secretariat and on the Politburo. Andropov was recalled from Hungary in the same year to work again under Kuusinen in the International Department of the Central Committee Secretariat.

The Rewriting Begins

THE NEXT critical year in the history of perestroika was 1958 when Kuusinen undertook official revision of the textbook, *Foundations of Marxism-Leninism*. Last produced under Stalin, it needed to be revised to reflect the principles of de-Stalinization announced by the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. Kuusinen was assigned a writers' collective to assist him, but chose to form a new one. Arbatov tells the story:

> The old [textbook], pardon me, was bullshit. Kuusinen was dissatisfied with the group of people assigned to work with him and decided to recruit his own people. He had noticed me at *New Times* and asked me to be one of his principle assistants. The book we produced—it came out in 1960—wasn't bad considering when it was written. In fact, there were many interesting things in it.[4]

Arbatov also describes the importance of this writers' collective:

> . . . I worked as leader of a group of advisers in the section [of the CPSU Central Committee] headed. . . by Andropov (by the way, I was introduced to him by Kuusinen, who knew him through his work in Karelia). I am much indebted to these people as teachers.[5]

[4] *Voices of Glasnost*, pp. 308–9.

[5] See footnote 3.

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Burlatsky was also an important part of the new writers' collective. He describes why Kuusinen rejected the group he was originally offered and chose his own:

> These were people not capable of approaching the problems deeply disturbing the development of the contemporary world in any sort of new, fresh, and out-of-the-ordinary way.[6]

And so the intra-party reform movement began, as Burlatsky and Arbatov joined the writers' collective for the textbook on Marxism-Leninism under Kuusinen's direction.

The textbook they produced in 1960 is relatively dry and, to a reader some thirty years later, not obviously reformist. Yet Burlatsky and Arbatov both believe that the intra-party reform movement finds its earliest roots in this work. Burlatsky's vivid description of his first meeting with Kuusinen helps explain why:

> [The first speaker is "Matkovskii," one of Kuusinen's aides, who brought Burlatsky to speak with the "old gentleman."]
>
> ". . . Otto Vilgelmovich will tell you [Burlatsky] about his thoughts on the writing of a chapter about the state for our textbook. It must be an entirely unusual chapter, perhaps the central chapter in the book. Well, I have fulfilled my mission and I will shut up."
>
> "Yes, yes, precisely, precisely," squeaked out the old gentleman, "I invited you to attempt. . . To attempt to approach this question anew. You have correctly stated it in the article: we must develop soviet democracy.[7] But what does this mean? What do you think?"
>
> I began to reiterate the bases of the position of my article. But Kuusinen stopped me with his glance.
>
> "Yes, yes, precisely. . . But what do you think, is it necessary for us to retain the dictatorship of the proletariat when we have already constructed socialist society? Or is the transition to some sort of new stage in the development of the state necessary?"
>
> This question, I must say, embarrassed me. Not because I had not thought about it, but because the answer to such a question, as they said in our editorial board, is fraught with unforeseen consequences. . . . But is it possible to speak about this to a person who represented the highest leadership of the country? It is true, by the very fact that he posed the question he gave a hint of the possibility of some sort of new judgement. . . . However I had not even thought out to its conclusion this thought under the attentive, searching look which he was calling for from me demanding not my formal, but my most sincere opinion.
>
> "If I were to speak openly, Otto Vilgelmovich, then it seems to me that the dictatorship of the proletariat has already played out its role in our country. It must be transformed. This process, strictly speaking, is already underway, and the task lies in consciously accelerating it."
>
> "Precisely," the shawl was moved, which, as I later understood, signified the utmost degree of excitement, "But this is the question: into what is it, this dictatorship, being transformed?. . . "
>
> "I think into a state of the whole people, into socialist democracy."
>
> "Yes, yes, precisely, but perhaps an all-national [*obshchenarodnoye*] state? Marx at some point criticized the slogan 'national state.' But this was a long time ago and, besides, applied to a different state entirely. Lassalle thought to replace the junkers' bourgeois power with a national state. This was an illusion. This was a deception. But we have an entirely different situation now, when the dictatorship of the proletariat has already played out its historical role."
>
> Here he made a pause, which lasted so long because I did not know if I was supposed to add something to his remarks. But he, evidently, was continuing to consider what he said, as if a word, having separated from him, took on some sort of independent meaning and sound, so that it was necessary to evaluate it anew.
>
> "So in this spirit am I supposed to write this chapter for the textbook?" I could not hold back.

[6] *Posle Stalina*, in *Novy Mir*, October 1988, p. 168.

[7] Burlatsky had published a much criticized article calling for the further development of "socialist" or "soviet" democracy.

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"Precisely, precisely in this spirit. It is necessary to ground it theoretically. It is necessary to quote from Lenin—for what and why the dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary—and to prove that now it has played out its role."

"Are we speaking only about theory, or also about practice?" I asked. "Do we have in mind introducing some sort of large-scale changes into the political system?"

"Yes, yes, precisely," answered Kuusinen. "In the beginning theory and then," here he made a motion with his hand toward somewhere in the distance, "and then even practice. . . . "[8]

As this account reveals, Kuusinen was clearly a man who believed that major systemic reforms were necessary in the Soviet state. Their necessity emerged not from practical but from ideological considerations. Thus, contrary to the dominant opinion today—that perestroika was begun in response to the dreadful performance of the Soviet economy—the movement has its roots in a belief that the system itself must be changed.

New Recruits

BURLATSKY does not tell us what Kuusinen's *obshchenarodnoye* state was to be like. His chapter quotes from Lenin to show the necessity of the dictatorship and describes how the conditions which created this necessity no longer exist. It then calls for the establishment of an *obshchenarodnoye* state, but goes no further and sheds no more light on the meaning of "reform." We are left with the impression of an imperfectly thought-out plan to move on to the next step in Marxism-Leninism—a step whose character no one, not even Marx or Lenin, had ever worked out.

Nor did Kuusinen himself, as far as we know, produce a detailed account of exactly what was wrong with the old system. He, too, proceeded from abstract principles to advocate another abstract principle—the *obshchenarodnoye* state. Khrushchev adopted this idea enthusiastically, and proclaimed in 1961 that it was time to end the dictatorship of the proletariat and bring about the *obshchenarodnoye* state. The concept Khrushchev described under this heading, however, is a meaningless philosophical abstraction of infinite plasticity and accompanied by careful qualifiers. Khrushchev was not a part of the intra-party reform movement; Kuusinen and Andropov, in fact, seem to have worked against him immediately prior to his downfall. His adoption of Kuusinen's term the year after the textbook came out indicates, however, the basic point of agreement of all reformers in the Soviet Union at the time: anti-Stalinism. Khrushchev snatched, as Kuusinen had, at the idea of "transcending" the developmental stage in which Stalin's Soviet Union had found itself—so as to do away with Stalin's Soviet Union. Even Brezhnev shared the fear of certain aspects of the Stalinist system, and acted on it by introducing the notion of "stability of party cadres." This anti-Stalinism, however, did not and could not serve by itself as the basis for a coherent reform platform. Besides, in the 1950s and 1960s the issue of anti-Stalinism was still very controversial, and neither Khrushchev nor the intra-party reform movement ventured to analyze past sins thoroughly or to determine what precisely they would replace the old system with.

The writers' collective broke up when the book was finished in 1960, but the intra-party reform movement continued. Kuusinen and Andropov remained in their places, and Andropov recruited Arbatov and Burlatsky to serve him in the Central Committee apparatus. He instructed Burlatsky to create a group of advisers for him in the International Department. Burlatsky recalls:

In 1960 [Andropov] asked me to come to work in his department as a consultant. To tell you the truth, I had real misgivings. I've never liked a regular office job, and I felt no urge to work in the party apparatus. But when Andropov assured me that my job would be to write theo-

[8] *Posle Stalina*, p. 170.

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retical articles, I accepted the position. Then he asked me to create a group of consultants under him, so I brought in a number of people who are now very prominent—Georgii Shakhnazarov, who's a personal aide to Gorbachev; Gennadii Gerasimov, who's the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry; Oleg Bogomolov, who is director of the Institute on the Economics of the World Socialist System; Georgii Arbatov and Alexandr Bovin. . . and others. It was a very unusual group of young party intellectuals, perhaps the first ever in the Central Committee.[9]

And so 1960 became the next pivotal year in the history of perestroika. By then most of the people who were to become key advisers to Gorbachev had been co-opted into the intra-party reform movement.

Just as the movement was a faction within the Communist Party—the dominant faction under Khrushchev and the minority faction under Brezhnev—so that movement itself rapidly developed two divergent views of reform. One was epitomized by Burlatsky, the other by Andropov himself. Burlatsky is a maverick. As he himself points out, he was not well suited to serve in the Soviet government, always much more radical than most of his colleagues, asserting that changes should be more rapid and more far-reaching. Andropov was quite different. He seems to have been something of a Burkean reformer, believing that changes are necessary but that they must be introduced slowly and carefully so as to avoid disruption and the chaos that is worse than any tyranny. "Do your measurements seven times," Andropov cautioned in 1983, "for you can only make one cut."[10]

The conflict between the two is illustrated by an anecdote Burlatsky relates. He had written an article about Yugoslavia's movement toward the free market in the 1960s. It was, by the standard of the times, radical, for it took a positive view of these new developments. Andropov sent Burlatsky a long note asking him to withhold the article. He argued that it was not time, that the article would be incendiary and counterproductive. Burlatsky yielded.

I did not agree with him, but I believed that, as distinguished from us, the young advisers coming from scientific or journalistic circles, [Andropov] understood politics as the art of the possible. He knew not only what it was necessary to do, but also how it may be achieved in concrete conditions. . . .[11]

The disagreement did not prevent Burlatsky from working with Andropov, but it points to a division within the intra-party reform movement that appears to have persisted through the years.

The Reformist Diaspora

IN THE EARLY 1960s the intra-party reform movement began to fall on hard times. In May 1964 Kuusinen died. His power could not have been great by the end, but his death removed Andropov's support in the Politburo. When Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964, all powerful support for reform of any kind disappeared. Andropov and his group of advisers found themselves in an exposed position. Burlatsky decided that he could not write the sort of hardline dogma that the Brezhnev-Kosygin government wanted and quit the Central Committee apparatus, much to Andropov's dismay. His place as head of the group of advisers was taken by Georgi Arbatov in 1965. Early in 1967, however, Arbatov accepted a position as head of the newly-formed Institute of the United States and Canada and he, too, left the group. Alexander Bovin replaced him. Bovin shares Burlatsky's enthusiasm for Andropov unreservedly.

Andropov was the first major political figure in my life—a kind of mentor. You see his picture on the shelf here in my office. Andropov was a born politician. . . but he was also an undogmatic, knowledgeable intellectual. We'd spend hours arguing about some

[9] *Voices of Glasnost*, p. 176.
[10] *New York Times*, August 16, 1983, p. A4.
[11] *Novy Mir*, October 1988, p. 183.

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problem, he with his coat off and his shirtsleeves rolled up. . . .[12]

Bovin's service under Andropov was to be short, however, for within a few months Andropov was transferred to the post of chairman of the KGB and separated from the advisory group. Burlatsky makes it very clear that Andropov's transfer was unwelcome.

> As for Andropov becoming head of the KGB in 1967, I'll tell you what really happened. He was forced to leave his post as a Central Committee Secretary and go to the KGB. Under Khrushchev, Andropov was being groomed to become the successor to Mikhail Suslov. . . . The first thing Suslov did after Khrushchev's ouster was to demand that Brezhnev remove Andropov as a Central Committee Secretary by sending him to the KGB. Suslov thought this would make it impossible for Andropov ever to return to leadership politics because after Stalin's death there was no precedent for a KGB chief becoming a Central Committee Secretary. Suslov wanted to end Andropov's political career. But Brezhnev was a man of grand compromises. He agreed to Suslov's demand, but at the same time promoted Andropov to candidate membership on the Politburo. Eventually, after Suslov's death in 1982, that made it possible for Andropov to return. It was always his dream while he was at the KGB. I remember when he left the Central Committee in 1967, he gathered his associates and pledged, "I will return to the Central Committee."[13]

It must have been an emotional scene. Burlatsky had gone into a self-imposed exile, Arbatov had left to head a new institute of dubious power, and Andropov pledged to his remaining allies that he would return to a position of power one day.

The interim was a bad time for the members of the advisory group. Burlatsky went to work for *Pravda* as a political commentator, but lost his job in 1967 for being too radical. He then went to work with Alexander Rumyantsev at the Institute for World Economics and International Relations. Rumyantsev was also a radical reformer and was trying to gather a group similar to Andropov's, but the Brezhnev mafia caught up with him, fired him, and broke up his group in 1972. Burlatsky went to head a section at the Institute for State and Law. In 1975 he became head of the Institute of Social Science and in 1976 vice president of the Soviet Political Science Association where he remained until 1982.

Alexander Bovin, a more flexible man than Burlatsky, fared better. He remained head of what had been Andropov's group of advisers until 1972, when he went to work for *Izvestia* as a political writer. He was probably transferred against his will. As he puts it today, "Sometimes the Communist Party feels that an individual ought to have a new assignment somewhere else. In my case, it was suggested to me that I ought to go to *Izvestia* as a political writer."[14] He remains there to this day.

Georgi Arbatov proved most successful of all. He still heads the USA-Canada Institute. This is technically under the control of the USSR Academy of Sciences, but the KGB relies heavily upon it for information and disinformation about the U.S. It is likely that Arbatov was able to maintain contacts with Andropov in a much more normal fashion than any of the other consultants during Andropov's years as head of the KGB.

The Long March

ANDROPOV'S own position was also difficult. Since Stalin's rise in the 1920s, the position of supreme power in the Soviet Union has been that of general secretary of the Central Committee (CC) of the CPSU. No one has ever held that position who did not rise through the ranks of the Secretariat of the CC CPSU. Andropov's transfer to a position outside of the Secretariat seemed an insurmountable obstacle to his progress to ultimate power. Also, no previous chairman of the KGB had ever risen to supreme power.

[12] *Voices of Glasnost*, p. 214.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 183.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 217.

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He could only hope to succeed by so pleasing those in power that they might call him back from exile. He could do this, however, only by pursuing policies which flatly contradicted his own sentiments. The evidence suggests that Andropov became a model "hardliner" for a time, not out of conviction but in order to attain power.

His willingness to compromise was tested almost immediately. In 1968 he helped brutally crush the Prague Spring, impressing his overlords with his ability and loyalty. He then turned on a dissident movement (the so-called "law-defending" movement), exaggerating its importance and twisting its meaning so that it appeared to aim at the overthrow of the Soviet state—which it did not.

In 1979 Andropov appears to have actively supported the invasion of Afghanistan. The KGB maintains a system of spies and informants within the armed forces for the purpose of monitoring unit morale, cohesiveness, and effectiveness, as well as combating any "spies" who may have crept into the ranks. The KGB also performs some of the intelligence assessment functions carried out in America by the CIA and the NSA. It is hard to imagine, therefore, that any Soviet general secretary would go to war without the active support of the chairman of the KGB. At the very least, he would surely replace a reluctant chairman in such a critical position. There is therefore good reason to believe that Andropov must have supported the invasion.

Part of the explanation for Andropov's contradictory behavior is sheer opportunism, which has characterized the whole Kuusinen-Andropov-Gorbachev reform movement. The earliest reformer, Kuusinen, not only survived Stalin's regime but managed to advance his political career during that reign of tyranny. What doing so involved is graphically illustrated by one episode.

In the 1930s, Kuusinen's wife, Aino, and his son were arrested and imprisoned by Stalin. One day while talking with Kuusinen, Stalin asked him why he did not try to get his son released. "Evidently there were serious reasons for his arrest," Kuusinen responded. "Stalin grinned and ordered the release of Kuusinen's son."[15] Kuusinen had not protested the imprisonment nor fought for the release of his wife and son. Such a struggle might have led to his joining them in prison to no effect. Despite this personal proof of Stalin's cruelty, however, the father of the intra-party reform movement continued to serve Stalin loyally for all the dictator's days.

Georgi Arbatov has displayed the same cool opportunism in his twenty-three year tenure as head of the USA-Canada Institute, through the stewardships of KGB heads Andropov, Fedorchuk, Chebrikov, and under the new chairman, Kryuchkov. He has collected a small group of friends at the institute, some of whom, like Nikolai Shmelyov, are now prominent reformers, but there is no indication that Arbatov has refused to take part in the institute's many shady functions.

Fyodor Burlatsky stands distinct from the other reformers. Always dubious about his role in government, he left as soon as he felt he could no longer produce what the government wanted. (And when he left rather than sacrifice his principles, Andropov was angry with him.)

Uninhibited opportunism of the sort demonstrated repeatedly by the intra-party reform group, however, would not have been possible if the group had possessed a clear idea of exactly where it was heading. Maneuverings of the sort used by Kuusinen, Andropov, Arbatov, and the others to maintain and improve their positions tell us more about the character of their thought than about the individuals themselves. If the perestroikists had had a concrete goal, a vision of the society they were striving to create, a principle on which to base their projected improvement of Soviet society, there would have come a point around which they were unwilling to maneuver, a principle which they could not sacrifice. Yet their maneuverings do not seem to have been in the least

[15]Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 547, note 39.

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limited by any concrete value, and their nebulous ideas allowed them to perform whatever contortions their survival seemed to require. Indeed, it might seem that the one goal that was clear in their minds was gaining power.

In 1982, all this paid off and Andropov returned to the CC Secretariat. Soon the death of Brezhnev offered him the chance for supreme power.

Andropov out-maneuvered Brezhnev's chosen successor, Konstantin Chernenko, and took the party leadership. He immediately offered Burlatsky the post of political observer for *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, the journal which he now edits. Andropov began a series of cautious reforms in an attempt to revitalize the now crippled Soviet economy. He continued the anti-corruption campaign he had begun as chairman of the KGB, and called for the increased application of new technology in industry, better use of robotics and applied chemistry, and a general speeding-up of the economic mechanism. Such calls were not new—Khrushchev first made them in the 1950s—but they were a sharp break from the conservative stagnation of the Brezhnev era. It is hard to know exactly where Andropov's reforms would have gone. His announcements were cautious and ambiguous, and his actions even more so. After a little more than a year he fell ill, never to recover.

Just as the debilitated Lenin had done, Andropov hid his illness as best he could and tried to rule from his sickbed. His strongest and most loyal ally at this time was Mikhail Gorbachev. They had met in the late 1970s, and Andropov had been deeply impressed by him. He told Arbatov, "There is a brilliant man working in Stavropol."[16] According to one of Gorbachev's biographers, "There can be no doubt that even before [Andropov's] brief time as General Secretary, Andropov was one of Gorbachev's patrons. . . . It seems likely. . . that in the prolonged and thorough preparations for his own accession, Andropov included Gorbachev in his plans as his principle organizer and 'crown prince.' "[17] During Andropov's final illness, Gorbachev served as his confidant and assistant, visiting his bedside daily.

The ailing Andropov, however, was not able to place his "brilliant man" on the throne; Brezhnev's heir, Chernenko, was selected instead. He represented the old guard which still had considerable influence throughout the country, though he himself was not expected to make any important policy decisions during his expected short tenure. It seems possible that Gorbachev and Andropov's other allies compromised with the Brezhnevites and agreed to place the aged Chernenko on the throne with the proviso that Gorbachev would be his successor. However that may be, Chernenko died in 1985 and Gorbachev came to power.

The Wages of Opportunism

THE PROXIMATE cause of the collapse of the Soviet economy was clear—the "stagnation" of the Brezhnev years had destroyed the incentive structure of Soviet society. Whereas Stalin had made the economy perform through fear of the blood purge and Khrushchev had achieved his goals through the administrative purge, Brezhnev introduced the concept of "stability of cadres," assuring all party apparatchiks that neither their lives nor their jobs were in danger, however incompetent they might be. The predictable result of over fifteen years of this policy was to set the Soviet economy on the downward spiral along which it continues to spin.

Gorbachev attempted to turn to the traditional Soviet remedy for a problem such as this—the purge. Unwilling to use physical force to achieve his aims, he sought to develop new allies—the intelligentsia and popular opinion—in his struggle against entrenched and inefficient party bureaucrats through the policy of glasnost. Gorbachev

[16] *Voices of Glasnost*, p. 312.

[17] Christian Schmidt-Hauer, *Gorbachev, The Path to Power* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1986), p. 64.

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expected that Soviet intellectuals, allowed to speak their minds for the first time in twenty years, would point out both the deficiencies in the system and those mid-level bureaucrats who were to blame for the deficiencies. Gorbachev could then remove these culprits through a combination of administrative fiat and the force of popular indignation.

The intellectuals did not disappoint. Slowly at first, then with increasing frequency and force, the Soviet intelligentsia began to speak out against the recalcitrant bureaucracy. Many of the members of the intra-party reform group were well prepared to assist in this endeavor. Ivan Frolov was made editor first of *Kommunist*, an important ideological journal, and then of *Pravda*, where he remains today. Burlatsky was appointed to the Soviet Union's Committee on Human Rights and, somewhat later, made editor of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, from whose tribune he continues to speak forcefully and frankly in defense of reform. Alexander Bovin remained in his post as political commentator for *Izvestia*, and both Georgi Arbatov and his son, Aleksei, have led the charge from the USA-Canada Institute.

The purge, however, did not occur. Partly because the bureaucracy was extremely well entrenched and partly because the intellectuals failed to direct enough of their energy to uprooting corruption, wasting it instead on petty squabbles, by 1988 it had become clear that Gorbachev had not succeeded in bending the party to his will. He embarked, therefore, upon a series of rapid, ad hoc attempts to induce change in the Soviet system. He tore down the old administrative structure, changed the number of ministries and their duties, and moved as many people as he could to positions from which they could less easily resist him. Only after Gorbachev began increasingly radical reforms did such moderate reformers as Viktor Chebrikov and Yegor Ligachev, who had supported the initial drive for perestroika, desert to join with the hardliners.

Two factors then conspired to create the chaos which now reigns in the Soviet Union. The first was that as hardline opposition grew, more and more radical reforms became necessary to oppose it, which drove more and more moderates out of the reform movement and into the hardline camp. The second was that by inviting the intelligentsia and popular opinion to play a novel role in government, Gorbachev empowered many groups he did not intend to empower. The rise of nationalist movements within the Soviet Empire, for example, though an obvious result of loosening the reins of a multinational state, came as a rude surprise to Gorbachev, who had other goals in mind when he created the preconditions for these movements. The overall consequence is that Soviet society has become highly polarized and *all* authority has been brought into question.

Gorbachev's failures—the inability to formulate even a systematic description of the ills of the Soviet system, let alone give an account of their causes; the absence of clearly formulated goals; the opportunism and evasiveness; the vacillation between timidity and recklessness—are not merely personal failings but reflect the character of the intra-party reform group from which he came. Indeed, the very choice of Gorbachev as the group's candidate for leadership establishes the connection between the two.

From Kuusinen's *obshchenarodnoye* state through Andropov's timid and uncertain tinkering with the system to Gorbachev's bold but poorly thought-out and increasingly frantic efforts, the need for reform has been clearly felt, but the program of reform has been practically non-existent. Gorbachev has shown that, intentionally or unintentionally, he can destroy the Soviet system comprehensively. It remains doubtful whether, given the intellectual barrenness of the intra-party reform group, he can replace what he has destroyed.□

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Getting to Market

Charles Wolf, Jr.

OVER THE PAST century, economists and other intellectuals have produced an enormous amount of literature on how to convert capitalist market economies into socialist centrally planned ones. Among the better known contributors to it are Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Oskar Lange, Abba Lerner, Joan Robinson, Nicholas Kaldor, Paul Sweezy, Wassily Leontief, and J.K. Galbraith; but there are many, many others.

It is ironic that the reverse problem of converting socialist economies into capitalist ones has received scant attention. The writings of Friedrich Hayek, Joseph Schumpeter, Milton Friedman, and P.T. Bauer are partial exceptions, but their focus has usually been elsewhere: namely, exposing the errors made by the advocates of socialism rather than charting the transformation. Hence, there is no general theory to draw on in addressing the crucial economic policy problem of the 1990s: how to transform command economies into market economies.

Recognition of the failures of command economies and the need to transform them is the reason the rhetoric of "markets" and "marketizing" is fashionable in the 1990s. But the unanimity and ubiquity with which markets are advocated—in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, and the Third World—obscure the profound divergences about what the terms mean and what they imply for transforming command economies into market-oriented ones. These divergences are latent in such frequently used oxymorons as "market socialism" (a term invented by Hungarian economist Janos Kornai, but subsequently rejected by him), "regulated socialist markets" (a term favored periodically by Gorbachev and certain "conservative" Soviet economists), and what some Chinese leaders envisage as a system between capitalism and socialism which they describe as "socialism with Chinese characteristics."

The underlying disagreements concern the details about transforming command systems into market systems. In this case, as in others, the details are crucial. They relate to whether markets should be "free" or "regulated," competitive or "social"; whether the market's intended reach should be extensive and predominant, or partial and limited; whether transformation should be rapid or gradual; whether the emergent system should be open to international competition, allowing free movement of capital and commodities, or protected from it; and finally, whether the scope of the government sector, at the end of the process, should be extensive, or narrowly circumscribed.

That these divergences are so deep is not surprising. The rhetoric of markets and mar-

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ketizing has been adopted by a remarkably diverse group of advocates, including Communists, ex-Communists, erstwhile central planners, Social Democrats, "liberals," and "radicals," and new and aspiring entrepreneurs in the transforming command economies. The advocates also include an ideologically mixed set of experts, advisers, consultants, and commentators in the West, including some—like Jacques Delors, secretary general of the European Community, and Jacques Attali, head of the new Bank for European Reconstruction and Development—who have until recently favored transformation of capitalist economies into socialist ones.

As a result of this diversity of views and viewers, the ensuing policy debate has often been muddled, the essentials of the transformation process frequently misunderstood, and its costs generally exaggerated. Indeed, transforming command economies into market ones, although a challenging problem, is more tractable, and the costs and "pain" of the transition should be considerably less than much of the debate has implied—provided the transformation is pursued comprehensively and aggressively.

Transformation as a Systems Problem

THE GENERIC problems of transformation are essentially the same whether the locale is the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, or any one of the centrally controlled economies of the Third World. To be sure, there are differences in historical circumstances, cultural affinities, institutional antecedents, and the existing physical, social, and political infrastructures. But the differences, while important, are incidental to an essentially similar task. Transformation depends on implementing simultaneously, or at least contemporaneously, a package of six closely linked and mutually supporting elements:

- Monetary reform to ensure control of the money supply and credit;
- Fiscal control to assure budgetary balance and to limit monetization of a budget deficit if one occurs;
- Price and wage deregulation to link prices and wages to costs and productivity, respectively;
- Privatization, legal protection of property rights, and the break-up of state monopolies to provide for competition as well as worker and management incentives that reflect changes in relative market prices;
- A social "safety net" to protect those who may become unemployed as transformation proceeds; and
- Currency convertibility to link the transforming economy to the world economy and to competition in international markets.

The first two elements (monetary reform and fiscal control) and the fifth (the social safety net) create the broad macroeconomic environment that enables the incentive mechanisms of the other three to move resources toward more efficient and growth-promoting uses. The government's role is both crucial and paradoxical: crucial in initiating all of the elements, yet paradoxical because the process that the government initiates is intended to diminish its ensuing role, displace its overextended functions, and reduce its size in favor of market mechanisms.

Each of the six elements is less likely to be effective without the reciprocal support provided by the others. Hence, attempts to reform non-market economies by piecemeal steps are more likely to founder than to succeed.

Consider, for example, the link between the first two elements. Monetary reform is necessary to limit growth of the money supply to a rate that accords with the growth of real output. It is also a necessary means of providing access to credit on the basis of borrowers' economic capabilities and their associated risks, rather than on the basis of their political connections or credentials. A competent entrepreneur with a good idea should be able to obtain credit not available to someone whose principal distinction is mem-

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bership in the governing political party or kinship to a government official.

Fiscal reform requires a budget process that constrains government expenditures to a level close to revenues, and precludes or limits "off-budget" subsidies and other transactions that would disrupt monetary discipline, as well as budgetary balance. Recourse to extra-budgetary subsidies to bail out deficit-ridden state enterprises has been standard procedure in the Soviet Union, China, and other command economies. Fiscal and monetary reform should preclude its recurrence. Usually, the complementarity between monetary and fiscal reform is facilitated by institutional separation between the finance ministry (or treasury), and the central bank or banking system.

IN TURN, the third element—deregulation of prices and wages—requires monetary and fiscal restraint if prices and wages are to be linked to real costs and productivity, while avoiding general inflation. Goods that are in short supply or are costly to produce should experience price increases relative to those that are more abundant and less costly. In turn, these price increases provide signals and incentives for increased and more efficient production. Similarly, wages paid for more productive labor and skills should be expected to rise relative to those that are less productive. The newly established parities among costs and prices should operate in the public sector as well as the private sector.

For deregulation of prices and wages to promote efficient use of resources, the fourth element—privatization, legal protection of property rights, and the break-up of state monopolies into competing entities—must be implemented at the same time. This requires an appropriate legal code and appropriate procedures for resolving disputes over property transactions and acquisitions, as well as litigation associated with prior ownership claims. It also requires a choice among several ways of changing from state ownership to private ownership—an issue about which there is considerable controversy among policy-makers, economists, lawyers, and financiers.

For example, equity shares in state enterprises can be issued to workers and management, while reserving some of the shares for local government and foreign investors (resale of the shares with or without a specified holding period can also be invoked). This method, favored by Paul Craig Roberts among others, has the advantage of simplicity and clarity; its putative disadvantage is the ostensible unfairness of a process in which some of the new shareholders would be losers while others would realize gains, due in both cases to the arbitrary circumstance of where they had been previously employed.

Another mode of privatization is to issue enterprise shares to the general public on a random basis rather than determining enterprise ownership on the basis of employment. In this case, everyone has an equal chance of picking a winner or loser among the hundreds or thousands of state enterprises that typically exist in command economies. Windfall gains that result from a random process are, it can be argued, more equitable than those that result from the accident of prior employment.

Perhaps the simplest method of privatization is to auction enterprises to the highest bidder—limiting or excluding participation by non-nationals. This method, favored by Czech economist (and Finance Minister) Vaclav Klaus and others, has sometimes been criticized on the grounds that those most likely to have ample funds to win the bidding are black marketeers and former Communist Party nomenklatura.

Still another method is to issue public vouchers representing potential claims on the shares of enterprises to be privatized. Foreign bankers or mutual fund managers would be invited to bid for the public vouchers. The public would then trade their vouchers in return for shares in the mutual funds that appealed to them. Variants of this method of privatization have been advanced by Jeffrey Sachs and several Polish economists.

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All these methods would result in the creation of a resale market for equities and mutual fund shares. Contrary to some of the debate on this issue, none of the methods requires that state enterprises be carefully evaluated *before* privatization is accomplished. Choosing among the alternative methods does require assessment of their respective advantages (for example, simplicity, comprehensibility, and speed), as well as their disadvantages (for example, distributional unfairness and inequity).

In any event, whichever method or methods of privatization are selected—and experimentation with several is advisable because none is clearly preferable to the others—their success remains linked to the other elements of the transformation package. Unless rewards are tied to asset ownership, and unless such rewards can be accumulated legally, incentives to innovate and to increase productivity will be impaired. Effective supply responses to price and wage deregulation depend on the incentives provided by private ownership and accumulation. Moreover, private ownership is essential for market forces to provide an effective "stick," as well as "carrot." If ownership is in the hands of the state, the discipline imposed by market competition will be attenuated, if not eliminated. When state enterprises are confronted by losses, they typically evade or ignore the threat of bankruptcy that private enterprises would face if confronted by similar losses.

It has sometimes been argued—by Gorbachev, Li Peng, and others both inside and outside the reforming command economies—that privatization is neither necessary nor effective. The argument is that a "culture of envy" has become strongly pervasive and ingrained, especially in the Soviet Union. Since privatization leads to wide gaps between rich and poor, it is said, privatization won't be tolerated, and won't be effective if it is imposed.

This "culture of envy" may be attributable to the long-standing, widespread experience in communist societies that sharp disparities in income and living standards are associated with political favoritism and corruption, rather than with private ownership, innovation, and productivity. Such resentment is not unknown in market economies. Nevertheless, in moving from command to market economies, private ownership plays a crucial role by providing the incentive structure required for markets to function efficiently. Avoiding socially unacceptable disparities in income distribution is a responsibility of public expenditure and tax policies, within the context of private ownership and market competition.

THE FIFTH element—establishment of a social security system as a "safety net"—is also essential for the transformation process to succeed. Without it, the process may create fear of widespread unemployment, social stress, and political instability, thereby seriously impeding the transition.

In most command economies, social protection—against illness, disability, age, and unemployment—has principally been the responsibility of state enterprises. As privatization proceeds, these responsibilities are likely to become one of the principal functions of government, financed by taxation and by payments levied on the insured. In the initial stage of transformation, taxation will probably have to bear most of the burden, although, for reasons to be discussed later, the real *incremental* burden imposed on the economy by the social safety net is likely to be less than is usually assumed.

The final element—currency convertibility—is essential to complete the transformation process by linking internal markets and their prices, wages, productivities, and technologies to those of international markets. This linkage provides the opportunity for comparative costs and comparative advantage to operate for the benefit of the transforming national economy. With a convertible currency, the transforming economy can determine those goods and services it can produce at relatively low cost compared to the costs of other countries, and

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Figure I
Components of Transformation of Command Economies



those it produces at relatively high cost. In response to convertibility, exports of the relatively low-cost goods will expand, as will imports of the relatively high-cost ones.

If the other elements of the package—especially monetary and fiscal discipline and market-determined prices—are effectively implemented, currency convertibility with a floating exchange rate can be embarked upon and sustained with minimal hard currency reserves, contrary to a frequent argument about the need for large reserves as a precondition for convertibility. Poland's establishment of a convertible zloty at the beginning of 1990 was accomplished notwithstanding the country's net foreign exchange indebtedness of over $50 billion. Although Poland received a foreign exchange stabilization loan of over $1 billion from the United States, none of it was drawn upon in the ensuing year. Instead, with its convertible currency system, Poland accumulated hard currency foreign exchange holdings of over $2 billion in 1990.

The interactions and mutually supporting relationships among the six elements of the transformation process are summarized in Figure 1. The lines indicate the contribution by one element to the effectiveness of another to which the arrowhead points. (For example, monetary and fiscal reform contribute to the effectiveness of price and wage deregulation.)

In sum, the process of transforming command, non-market economies to market ones is both better understood and more tractable than might be inferred from much of the public debate. Transformation is a systems process encompassing the interactive and mutually supporting elements described above. The debate which disputes this systems view argues that one or another of the six elements is not essential, or is of higher priority than other elements, or should precede the others.

For example, as noted earlier, Gorbachev, Li Peng, and some of their "conservative" advisers contend that private ownership of productive assets, including land, is not essential because its incentive effects can be obtained through leases administered by the state. In opposition to this view is the position of American banker Leif Olsen, Soviet economist Nikolai Shmelev, and others, who assert that private ownership in general and privatization of state enterprises in particular are the most fundamental ingredients of economic re-

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structuring. Along the same line, Canadian economist Reuven Brenner argues that reform of the legal system, to assure and protect property rights, is the essential precondition for any further reform efforts.

Another stance, associated with economists Gregory Grossman, Igor Birman, and Judy Shelton, emphasizes the primacy of monetary and fiscal reform and, in the Soviet case, substantial reduction of the existing monetary stock—the so-called "ruble overhang"—as an indispensable precondition for preventing the rampant inflation that would otherwise follow price deregulation and other reform measures.

Indeed, I have previously advanced some of these views myself. In earlier writings on the Soviet Union, I suggested that price and wage deregulation, combined with the mandatory conversion of large ruble holdings into long-term, non-tradable bonds to reduce the "ruble overhang," were necessary and sufficient measures for moving the Soviet economy toward marketization. And in subsequent work in China, I focused on the central importance of currency convertibility in achieving marketization. Now, it seems clear to me that trying to transform a command system into a market system without the synergy provided by all of these elements is like trying to swim with only one arm and leg. To attempt the transformation process on a piecemeal and gradual basis would be—to use another simile—like trying to shift a country's driving practices from the left side of the road to the right side in stages. The risk of serious accident is manifestly greater than if the change is accomplished all at once.

Some Recent Experiences

AMONG THE command economies that have attempted to transform themselves into market economies, Poland's efforts have been the most far-reaching. Yet these changes have been incomplete. On the positive side, Poland's budget deficit has been reduced from approximately 8 percent to about 1 percent of GNP. Monetary discipline has been encouraged by separating the central bank from the treasury. Ninety percent of all prices have been decontrolled and convertibility of the zloty has been maintained at a stable rate since January 1990, with exports increasing, hard currency imports declining, and a resulting trade surplus of over $2 billion.

Though these are significant accomplishments, they are not sufficient. To date, the Poles have only partially privatized, have deferred the break-up of state monopolies, and have delayed the wage reform necessary to create proper incentives for labor and management. Hence, supply responses and sectoral resource reallocations have been inhibited, and output, employment, and inflation have suffered. Still, if one were grading the various country efforts, Poland would receive a strong B.

By contrast, Gorbachev's faltering attempts to move toward a market economy and to combine the now-defunct Ryzhkov and Shatalin plans would barely rate a D. Thus far, controls remain on the prices of essential consumer goods and basic commodities like oil, gas, lumber, steel, and other key goods and services, such as transportation and communications. Although their "established" or official prices have been raised, the levels and parities among them are still determined by central planners. Gorbachev's recent edict, making fifty and one hundred ruble bills worthless, is a meager and ineffectual effort to reduce the money supply at the same time as other measures continue to add to it. Budgetary spending is supposed to be curtailed, yet subsidies for many enterprises have been maintained. State enterprises are supposed to resort increasingly to "self-financing" to meet their financial needs. In fact, credit extensions are still available to them if stringencies arise, especially if the enterprises can argue that financing is needed to fulfill state contracts. Although Gorbachev has said state enterprises will be privatized, no timetable or operational plan for doing so has been established. And to the extent that convertibility of the ruble is mentioned at all, the intention is that it will be done "gradual-

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ly," without any indication of when or how this will be accomplished. Even these limited measures have been set back as a result of recent increased reliance on KGB and military authority in running the economy.

China's economic restructuring efforts probably rank somewhere between Poland and the Soviet Union—perhaps warranting a grade of C, probably higher for its rural reform in the early 1980s, but lower for its meager reform efforts in the urban sector before and after the Tiananmen tragedy of June 1989. While there has been extensive price deregulation, wages remain largely fixed. Limited progress has been made in the direction of privatization, especially through joint ventures with foreign investors. State enterprises remain largely responsible for social security, thereby burdening them with high-cost obligations and impeding any prospective progress toward the break-up and privatization of these enterprises. Although there has been no explicit move toward convertibility, the establishment of fairly effective monetary and fiscal discipline has helped to create a situation in which the black market value of the yuan is only about 30 percent below the official rate.

Transitional Costs of Transformation

IT IS WIDELY assumed that the transitional costs of transforming command economies into market ones will be extremely high, as well as protracted. But this assessment is flawed by a fundamental measurement error. In fact, the costs and pain of the transition are likely to be less than is usually presumed if the process is pursued along the inclusive and expeditious lines described earlier.

The critical error arises from comparing *real* levels of output, employment, and prices in the post-transformation market environment with the *spurious* recorded levels of the prior command environment. For example, it has been said that Poland's GNP has declined by 16 percent, unemployment has risen to more than one million, and inflation has increased by 35 percent more than wages since Poland's "crash" economic reform program was initiated in January 1990. Similar or greater disruptions have been predicted by Gorbachev and others for the Soviet Union if "radical" restructuring were to proceed there. All these figures are wide of the mark.

In non-market systems, recorded output is typically and substantially overestimated due to several factors: first, underestimation of "hidden" inflation that takes the form of maintaining constant prices for products of decreasing quality, or establishing higher prices for products that are reclassified to reflect apparent, but not actual, increases in quality (in the Soviet Union, it has been estimated that the annual rate of inflation in recent years has probably been two or three times the previously acknowledged rate of about 2 percent); second, inclusion of physical, but valueless, output—for example, shoes that consumers won't buy and bulldozers that are too hazardous to use and too costly to fix; third, fraudulent reporting—the padding of reported data (*pripiski* in Russian) to meet or exceed established production norms; and fourth, data manipulation for internal or external propaganda purposes.

Such factors probably account for overestimates of at least 25 percent of recorded GNP in the Soviet Union and other non-market systems. It is significant that estimates of the size of the Soviet GNP relative to that of the United States by the CIA (as well as by the Soviet State Committee on Statistics) have placed the figure at about 50 percent, whereas estimates by other economists—Soviet, American, and European—have placed the figure between 14 and 30 percent.[1]

[1]See my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Estimating the Size and Growth of the Soviet Economy," July 16, 1990. See also Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr. (eds.), *The Impoverished Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1990); especially Chapter 1 by Anders Aslund, "How Small is Soviet National Income?".

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It is also significant that East Germany's per capita GNP in 1987 was estimated by both the CIA and the World Bank at about 88 percent of West Germany's, while more accurate estimates since reunification suggest a figure of less than 50 percent.

Similarly, comparisons between post- and pre-transformation unemployment are misleading because they are based on unemployment that is *visible* in the market economy, but do not allow for the make-work, featherbedding, and pay-without-product unemployment that is *hidden* in the non-market system. The employment realities are suggested by the familiar Soviet joke: "We pretend to work, and they pretend to pay us."

Finally, it is misleading to compare post-transformation "inflation" with pre-transformation's apparent price stability. Transformation to a market system converts inflation that has typically been "hidden" in the non-market system (but reflected in long and uncertain queues and declining product quality) into *visible* price increases in the market system.

When properly measured, the economic costs of the transition—in the accurate sense of opportunity costs—should be much less than suggested by most comments and estimates.

Why Is Transformation Faltering?

IF TRANSFORMATION to a market system is more tractable and the attendant costs are likely to be lower than is commonly assumed, why has progress been lacking (as in the Soviet Union), or very limited (as in China), or at best only modest (as in Poland)?

The question relates more to the politics than to the economics of transformation, more to the motivation and capacity of potential leadership and organizations than to understanding the policies necessary for moving forward. Part of the answer lies in the fact that there are deep underlying divergences among many of those who intone free market rhetoric and slogans, but are themselves decidedly ambivalent about the desirability of real system transformation. Hence, they seek reasons or excuses for delaying and temporizing, even while solemnly acknowledging the necessity for eventual systemic change. To profess a belief in free markets, together with an intention of maintaining the political dominance of the Communist Party, as does the leadership of both the Soviet Union and China, is oxymoronic.

Transforming command economies into market economies inevitably means winners and losers, although in the aggregate the economy will gain much more than it loses. In the Soviet Union, the issue is further complicated by the likelihood that the economy that gains will be that of the republics, while the loser will be that of the union. The practical problem created by impending transformation is that the reigning leadership in the ostensibly transforming economies—especially in the Soviet Union, China, Romania, Bulgaria—is very likely to be among the losers in terms of their power, privilege, and prestige. Hence, while they may use the rhetoric of markets and competition, their interests induce, if not compel, them to temporize, to delay, and perhaps to incapacitate the transformation process.□

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All Rise for Chairman Powell

Kurt M. Campbell

OPERATION DESERT Storm presented us with the opportunity to observe America's military establishment in serious action. And what we saw was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, playing a very public role as military strategist, presidential confidante, and administration spokesman. Not since Vietnam has a military matter so preoccupied the nation, and not since World War II has the counsel of a sole military man figured so prominently in the making of national policy. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—not the secretaries of state or defense—was the most important strategist and adviser to the president as Operation Desert Shield was transformed into Operation Desert Storm.

Yet the chairman's new power and access both precede and transcend the war in the Gulf. As a result of a quiet revolution in the way the American military establishment is organized and operates, the chairman and the military culture of "jointness" are now in ascendance. Although the rise of the chairman in the bureaucratic arena of Washington has been helped by international events, strong personal ties, and good professional preparation, it owes just as much to an obscure military reform act. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 stands as one of the most important, yet unheralded, military reforms in U.S. history.

Previous defense reforms sought primarily to centralize civilian authority in the Pentagon. The National Security Act of 1947, for example, mandated the creation of the civilian office of the secretary of defense. Goldwater-Nichols reversed this trend. By centralizing authority in the office of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Goldwater-Nichols has increased the prestige of the military and dramatically raised its profile. Even more important, the key provisions of the act created a single, dominant military voice and perspective. The entire new military command structure rests on the good judgement of one uniformed man: the chairman. Goldwater-Nichols has boldly enhanced the position of chairman in supreme military councils, making him, in the words of one account, "the most powerful peacetime military officer in American history."[1] And this power only grew during the early stages of the war in the Gulf.

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[1]Arthur T. Hadley, "In Command," *New York Times Magazine*, August 7, 1988, p. 21.

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Force and Fiasco

BEFORE 1986, the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the collegium of chiefs of staff of the Army and Air Force, the chief of naval operations, the commandant of the Marine Corps, and the chairman—were collectively charged with three crucial tasks: advising the president, commanding U.S. forces in the field, and conducting military planning. This, in theory, was the most powerful military forum in the government, where a single, coherent position could be reached by the senior servicemen after secret sessions in "the Tank" (the JCS staff and briefing room in the Pentagon). In practice, however, the process was often much less decisive and the product much less useful; indeed, at times both were dangerously lacking. Not only were the Joint Chiefs mandated to exercise their power by committee decision, but they also had to act by consensus, with all the chiefs in unanimous agreement.

The result was often the worst kind of military decision and advice. Dean Acheson once referred to formal JCS products as "oracular utterances," explaining that "since [the JCS] is a committee and its views are the result of formal papers prepared for it, it quite literally is like my favorite old lady who could not say what she thought until she heard what she said."[2] The conflicting interests and service rivalries made consensus-building inside the Tank difficult, and the result was that the JCS too often dispensed corporate advice that was broad and more or less useless to policy-makers. Important matters were invariably sent upward for decision by the secretary of defense.

Although there were clear deficiencies in military advice and strategic planning, the most appalling shortcomings of the old system lay elsewhere. Simply put, the Joint Chiefs were seriously handicapped when they had to plan military operations. The JCS was usefully configured only for planning huge, multiservice campaigns. If smaller operations were needed, tensions developed and troubles arose. As William J. Lynn and Barry R. Posen wrote in a review of JCS performance before the 1986 reform: "This multiplication of command, coordination, and logistical problems has contributed substantially to poor military performance."[3] These dangerous tendencies were on display in a series of subpar and small scale military misadventures. The failed 1980 Iranian hostage rescue operation, the invasion of Grenada, and the bombing of the Marine contingent at the Beirut airport all illustrated the problems of waging limited military operations under the old JCS system.

Such flaws were particularly—and painfully—apparent in the doomed staging of Desert One in Iran. There was no single commander of the overall rescue mission, but an Army commander for the ground portion of the mission, a Marine in charge of helicopter operations, and an Air Force commander also on the ground in Iran. Service personnel were required to perform unfamiliar missions (for example, Marine pilots flew long helicopter missions they were not trained for). Undoubtedly the most flagrant faults of all were at the top of the U.S. military command. Under the old JCS system, the chairman did not have a deputy and decisions became virtually impossible when he was away from the Pentagon. During a crucial period before the Iranian rescue attempt, there were seven different acting chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, each of whom had to be briefed and brought up to speed before he could make a decision. This confusion of command, combined with the service scramble for participation, were at the heart of the flaming disaster in the Iranian desert.

The U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983 was another fiasco of uncoordinated brute force. To subdue a small group of renegade Grenadian revolutionaries and Cuban construction engineers, the JCS sent several thousand Army and Marine troops onto the is-

[2] *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 243.

[3] "The Case for JCS Reform," *International Security* 10, no. 3 (Winter 1985/86): 69–97.

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land. This required dividing the tiny island into two theaters of operations, with the result that, because of equipment incompatibility, the Marine and Army commanders for the respective halves of the island were unable to communicate.

The bombing of the Marine peacekeeping force at the Beirut airport in 1983 that left 241 servicemen dead was probably made easier by the many layers of command that separated on-site officers and Washington. The Marine contingent was in theory commanded by an Army general in Italy through a number of admirals in Italy and deployed in the Mediterranean. As a result, the Marines did not receive timely advice about their changing and dangerous environment while they were camped in the middle of downtown Beirut.

The Purple Revolution

THESE MILITARY failures and shortcomings spurred sustained debate about military reform in the mid–1980s. A number of private studies and official hearings explored possible changes in the defense structure. The congressional Armed Services Committees addressed the issue in depth and the Reagan White House moved to establish a powerful bipartisan commission under former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard to investigate the problem. Even the serving chairman of the JCS at the time, General David Jones, went public with a recommendation for significant reforms throughout the entire military arena.

Though there was powerful opposition among all the service communities, particularly in the Navy and the Defense Department, to the whole concept of reform, most of the recommendations emerging from the various committees and reports called for strengthening the chairman. Critics responded that there was a working system of "military checks and balances," and that making the chairman first among equals would upset this delicate equilibrium and undermine consensus-building among the separate services. Officials at DOD argued, often passionately, that creating a powerful chairman would undermine civilian control at the Pentagon and weaken the secretary of defense. Caspar Weinberger testified against the proposed reforms. Nevertheless, following years of bitter skirmishing, the House and Senate scheduled a final round of hearings in 1986. After five months of testimony and staff research and with the joint sponsorship of Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols, they produced the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

The act effected a "purple revolution" at the pinnacle of American military power.[4] The JCS and the office of the chairman were fundamentally transformed. By strengthening the autonomy of the chairman, the Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to improve strategic planning, the conduct of U.S. military operations, and decisions about force posture and procurement. The legislation designates the chairman as "the principal military advisor to the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense," with the other service chiefs relegated to roles "as advisors." Although the chairman could now act alone, the act included provisions requiring that contrary views from the chiefs be passed along to civilian authorities accompanied by the chairman's recommendation. The law also gave the chairman a deputy, outranking the other members of the Joint Chiefs.

In addition, Goldwater-Nichols called for strengthening the JCS and putting its officers (who represent the services) directly under the chairman; adding muscle to the power of theater commanders and creating a direct line of command from them to the chairman; and an overhaul by the chairman of the military education system with a man-

[4]Purple is the proverbial color of Joint Staff personnel. In military parlance it connotes "jointness" as distinct from attachment and loyalty to one's original service. The JCS does not actually wear purple uniforms, and the origins of the term are vague.

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date to create more "jointness" in the ranks. Finally, and most controversially, Goldwater-Nichols provided the chairman with the power to completely redraft and redesign the global roles and missions of U.S. armed forces. This amounted to giving the chairman, at least in theory, the authority and mandate to reshape the responsibilities of U.S. forces as he saw fit.

Two Dynamic Men

THE FIRST thing done differently in the Tank after Goldwater-Nichols was that all the other chiefs rose from their seats when the chairman entered the room; previously the chairman and chiefs had either entered a room together or the other chiefs had remained seated when the chairman arrived. The innovation was symbolic of the fundamental changes taking place behind the tight security of the "Joint" corridors of the Pentagon. Before Goldwater-Nichols, the chairman commanded nothing, not even his junior aide-de-camp. Since the reform, the military chain of command has run from the secretary of defense through the chairman and then out to the commanders in the field, completely eliminating the other chiefs in the chain. Moreover, if the chairman feels the chain of command to the field is not working to his liking, he has the authority to change it. As one experienced Pentagon observer noted, "Having the authority to advise and *act* on things like the chain of command, well now that is real power."

Since 1986, there have been two pioneering and dynamic men in the position of chairman of the JCS: Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., and now General Colin L. Powell. The enhanced role of the chairman in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era has been explained by some primarily in terms of the powerful personalities of these two men. But their greater influence in Washington and the world owes more to institutional changes than to character, though those changes certainly give greater scope to decisive men. The changes prescribed by the 1986 reform act have led to the chairman's central role in drafting a range of military plans, policies, and operations. That higher profile has been apparent in numerous military matters that predate the Gulf War: for example, in the 1987 tanker escort operation in the troubled waters of the Persian Gulf; in the decision to invade Panama; in key conventional arms control initiatives in Europe; in developing new avenues of "military diplomacy" with the Soviet high command; in shaping operational military plans and procurement decisions. Now with his overseeing of Operations Desert Shield/Storm—the largest military campaign since the invasion of Normandy—the chairman is a national presence.

General Powell is emerging as the most important operational military strategist since the Vietnam War. He has made his mark in the Bush administration as an articulate advocate of the use of U.S. forces in a range of contingencies. As the *Economist* has noted, "Less than a year into his job, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' Colin Powell has deployed American troops six times—twice in Panama, once each in the Philippines, Liberia, El Salvador and now Saudi Arabia."[5] On the subject of the scale of force, the *Washington Post* observes, "The doctrine of invincible military force has been the main military principle underlying Operation Desert Shield. Powell is the new doctrine's intellectual godfather and Cheney its political champion, but President Bush has become their most ardent convert."[6] Powell has been known to remark that he wants the signpost "Superpower Lives Here" to hang in front of the proverbial American house. By no coincidence, President Bush singled out only General Powell among his inner circle of advisers for praise in his initial briefing about the Gulf Crisis to a joint session of Congress.

Crowe and Powell have each helped define and shape the new powers of the chairman. Crowe is perhaps most clearly identified with opening new avenues of com-

[5] *Economist*, September 1, 1990, p. 26.
[6] *Washington Post*, December 2, 1990, p. A1.

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munication between the American and Soviet military establishments. He fought many bureaucratic battles with civilian administration officials who unsuccessfully resisted such moves. He is also remembered for building the institution and personnel of the JCS. Admiral Crowe's tenure as chairman straddled the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and his last term was something of a laboratory for military reform. Although Crowe helped revolutionize the JCS, he was in some ways still linked to an earlier period; General Powell arrived as chairman unencumbered by the past and with a mandate to take the office to a new and higher level.

Beyond the obvious differences between the two men—one is an Army officer from the Bronx and the other a naval officer from the prairies of Oklahoma—there are suggestive similarities. Both have had extensive Washington experience in key Pentagon assignments—a fact that figures prominently in accounts of their performance by both supporters and detractors. Before serving with distinction as President Reagan's last national security adviser, General Powell spent almost half his time in uniform in numerous Washington posts. Similarly, combat assignments in Vietnam significantly shaped the political and military perspectives of both men. What they judge to be the lessons of Vietnam are a critical feature in their respective thinking and public utterances.

Perhaps surprisingly, Crowe and Powell took very different positions on how to proceed in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the national debate about war versus continued sanctions was largely defined by the testimony and statements of the two chairmen, one serving on active duty and the other retired. Admiral Crowe testified before Congress in November and urged the Bush administration to postpone military action against Iraq and give economic sanctions a chance to succeed. Crowe opined that "if in fact the sanctions will work in 12 to 18 months instead of six months, the trade-off of avoiding war with its attendant sacrifices and uncertainties would, in my view, be worth it." He counseled caution and patience in the Gulf, stating that it would be a tragedy if a "tin-pot tyrant and dictator" were able to out-wait the world's most powerful democracy. If force was ultimately necessary, Crowe also strongly favored a powerful air campaign before ground troops were committed to combat on Iraqi or Kuwaiti territory. The admiral has also voiced concern over the American disenchantment with prolonged conflicts arising from public fears about the possibility of "another Vietnam."

On the other side of the issue, General Powell has struck many as considerably more hawkish. His support for a policy of overwhelming force is a direct consequence of his experience of the indecisive and incremental military operations of Vietnam. In December, Powell gave congressional testimony in favor of having the capability in theater for a massive combined military campaign to liberate Kuwait and defeat Iraq. This would provide commanders with options, such as waging a concerted air attack, an armored tank and infantry strike-up through the desert outposts in Kuwait and southern Iraq, naval bombardment from ship to shore, and an amphibious landing. He thus articulated a major role for each of the services in case of war with Iraq. Before the onset of hostilities, Powell weighed in heavily for a massive and devastating use of force, and subsequently for no "pause" in operations which might provide Saddam Hussein with an opening to regroup his forces.

NEARLY ALL the senior military elite in the armed services today were initiated during tours of duty in Vietnam, and Crowe and Powell are no exception. What they believe to be the enduring "lessons" for the military in the Vietnam War remain in their collective consciousness. Many share the idea that there should be no commitment of U.S. forces without strong public support and that we should bring to bear overwhelming force in the event of war. Most also share a deep dislike of the press, and most important, a profound distrust of

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politicians who make the decisions about when, where, and how to wield force. As the senior representative of the military and a close adviser to the president, the chairman is now placed in the delicate position of straddling two bureaucratic worlds: the uniformed and the civilian.

General Powell, like Admiral Crowe before him, has been criticized (and in some quarters, commended) for being a politician in uniform. Some critics are concerned that without extensive combat experience or sea duty, a chairman will have difficulty gaining the confidence of his fellow senior officers and providing valuable military advice during a crisis. General Marshall's record as a shrewd and successful strategist in World War II who during a long and distinguished career never heard a shot fired in anger would tend to belie this point. Another, more troubling concern of some military officers is the possibility that the chairman will allow undue political considerations to color his military advice to senior civilian leaders. To date, Crowe and Powell have both worked to promote a distinct chairman's perspective of the national interest that is neither a hostage to the president nor a slave to service parochialism.

Apart from their pointed differences over the Gulf, both men have been alike in striking into uncharted political-military waters. As already noted, Admiral Crowe pioneered military-to-military contacts with the Soviet Union, often over the objections of other administration officials. General Powell has played a crucial role in reshaping U.S. military commitments to NATO and in developing fledgling contacts with the reformed national militaries of Eastern Europe. Most important, each has had a direct hand in planning military operations. Admiral Crowe is credited with devising and designing the naval escort mission in the Persian Gulf in 1987. General Powell has been intimately involved in the shaping of campaign plans in both Panama and the Persian Gulf.

The first two chairmen of the JCS since Goldwater-Nichols have redefined the position in ways that will probably be apparent only in retrospect. Indeed, unlike other government reforms, the 1986 act has set in motion new organizational lines of command and communication that are still evolving. The course of that evolution will be determined to a considerable extent by the U.S victory in the Gulf.

Goldwater-Nichols and the Gulf

THE FIRST—and ultimate—test of reform is whether what was legislated has helped national leaders to plan, prepare, and execute military operations better in crisis and war. The Gulf War provided the first real test of the quality of military advice and operations under the system that Goldwater-Nichols established.

The early results are generally positive. First, the delineation and shortening of the chain of command from Washington to the various theaters of operations mandated by Goldwater-Nichols appeared to be in place. Indeed, the line of command from the chairman to the theater commander (the CinC) for operation Desert Storm (General Schwarzkopf) and to respective ground, sea, and air commanders was short and direct. Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf communicated directly with one another, sometimes on an hourly basis. Orders flowed smoothly from the president through the secretary of defense to the chairman and then directly out to the field, bypassing any intermediate layers.

The reform has also dramatically increased the power and authority of the CinC. He is now directly responsible for implementing and directing the campaign plan, with little or no interference from military or civilian superiors in Washington. We saw this very clearly in Saudi Arabia, where General Schwarzkopf was primarily responsible for running the war effort in the Gulf. (General Thurman was delegated the same authority over operational matters in Panama.) This is quite a change from the practice during the Vietnam War when President Johnson pored over bombing targets in the White House basement.

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As a third consequence of Goldwater-Nichols, the Joint Staff, specifically the Operations Directorate working with the chairman and the CinC, was primarily responsible for drafting the order of battle in Desert Storm (as it was in Just Cause). Traditionally, the service staffs were principally involved in crafting operational plans. Now much of that responsibility has shifted under Goldwater-Nichols to the chairman and his staff in the joint arena.

Not all the results of this first major test of the revised command system have been favorable, however. There is the delicate and controversial matter of readiness. In mid-December last year, Lt. General Calvin H. Waller, the deputy U.S. commander in Saudi Arabia, voiced serious public reservations about whether the troops, and specifically the Army, would be ready for operations by the January 15 UN deadline. General Waller's remarks were widely criticized by the civilian leadership and downplayed by General Powell. Still, many in the mid-level military leadership were grateful that a senior officer spoke out about being rushed to war without the proper preparation. Waller's remarks raise the question of whether the administration's timetable for the onset of war was driven more by political considerations than by the best interest of the U.S. military. Indeed, significant numbers of Army personnel and equipment continued to pour into the theater in the weeks following the January 16 decision to strike Iraq.

The logistics and transportation challenges posed by Operation Desert Storm have also exposed some shortcomings in the military delivery system. Fast Navy transport ships were few and performed poorly. One transport vessel hauling an important cargo of tanks had to be towed back to the U.S. after engine failure. Further, the Army logistics system, which provides food and water for troops and servicing and support for mechanized equipment, was under strain. The chairman and the JCS must in future see that low-profile but essential service missions (logistics and transport) as well as military hardware (Air Force A–10 tank killers, Navy fast-delivery ships, and Army transport equipment) receive enough support.

The JCS Into the Future

IT IS NOT enough for a reform like the Goldwater-Nichols Act to enable military authorities to plan and execute operations more effectively. A second and subtler criterion of success has to do with the ways reform effects the delicate balance of civil-military relations in American society. The early results of Goldwater-Nichols suggest some potentially important developments on this latter front.

The present prominence of General Powell and the past performance of Admiral Crowe suggest that the primary purpose of the reform's architects—to strengthen the power of the chairman—has been achieved. Even the drafters of Goldwater-Nichols may not have dreamed that their reform would so quickly catapult the office of the chairman to an entirely new level. In the past, the position of chairman was usually the quiet end to a distinguished military career and a prelude to retirement and a book of memoirs. A president's appointment of chairman must now be seen as one of his most important acts, rivaling his choices for secretaries of state and defense and national security adviser.

Indeed, the qualities and criteria for a successful chairman require him to do far more than merely offer committee-driven military advice. Demands which are as much political as military, coupled with the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, have ushered in a new breed of military leader at the top of the uniformed services: the soldier-statesman. (It may be significant, in this respect, that Powell went from being national security adviser under Reagan to chairman of the Joint Chiefs under Bush). The position is even being seen now as a possible step to national political office for its occupant. In some ways, the chairman's increased power brings to mind the postwar generation of

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leaders like Eisenhower and Marshall, men whose government service blurred the distinction between soldier and statesman, officer and civilian. How much of the recent shift in power is due to the Goldwater-Nichols reform and how much to the qualities of General Powell is a matter on which senior officers and informed observers are divided. But even if Powell's prominence is as much a result of his character as of his office, his pioneering performance cannot but help to raise the status of his successors. In all likelihood the next president will rely on his chairman as President Bush relies currently on General Powell.

Critics of Goldwater-Nichols have argued that the new situation renders the secretary of defense "a prisoner in the Pentagon" to the power of the chairman, but it is more accurate to say that there is now a necessary partnership between the two at the top in the Pentagon. Neither can operate effectively without the active support and confidence of the other. In this respect, there has been a fusion, or perhaps a symbiosis, of civil-military authority.

Until now the administration has been fortunate to have had good "legislated partnerships" between Carlucci and Crowe and subsequently between Cheney and Powell. A breakdown in this mutually dependent (or perhaps mutually deterrent) relationship would have profoundly negative consequences for government operations. This factor will need to figure prominently in presidential appointments for both key posts.

AN IMPORTANT question remains, however, as to whether the president and his senior civilian advisers hear enough military advice that runs *counter* to the chairman's counsel. In creating a single, powerful military man, the Goldwater-Nichols architects have risked creating a single, dominant military opinion. The chairman is relied on heavily—indeed, some have argued too heavily—for military advice by both the president and the secretary of defense. As well, the particular military advice being offered—the Powell-driven, post-Vietnam doctrine of overwhelming force, rehearsed in Panama and then practiced fully formed in the Gulf—has come at a time when military experience and knowledge is an increasingly rare commodity among senior State Department officials and key National Security staffers at the White House. Although there is no reason to doubt JCS representatives when they state emphatically on the record that General Powell conveys all shades of military opinion to civilian authorities, there is still a concern that the current structure creates the preconditions for some future chairman to dominate and shut out his uniformed colleagues.

The rise in the stature and strength of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs will have subtler but equally important implications for government and inter-service operations. In the period ahead, there will be a sharp reduction in troop numbers stationed in overseas bases, beyond the already significant withdrawal of U.S. troops and tanks from Europe. Defense budgets will shrink, perhaps precipitously. There remain clear shortcomings in the current system of procurement and strategic planning that will continue to hamper America's capacity to field and project force. Moreover, the past forty-five years have been marked by a stable and single overriding military threat in the form of the Soviet Union.

Between the Soviets' evident collapse and the onset of the Gulf Crisis, there was a brief, probably naive, national hope that the application of force would now become obsolete. With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the multilateral war that followed, serious talk of forgoing the use of force has disappeared along with dreams of a "peace dividend." In place of a clear and present danger (the Soviet Union) and a primary prospective theater of operations (Europe), the United States now faces a much messier and more diverse world of indirect threats, complex strategic realities, and uncertain theaters of military operations. The current watchwords in the defense community are "uncertainty" and "flexibility."

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The new international order—or to be more accurate, reordering—will require giant leaps in military thinking, training, planning, and procurement. Discussions about creating a "strategic reserve" of U.S.-based forces ready for Gulf-like contingencies, already at an advanced stage, are but one manifestation of the changes in progress.

The demands to reduce the military and reorient its focus will ultimately involve tremendous inter-service competition for missions. For example, there is already jousting between the Army and Marines about which service should be principally responsible for conducting Third World operations. Each of the services will also have to make difficult choices concerning procurement and cutting forces as defense allocations decline. Some military systems, such as the B–2 bomber, will probably not survive the scrutiny of a post-Cold War reassessment. Other capabilities, such as fast Navy cargo ships, have not been a priority with Navy planners but are clearly required but were largely unavailable for Desert Storm. There are also clear indications that the service truce that has held for the most part in the 1980s will be severely strained in the 1990s as the service communities struggle to redefine and extend military missions. There is even a possibility that the delicate domestic treaty between the services that established and defined roles and missions—the 1948 Key West Agreement—will be renegotiated. Under the stewardship of Crowe and Powell, the plague of debilitating service rivalries has been reduced and restrained. It remains to be seen whether the chairman can remain "an honest broker in purple uniform," in the words of one senior military officer, remaining above the fray of interservice competition during the coming fiscal cutback.

Changes may also come in the way senior military officers are selected and promoted. In the past, all the services favored the officer who had made his mark in the field or at sea, rather than the one who had labored in "political" jobs in Washington or "purple" jobs with other services in the Pentagon. The sudden dismissal of the chief of the Air Force, General Michael Dugan, after some unfortunate remarks to the press, reinforces a growing perception among the military that political skills beyond those necessary for promotion in the narrow service community are now essential for survival in highly visible assignments. As this perception becomes general it is likely that terms like "diplomats in uniform" and "soldier statesmen" will lose the derisive edge they have often carried in the past. The enhanced authority of the Joint Staff will make service as a "purple suiter" more important as a prerequisite for choice assignments, including the office of chairman itself. Indeed, Admiral Crowe has on occasion said that "it would be a disaster if the president chose someone other than a true 'purple suiter' to be chairman." The unintended message that the success of Crowe and Powell sends to war-fighting officers in combat assignments is that Washington experience, "joint" assignments, and higher education are all essential for promotion in today's military. Will this realization start a stampede of the most ambitious officers from the field to Washington, in search of staff jobs with political connections?

Secretary of State James Baker has frequently referred to the Gulf War as the first crisis of the post-Cold War world and as a "defining event" for the United States. The crisis was also a "defining event" for the chairman. Even if the war in the Persian Gulf turns out to be an isolated and anomalous case of the massive use of force, the Goldwater-Nichols reform will be judged largely through the prism of U.S. victory in the Persian Gulf.

But success in the Gulf War does not put all questions about the Goldwater-Nichols reform to rest. The jury is still out concerning the ultimate effectiveness of the new system. Only the experience of several chairmen, under several administrations, can show whether there is any basis for concerns about the potential for damaging rivalry between the chairman of the JCS and the secretary of defense, or fears that the chairman will use

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his new power to insulate the president from dissenting military advice. Time will show whether the new system can moderate interservice rivalries in a period of budgetary decline, and whether the increased importance of Joint Staff officers or "purple suiters" will (as some fear) encourage the promotion of politically adroit careerists over first-rate soldiers. Although the results to date of the new military order's baptism by fire in the Persian Gulf have been encouraging, it remains to be seen whether the promise of "the purple revolution" in American military command will be fulfilled.□

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A Primer for Conservatives

Burton Yale Pines

THE ERUPTION of hot war in the Persian Gulf has imposed a ceasefire in the debate raging among American conservatives over the direction of American foreign policy. Muted by the war, understandably and appropriately, are the barbs and criticisms with which this debate was being conducted. Muted they are likely to remain until the war ends.

When it does, the debate will resume—probably with its ferocity increased by the sacrifices demanded by the war. For whatever else will have been accomplished in the Gulf and for however military power will have been vindicated and the bravery of American forces confirmed, the war almost certainly will fail to answer the monumental questions that ignited the conservatives' foreign policy debate. It will fail to do so because the policy that has led America into war, however sound, is a policy conducted ad hoc. It has lacked from the start a clear or convincing statement of what part the rapid and massive American response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait plays in America's emerging role in the post-Cold War world.

Ad hoc too have been other Bush administration foreign policy actions. It scrambled Air Force jets in the Philippines to save Cory Aquino, but sat on its hands during a coup in Liberia, long described as America's oldest and best friend in Africa. The White House lauded what it calls a "new world order" but has made no attempt to define it.

The problem with ad hoc foreign policy is not that it guarantees unwise actions. Some administration ad hoc moves have been correct—drawing the line against Saddam Hussein's aggression, for example. The problem is that, without the guidance of underlying principles, foreign policy becomes a lottery, depending for its success on lucky gut instincts, lucky timing, and other good fortune—particularly the good fortune of public support.

This has not been changed by the war in the Gulf, for despite the heroism and sacrifices and fine generalship, the war offers little guidance for future American responses to international trouble. To the contrary, the Bush administration's Gulf actions may set the dangerous precedents of requiring United Nations approval for American actions abroad and of America continuing to bear most of the burden in lives and money for actions that mainly benefit nations (like Japan and those in Western Europe) that can well afford to contribute more.

Instead of operating ad hoc, George Bush must construct a coherent foreign policy that wins American public support. It must state what the United States seeks and needs from the world and then explain what actions are required for this.

Public support for foreign policy is not

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something mobilized afresh for each foreign adventure, as it has been for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Rather, public support is a reservoir from which Washington can draw. It is created by coaxing and nurturing public understanding of American foreign policy's broad outlines and goals. By 1947, for example, Americans understood that Moscow had become a global threat which the United States had to counter. Americans then were ready to back Truman's unprecedented emergency aid to Greece and Turkey and America's unprecedented membership in NATO. The same understanding allowed the United States throughout the Cold War to aid scores of nations, fight in Korea and Vietnam, and help Third World anticommunist freedom fighters.

Successive administrations engaged the nation abroad in a way that was understood by the public as being, by and large, a piece of a broad, coherent policy of waging the Cold War. To simplify greatly, this policy assumed that what hurt Moscow was good; what helped Moscow was bad; power vacuums were dangerous because Moscow would fill them; and unattached Third World countries had to be wooed (with aid or weapons or both) before they were lured into the Moscow camp.

This Cold War, at least as it was known for four decades, is now over, although Washington-Moscow tensions remain and can grow. What America needs now, and what the Bush administration has yet to offer, is a new, coherent American foreign policy, capable of winning long-term popular backing. Such a policy is possible and can be constructed from ten conservative principles.

Principle 1. *Foreign policy is domestic policy.*

To paraphrase the classics loosely, foreign policy is the conduct of domestic policy by other means. This does not mean that domestic politics should drive foreign policy. It does mean that the sole reason for expending American lives and other resources in dealing with nations is to secure and improve the lives of the American people. As such, foreign policy is not an end in itself. Nor is it an excuse for crusades or for missionary expeditions, as virtuous as conducting these may make some Americans feel. Nor is it the fulfillment of a process. As John Foster Dulles advised in 1958, "There is nothing mysterious about the goals of United States foreign policy. It seeks to defend and advance the interests of the United States." These interests are advanced only by measures creating a global environment in which Americans gain the greatest possible degree of liberty, freedom, and opportunity. Policies failing to serve these purposes are not in the national interest.

Principle 2. *Morality should not drive foreign policy.*

Advancing human rights or advancing democracy should not, by themselves, drive foreign policy unless these actions directly protect Americans from threats or directly advance American interests. If they do not, it is unjust for Washington to tax Americans or put American lives at risk in pursuit of such policies. Typically, of course, human rights and morality are advanced around the globe as the happy by-product of specific American policies. But advancing human rights and morality should not be the reason for the policy. At the times when they have been, they have fathered disaster. Jimmy Carter's disregard for American interests in Iran and his obsession with human rights, for instance, undercut the Shah and opened the door for the repressive ayatollahs. Similar Carter policies allowed the Sandinistas to take over Nicaragua.

By contrast, a wise appreciation of national interests allowed Washington warmly to support Chile, Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan despite their authoritarian and at times even harsh regimes. National interests also prompt America to overlook Mexico's decades-long one-party rule and rough treatment of the political opposition.

Relegating human rights and morality to minor goals does not prevent America from rhetorically championing them nor even from

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supporting them with token grants from the National Endowment for Democracy or similar government agencies. Nor, of course, does this prevent individuals, churches, corporations, and voluntary organizations from crusading for democracy and human rights in Burma, China, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the host of other repressive lands. Nor, most important, does it dim the beacon of the American model. As Dulles said: America shows "men everywhere the way to a better and more abundant life." It was this that Ronald Reagan had in mind when he repeatedly reminded America that it remains a City upon a Hill and a Zion in the Wilderness. Yet neither Dulles nor Reagan made the mistake of exporting this idealism at the expense of America's security or other interests.

Principle 3. *Ambitious foreign policy poses domestic dangers.*

The big government required to conduct an ambitious foreign policy threatens individual liberty. The Founding Fathers recognized this when they divided federal power to make it difficult for America to conduct an assertive, activist foreign policy. Arguably, George Washington's warning against foreign involvement was intended as much to protect America from a powerful internal central authority as to shelter a weak new nation from external entanglements. Indeed, today's mammoth federal government is the product not so much of the New Deal but of the massive power assembled in Washington to wage World War II and the Cold War. The huge Pentagon, of course, has preserved America's freedom; the problem is that the Pentagon's size legitimizes the vast centralization of power and gigantic bureaucracies required to run the huge domestic programs started by Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. Thus while conservatives accepted the large Pentagon needed to wage the Cold War, with Soviet power now waning, conservatives would welcome a dramatically smaller Pentagon and State Department. Only when national interests are directly at stake should foreign policy be permitted to expand government.

Principle 4. *Deal with world reality.*

This should seem self-evident. Yet real world conditions are ignored by those who imply that the United States can withdraw into a Fortress America and by those who sagely counsel that, for the first time in history, military power counts for far less than economic might and that unprecedented global economic interdependence makes independent national action almost impossible.

The would-be isolationists seem blind to the dangers still posed by the world to America. Whether it is denying America access to natural resources, interdicting trade routes and sea lanes, endangering Americans abroad, or igniting brushfires that could flare into major wars, such potential actions require some American involvement—even selective intervention—in the world. Blinder still to world reality are those, like former Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, co-authors of the 1988 tract, *American Agenda*, who dismiss the efficacy of military power. It should not have taken America's lightning response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to prove the obvious: the ability to flex military muscle is still the measure of a great nation.

Economic interdependence, moreover, is far from a new phenomenon. In 1453, for instance, the fall of Constantinople sent ripples of economic dislocation throughout the Mediterranean world; in the sixteenth century, shiploads of gold and silver from New World mines set inflation ablaze throughout most of Europe; in 1871, property losses from the Great Chicago Fire cost London financial houses millions of dollars; and by the mid-nineteenth century, the locomotive and other inventions that carried America's Midwest grain to the world market forced Europe's farm sector to restructure. These and scores of similar examples from distant history make the point that economic "interdependence"is as old as commerce between nations. While it is true that international economic links have increased substantially in recent decades, they have not done so enough to make the global environment benign. It is thus the persistently hostile world, full of dangers to

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American security and interests, which foreign policy must address.

Principle 5. *Specific policies for specific problems should replace global foreign policy.*

With no Soviet global threat, America no longer needs a global foreign policy. No longer must Washington concern itself with just about every nation just about everywhere. No longer must Washington embrace and aid Third World dictators simply because they act anti-Soviet. No longer must Washington automatically worry when a country adopts a communist economic and totalitarian political system. If Egypt or Angola or Poland or the Philippines or Zaire or Peru or other nations choose to cripple themselves, it is their problem. It becomes America's problem only if it threatens America.

This allows Washington to construct a calculus for dealing with nations. Such a calculus obviously would take account of such factors as a nation's traditional friendship with America, its economic value to America and, of course, its potential for endangering American interests. How a nation ranks in this calculus would determine, by and large, the kind of attention it receives from Washington. To be sure, the process of devising and constantly revising this calculus will at times ignite heated congressional and public debate, making America's conduct of foreign affairs less tidy than State Department professionals would like. Yet it is such debate that educates the public about foreign policy goals and priorities and, in so doing, creates the reservoir of understanding and support that allows America to act boldly internationally when necessary.

There are, of course, problems with making lists of priorities; those near the bottom or omitted altogether could be viewed, correctly, as of scant value to America. When Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1950 left South Korea off his list of nations inside America's "defense perimeter," he in effect invited North Korea to attack. But today is not 1950. No great power is poised to gain advantage by pouncing on those omitted from America's list. Wars between or within nations of little consequence to America should elicit nothing more from Washington than America's expression of regrets.

Principle 6. *Rank the threats to America.*

To create public and press understanding of American foreign policy, Washington must be explicit in describing and ranking the dangers to America. Not all dangers warrant an American response. Those that do include:

• Soviet missiles.

Until it is dismantled, Moscow's arsenal of nuclear-tipped missiles remains the greatest threat to America. The most pressing task of U.S. foreign policy must thus be the elimination of this arsenal, whether it is controlled by the current Soviet state or successor regimes. The most pressing task of U.S. military policy, meanwhile, is to deter missile attack and, more important, to protect America with a strategic defense system should deterrence fail.

• Third World missiles.

America and nations important to America are in or are coming within range of Iraqi, Brazilian, and other Third World missiles potentially armed with biological, chemical, and even nuclear warheads. American policy thus must try to halt the further proliferation of missile technology and to penalize countries obtaining missiles. To deter attacks, Washington must credibly threaten devastating retaliation. Because this will not deter an irrational Third World leader, America must deploy an anti-missile defense system.

• Threats to freedom of the seas.

As a maritime nation whose enormous trade is borne mainly by ships and whose ties with its allies are mainly by sea, America must vigorously conduct policies—as it has since the Founding Fathers—that keep open the globe's sea lanes. This requires a navy that can project decisive power on all oceans and against all coasts and that can move swiftly from ocean to ocean. For this, perma-

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nent American control of the Panama Canal is essential.

• Domination of Europe by a hostile power.

America fought both world wars and the Cold War to prevent Europe from being dominated by one nation. It correctly was feared that such a nation eventually would turn Europe's vast resources against America. Though today's Europe, with its democratic institutions and emerging unified market, does not threaten us, the potential for danger remains. It is uncertain, for example, how well some European democracies would weather severe economic setbacks. It is uncertain how Germany would respond to chaos in the Soviet Union and the Balkans. Uncertain too is whether Moscow, as center of a revamped USSR or simply as capital of Russia, again would try to extend its grasp westward. Because these and other developments could endanger America, the United States must remain involved in European security arrangements. America preferably should do this through a dramatically revamped NATO. But if the venerable alliance cannot adapt to Europe's new situation, then America's continued role in Europe could be defined through bilateral agreements, including one with Moscow.

• Domination of East Asia by a hostile power.

With its huge window to the Pacific and its historic interest in the Orient, America cannot afford to allow East Asia to be controlled by one power. In contrast to Europe, where emerging economic and even political integration could temper historic rivalries, East Asia remains an area of fiercely independent and potentially contentious nations. On one matter, East Asian countries all seem to agree: only American diplomatic and military forces can preserve the equilibrium that allows East Asia to prosper. This, of course, benefits the United States enormously.

• Terrorist attacks on Americans at home and abroad.

To fulfill government's most fundamental responsibility of protecting its citizens, Washington must have the diplomatic and military means to deter and punish terrorists who target Americans.

• Economic blackmail.

Control by one or a group of nations of oil or the other resources upon which modern economies depend threatens American living standards. Protecting these standards, at reasonable cost, is a legitimate function of government. Also threatened by control of vital resources is the stability of European and Asian democracies, also a matter of legitimate concern to America. As such, Washington must craft policies and take actions to prevent nations from blackmailing America through control of resources.

Principle 7. *Mexico, Russia, Israel, Japan, and China merit special treatment.*

So important to America are some countries that they warrant special policies and, often, special treatment. If there is a case for a U.S. "special relationship" with any country, it is with Mexico. Bordering the United States for nearly 2,000 miles, rich in resources, and home to eighty-five million people, Mexico will affect the United States profoundly in the next century. An economically thriving and politically democratic Mexico can benefit the United States enormously, just as an impoverished and chaotic Mexico can create serious economic, social, and even security problems for the United States. Simply put, not only can we not afford an unstable Mexico, we cannot afford to squander the opportunity to help raise the Mexican economy to world-class levels. In ways sensitive to Mexican historical grievances, Washington must work tenaciously at improving ties with Mexico. Central to this is the special economic link that would be created by a free trade area agreement. If extended to Canada, this would transform North America into the world's most powerful and dynamic economic unit. Central also to Washington's relations with Mexico are U.S. economic, security, and diplomatic actions to prevent the unrest in Central

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America that would destabilize southern Mexico.

The Russia that could emerge from a disintegrated Soviet Union will require Washington's special attention and creativity. With a population of at least 150 million, a vast territory, and a huge arsenal, it would be the giant of Europe in every respect save economics. For the foreseeable future, with its nuclear arsenal, it will be the only nation literally capable of destroying much of the United States and of intimidating and devastating Western Europe. Moscow thus will remain Washington's essential partner in arms control and nonproliferation efforts. It will remain the most important object of American efforts to implant respect for the sovereignty of other countries. It will become, as some Russian officials hint it is ready to be, the vital partner in creating a safer world by shifting the nuclear balance from offensive to defensive weapons. And, in the longer term, America and Russia could discover in each other—and build upon—the profound similarities noted more than a century ago by Alexis de Tocqueville.

Repeatedly having proven its friendship, dependability, and gratitude to America, Israel merits Washington's continued special commitment. Israel's importance to America, in fact, has mounted because of the Arab world's increasing instability and in the wake of the Persian Gulf Crisis and War. As a fortress of democracy in a region where dictators are the rule, Israel is the paradigm of a nation surrounded by enemies. Without America's diplomatic, economic, and military support, Israel could not survive. At the same time, American backing of Israel must not remain unconditional; it must prod Israel to advance the political rights of the Palestinian population of the West Bank and to adopt free market reforms to reverse the decade-long deterioration of its economy. Without such actions, Israel's long-term existence—even with considerable American help—is questionable.

Were Japan simply an economic behemoth, it would warrant no more of Washington's attention than does the European Community. The problem, though discussion of it remains taboo, is that Japan's wealth and technology again could build a war machine which threatens East Asia and, ultimately, America. It is America's particular responsibility to prevent this; no other nation can do so. The danger is not that Tokyo already is planning for the day when it can flex military muscle. The danger rather is that if Japan begins feeling threatened, it will act to protect itself by obtaining weapons that it so far has not had—aircraft carriers, long-range bombers, and, perhaps, even nuclear missiles—and develop the devastatingly accurate high-technology smart weapons. Such an arsenal will terrify all of Asia. The special challenge for American policy is to maintain an East Asian environment in which Japan continues to feel secure and gives Japan no reason to expand its arsenal. Key to this is the continued stationing of U.S. military forces in Japan and elsewhere in Asia, something just about all Asian nations (including China) support, as do some Soviet officials privately. At a time, therefore, when America should be planning to reduce its overseas commitments, exception must be made for Asia. Since the entire region benefits from the stability created by the U.S. troops, East Asian nations should begin paying the full cost of these troops.

It is not only its standing as the world's most populous nation that earns China special consideration by Washington. Because it borders Russia and is Asia's only potential geopolitical counterweight to Japan, China is a key element in any American formula to block potential Russian or Japanese expansion. Also raising China high on the calculus of American concerns is America's historic, even romantic, fascination with China. More than any other nation, it has attracted generations of American religious, economic, and political missionaries who seem to have been "called" to serve China. Conservatives, too, have felt this "call," typically arguing that America's global destiny is fulfilled across the Pacific, not the Atlantic, and that at the heart

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of this is an intimate relationship with a pro-American China.

Principle 8. *Expand opportunities for Americans.*

American living standards can be raised through specific foreign policies. Negotiating liberalized trade, for example, gives American consumers greater access to foreign goods and American producers greater access to foreign markets. International agreements on patents, copyrights, and other intellectual property protects American inventors, writers, and artists. A vastly restructured foreign aid program that requires recipient nations to adopt free market policies spurs Third World economic growth which then creates new markets for American exports and new sources for American imports. And environmental accords that preserve the global ecology without undermining economic growth enhance Americans' quality of life.

Principle 9. *Give no nation or organization a veto over American actions.*

Washington may find approval of its actions by other nations comforting. Yet making this a condition of such actions will paralyze foreign policy and could force America to act against its interests. No matter how the Persian Gulf War ends, a dangerous legacy of Bush's handling of it has been his refusal to act without first winning approval from the United Nations Security Council and from Moscow and Beijing. Neither the United Nations nor any nation should be allowed to veto U.S. actions.

Principle 10. *Stability is not the goal of foreign policy.*

There is no inherent virtue in stability. Instability, after all, at times topples evil regimes, as the persistent conservative call for the rollback of the Soviet Empire recognized. At the same time, conservatives cannot remain indifferent to the potential dangers of global instability. Nor can conservatives forget that, as Owen Harries noted in this journal's last issue, "continuity, gradualness, predictability, and order" may be *the* defining conservative value. Whether stability thus is an appropriate goal or guiding principle of policy depends on what is being stabilized and on the costs of destabilization. Only when instability specifically threatens American interests should ensuring stability be an aim—as when instability threatens the world's energy supply, or when instability in Central or South America threatens Mexico or the Panama Canal, or when instability in Europe invites Germany or Russia to dominate the Continent, or when instability in Asia allows Japan or China to dominate the region. In each case it is not the instability itself that is to be countered, but the specific results of the instability. This means that Washington need not be a global policeman automatically rushing to calm unrest, aggression, and other forms of instability everywhere.

FROM THESE ten principles, America can shape its post-Cold War foreign policy. From these principles too it is obvious that conservatives are reluctant internationalists. They know that America is less in need of a foreign policy than perhaps any other nation, for, of all nations, America is least threatened by and can better endure crises anywhere in the world. They know too, having seen it confirmed, that interventionist foreign policy requires a more active and larger federal government than is good for the nation. This understanding contributes to the admirable conservative instinct for isolation. So does, of course, the conservative reflex to look inward, preferring to solve the problems in the family, community, school, church, and synagogue before solving them in the world.

To be sure, some world problems require America's attention. But the burden of proof is borne by those urging this attention and intervention. They very convincingly made the case for this during the Cold War. As a result, conservatives overcame their global hesitations and enthusiastically championed and led the multifront campaign against Moscow-led communism. But with the Soviet

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threat receding, conservatives rightly ask that Washington make anew the case for why and where America should be involved actively in the world.

There is a case for this, but it must be made explicitly. George Bush must identify, as did Harry Truman in 1947, those dangers that the world poses to America. Unless Americans understand these dangers, they cannot be asked to risk their lives and property in pursuit of a foreign policy. The Bush administration, in situation after situation, must provide the relevant answer to the haunting, compelling question posed last spring in this journal by Patrick Buchanan: If North Korea attacks South Korea, "why should Americans be first to die?" This is a question poignantly raised again by the war in the Gulf.

The old—and satisfying—answer to Buchanan was that the De-Militarized Zone dividing the Koreas is America's first line of defense against international communism. A similar answer could have been given for a dozen other American troop deployments in a dozen other world hot spots. This answer no longer suffices. For a new answer to be credible it must convince Americans that their nation's interests are at risk in Korea. In this case, they probably are; East Asia is too important to America for Korea to be united under communist and anti-American rule. American interests similarly must—and can—be invoked to explain why the nation needs activist policies to guarantee access to the Panama Canal, freedom of the seas, protection from missile attacks, and so forth. But if arguments fail to convince, then Washington has no right to intervene with resources or force.

What this means is that instead of a global foreign policy, America can conduct specific policies for specific regions. Instead of a willingness for near-universal intervention, America can intervene selectively. Washington should find nothing wrong in declaring that some areas of the world are much more important to America than most others. Washington should find nothing wrong in saying that while it is unacceptable for a foreign power to control the Panama Canal or Cuba, America is not much affected by who controls Angola or Cambodia or even South Africa or if a South American country embraces socialism.

For a conservative, the goal of foreign policy is not a successful crusade for democracy or for human rights or for spreading the American way of life. These are worthy ends for individuals and private organizations to pursue; they do not justify, however, the federal government deploying Americans in harm's way or even spending taxpayer money on them.

For a conservative, the only legitimate goal of American foreign policy is the creation of a world environment in which America is left alone and at peace, in which America can trade and raise its living standards, in which Americans can expand their options and enrich their lives.

With the threats from fascist and Marxist totalitarian regimes now repelled, Americans no longer need to conduct a foreign policy that automatically imposes great costs, great risks, and great distortions in the power relationship between the American people and their government. What replaces this can be a foreign policy based on conservative principles. This will create that reservoir of public understanding and support from which Washington confidently will be able to draw at those moments when American lives and resources must be risked.□

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The Churches and the War

Robert P. Beschel, Jr. and Peter D. Feaver

"THE WAR in the Gulf is not a Christian war, a Jewish war, or a Moslem war—it is a just war," President Bush recently told a group of conservative religious broadcasters, "and it is a war with which good will prevail." Only a portion of churches within the United States would support this assessment. The American Christian community has been divided over the morality of the Gulf War, with the split taking place along largely predictable lines.

The Spectrum

CONSERVATIVE Protestant churches have been most supportive of the administration, with some fundamentalists choosing to view the war as an apocalyptic struggle between the forces of good and evil. The parallels between Baghdad and Babylon are obvious for those who wish to see them, and Saddam Hussein fits nicely into the role of Antichrist. The majority of the evangelicals and moderate fundamentalists, however, have adopted a more balanced and restrained approach, arguing that American policy is defensible on traditional just war grounds. (The just war tradition, a Catholic doctrine by origin, holds that the use of force may be morally justified under certain conditions.) Yet, in light of their sympathy for traditional values such as duty, honor, obedience, and love of country, evangelical support for the war has been surprisingly tentative and conditional. An editorial in the leading evangelical journal, *Christianity Today*, held that any line in the sand should be drawn "only with tears"; the author then warned against the dangers of chauvinistic nationalism, ethnocentric pride, and the seductive euphoria of techno-war. Dr. Richard D. Land of the Southern Baptist Convention, the largest conservative Protestant denomination, sounded a similar note of caution. Warning emphatically that jobs and oil are not a sufficient or legitimate cause for military action, he continued:

> Is America's motive to help erect a stable, just peace in the post-cold war world in which all people have a reasonable expectation that aggressors will be restrained by the world community of nations? If so, then perhaps this is a just cause. . . . The American citizenry does not have the information to answer many of these questions. We have the responsibility to ask them, however, and to demand that our elected leaders assess the crisis in light of them, and to provide affirmative answers be-

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fore resorting to armed force—always a last resort.[1]

Catholic thinking on the Gulf War has also reflected a balanced assessment of the pros and cons of the conflict in light of traditional just war theory. Last November, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops endorsed a letter by Archbishop Roger M. Mahony outlining their moral qualms about the developing crisis. It voiced concern that the Bush administration had not adequately fulfilled several criteria, such as the principles of just cause, last resort, and proportionality. By a vote of 129–15, the bishops urged the Bush administration to "stay the course" of non-military solutions to the crisis. The president of the NCCB, Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk of Cincinnati, expressed similar concerns the day before the outbreak of hostilities, but subsequently refrained from passing moral judgement upon the U.S. position after the fighting started, maintaining that "History will judge whether or when this war should have been launched." Individual Catholic leaders have ventured a range of opinions over the past few months. Boston's Cardinal Bernard Law argued that the war is legitimate according to traditional just war doctrine, whereas Thomas Gumbleton, auxiliary bishop of Detroit and head of the Catholic peace group Pax Christi, has been critical of American military involvement.

Traditional peace churches, such as the Quakers, Mennonites, and Moravians, have actively opposed all phases of American military operations in the Gulf. Drawing their inspiration from the Sermon on the Mount, these churches have historically rejected the moral legitimacy of any form of organized violence. In the current war, they have been joined by new allies, who—although from a different theological point of departure—have arrived at the same conclusion.

Protesting Protestants

ONE OF THE most striking, if not unexpected developments surrounding the American Christian community's response to developments in the Gulf has been the rapid condemnation of U.S. policy by mainline Protestant denominations and the church bodies which represent them (such as the National Council of Churches and the World Council of Churches with which it is affiliated). Although these groups were initially critical of Iraq's invasion and supportive of UN sanctions, they quickly became uncomfortable with the perceived militarization of American policy. By mid-September, many church leaders were openly questioning the deployment of U.S. troops in the region and campaigning against the inclusion of food or medicine in the blockade. After President Bush's decision to deploy additional American troops in November, many mainline churches moved to actively oppose administration policy.

A number of clerics journeyed to the Middle East in December for a "peace pilgrimage" under the auspices of the NCC. Traveling throughout the region, they spoke with Iraqis, Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians, Cypriots, and Jordanians (no mention of meetings with Kuwaitis). Upon their return they produced a document titled "War is Not the Answer" that strongly condemned current U.S. policy, arguing "The resort to massive violence to resolve the Gulf crisis would be politically and morally indefensible."

As the UN deadline approached, mainline churches increased their efforts to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. On January 11, the chief social action executive of the United Methodist church called on Congress and the president to "stop the rhetoric of war" and pursue political and diplomatic solutions. Four days later, the leadership of thirty-two mainline denominations and ecumenical organizations sent a letter to President Bush urging him to delay military action and not to lead the nation into "this abyss." After the outbreak of hostilities, the United Methodist bishop in the Washington, DC area stated that he was "very saddened by President Bush's

[1] "The Crisis in the Persian Gulf and 'just wars' " (The Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention), December 21, 1990.

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decision," while the president of the NCC characterized the resort to war as "a failure for the human spirit." A January 17 statement by the general secretary of the World Council of Churches "regretted" the failure of the Iraqi government to respond to international appeals, but "deplored" the U.S. government's decision to initiate hostilities. (In contrast, the WCC had been quite tolerant of the Soviet Union's decision to invade Afghanistan eleven years earlier, virtually blaming the Soviet invasion on American imperialism.)

Such strong opposition is remarkable because mainline Protestant churches have not been historically pacifist. On the contrary, by tradition they reject pacifism in favor of just war theory. And when the NCC issued its condemnation of Operation Desert Storm, it deliberately used the language of the just war tradition.

Although precise formulations vary, just war theory essentially focuses upon two different sets of principles: *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. *Jus ad bellum*, literally "right towards war," provides specific precepts governing the outset of any armed conflict. Such criteria include: (1) the war must be waged for a just cause, such as self-defense or the defense of a third party; (2) war must be declared by a duly constituted authority; (3) there must be a reasonable chance of winning or achieving one's objective; (4) the use of war must be a last resort; (5) the participants must have right intentions (i.e., to establish a just and lasting peace); and (6) the expectation of good through winning the war must be greater than the expected evil from waging the war itself. *Jus in bello*, literally "right in war," specifies criteria governing the conduct of the war, and includes such principles as: (1) the seriousness of the injury inflicted on the enemy must be proportional to the damage suffered by the virtuous; and (2) the means used must be moral (i.e., killing innocent people must be avoided and international law must be upheld to the greatest extent possible).

Although a legitimate subject for debate, it is not our purpose to address whether Operation Desert Storm satisfies all of these criteria. What is at issue is why many mainline denominations, as well as the NCC and WCC, never bothered to engage this subject in a serious or systematic fashion. Without explicitly rejecting traditional just war criteria, they offered extreme and unsubstantiated assessments about the likely dangers of combat. They then used these assessments in a highly polemical fashion to argue that the criteria for a just war could not possibly be satisfied.

Typical of these allegations is the NCC's observation that "military experts predict casualties in the tens and hundreds of thousands." Although there is a remote possibility of casualties in this range, expert testimony before the House Armed Services Committee suggested the actual numbers would be far lower, ranging from 300 American dead and 1500 wounded under the most optimistic scenarios to 3,000 dead and 15,000 wounded under the most pessimistic.

Predictions of massive civilian casualties also appear to be overstated. In the early weeks of the war the actual number of civilian casualties, always regrettable, has apparently been modest, thanks in large measure to many of the smart weapons systems whose funding and deployment the mainline denominations opposed.

Diplomatic solutions are almost always preferable to military solutions, yet one searches the position papers and press releases of mainline denominations in vain for any constructive solutions. In a spirit of heroic evenhandedness, the NCC's general secretary-elect returned from the Middle East convinced there would be no peace in the region until all outstanding issues were resolved. She therefore called for a regional peace conference under UN auspices to address not only the Gulf War but Israel's occupation of Palestine and the presence of foreign troops in Lebanon and Cyprus. It is difficult to imagine a more ill-conceived strategy than lumping together four problems, each so far incapable of solution in its own right. Not only would such an ap-

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proach be a recipe for guaranteed failure, but it would give credence to Saddam Hussein's argument that his invasion of Kuwait was intended to strike a blow for the liberation of Palestine—a thin post-hoc rationalization that did not surface until several days *after* the Iraqi invasion.

Many mainline churches also tend to believe mistakenly that international law, diplomacy, and military power are contradictory, not complementary elements of any constructive diplomatic solution. In a fashion remarkably similar to anti-war activists prior to World War II, they devote great attention to proclaiming lofty principles while giving relatively little thought to the tradeoffs, complexities, and hard choices involved in implementing these principles in a fallen world. Even inherently defensive actions, such as the initial deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia to deter an Iraqi attack or the use of U.S. naval vessels to enforce the blockade, were criticized as dangerously escalating the crisis. In a November resolution on the Gulf and Middle East Crisis, the NCC went on record opposing any sale or transfer of arms to Israel and Saudi Arabia as "morally irresponsible"—although these states faced the very real threat of an Iraqi attack. Mainline Protestant thinking regarding the efficacy of the United Nations betrays similar confusion. NCC calls to reduce American troop deployments in the Gulf "except those which might be required and explicitly recommended by the Security Council of the UN" are based upon unfounded assumptions regarding the UN's ability to function as an objective, apolitical body interested only in the common good.

Catholic theologians display a more sophisticated understanding of the interaction between power and diplomacy. Writing in the liberal journal *Commonweal*, the Reverend J. Bryan Hehir argued that the initial deployment of forces in Saudi Arabia was "justified politically and morally" in that it forestalled war and provided time for diplomacy and economic sanctions to work. Archbishop Mahony's letter acknowledged that a strong military presence can give credibility to a vigorous pursuit of non-violent solutions to the crisis, but expressed legitimate concern that the pressure to use military force may grow as the pursuit of non-violent options dragged on.

In the final assessment, the judgement of the mainline Protestant leadership regarding the morality of the Gulf War owes less to a carefully reasoned application of just war theory than to two deeper and more firmly held beliefs peculiar to the members who sit on the peace and justice committees of mainline Protestant denominations.

The first is an overwhelming sentiment against any use of force in international affairs. A 1980 survey of United Methodist bishops, for example, revealed that 92.6 percent rejected the use of war as an instrument of national policy, even though the church itself remained committed to traditional just war doctrine.[2] Similar views can be found in many denominations and find expression in a variety of outlets, such as the NCC's November 1990 resolution on the Gulf which warned that Christians must witness against "weak resignation to the illogical pursuit of militarism and war."

Mainline denominations have now formed de facto coalitions with traditional pacifist groups. Eleven religious organizations recently united to form "Churches for Middle East Peace," a group that includes representatives from the American Friends Service Committee (the Quaker church's political action wing) and the Mennonite Central Committee as well as the NCC and several mainline denominations. At the December press conference summarizing the results of the NCC's mission to the Middle East, mainline church representatives deferred the question of whether a Gulf War would satisfy traditional just war criteria to Jim Wallis, who asserted that these principles have not and cannot be met. Wallis was essentially

[2]James Foyle Miller, *A Study of United Methodists and Social Issues* (General Council on Ministries, United Methodist church, 1983), pp. 8–9.

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playing the role of a sheep in wolf's clothing. Reporters were not told that, as a devout pacifist and the leader of the radical Sojourners community in Washington, DC, he had concluded long ago that every war is immoral. Indeed, in 1980 he argued that the entire notion of a just war represents "a warped and twisted" view of Christian theology.

The second theme running throughout mainline thinking on the Persian Gulf War is a thinly disguised anti-American bias (or as the *New York Times* more elaborately put it, "a deep distrust of the United States' capacity to act constructively overseas"). Many clerics argue that, because of various sins of omission and commission, the United States lacks the necessary moral authority to address this crisis. Others have advanced the notion of moral equivalency. The General Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist church, for example, released a statement on the Gulf that mourned the "questionable policies of all nations which would seek superiority over others." Still others have placed primary responsibility for the conflict squarely upon the United States. United Methodist Bishop Melvin Talbert, who chaired the committee that drafted the NCC resolution on the Gulf, recently urged other bishops to demonstrate against American policy, arguing that the United States is the "real aggressor."[3]

Radical Councils, Pacifist Counsel

HOW DID this shift away from traditional just war theory to a radical, pacifist position come about? The answer to this question can be found in an interrelated series of theological, historical, demographic, and organizational developments that occurred during the 1960s.

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, American Protestantism was dominated by the thinking of several leading theologians, including Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, and Reinhold and H. Richard Niebuhr. These thinkers, and many of the classic Protestant understandings upon which their work was grounded, came under withering attack in the social turmoil of the 1960s. In the wake of this assault, liberal seminaries, churches, and denominations found themselves adrift theologically. No dominant figure emerged to provide coherence and vision, and many theologians and seminarians ceased to believe that systematic theology was either feasible or desirable. A pronounced theological eclecticism sprang up that led to the fragmentation of theology or, more accurately, the creation of multiple "sub-theologies" catering to particular grievances. Many of these theologies, such as liberation theology, feminist theology, black theology, and eco-theology, have borrowed heavily from secular progressive movements, and in some instances represent little more than an attempt to provide a spiritual component to distinctly non-theistic (or even atheist) concepts.

Much of the historical optimism that infuses these secular movements has found its way into mainline churches. They have largely abandoned the "prophetic realism" of Reinhold Niebuhr, with its emphasis upon the fallen nature of humanity and the imperfectability of human institutions. Instead, following the teaching of Jurgen Moltmann and others, they have come to embrace a "theology of hope" that views human nature as malleable. Freed from the burden of reproducing the sins of its fathers, humanity is now capable of radically transforming itself. As Moltmann noted in his 1969 book *Religion, Revolution and the Future*, the means of realizing this utopia could well be a violent revolution along Marxist lines.

Without going that far, many liberal churches remain convinced that humanity can be changed for the better by eliminating the roots of oppression. Because of the historical experience of the 1960s, these roots have become closely associated in their thinking with American military, political, and economic institutions.

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[3]See Lawrence E. Adams and Fredrick P. Jones, "Are These Angels Really Heralds of Peace?" *Religion & Democracy* (February 1991): 1.

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Until recently, church involvement within American politics was characterized by long periods of inactivity punctuated by occasional, frenetic crusades around particular issues. Before World War II, only the Methodist church had established an office in Washington, and this was primarily intended to keep an eye on temperance issues. Even as late as the 1960s, very few denominations maintained any presence in Washington or viewed it as their goal to influence social legislation.

The civil rights movement and the Vietnam War changed all this. The successful mobilization of many churches on behalf of civil rights legislation convinced many religious leaders that mainline denominations could be an effective force in national politics. At the same time, growing disillusionment with the war in Vietnam brought many clergy to reconsider their fundamental assumptions regarding America's role in the world.

Initially supportive of the war, mainline churches suddenly found themselves under attack as a part of the "establishment." They watched their college and young adult membership decline precipitously. Church leaders began to question the morality of the American position, and by 1967 many had shifted decisively against the war. These sentiments intensified as the war dragged on. By the early 1970s, the depth of the disillusionment many Protestant leaders felt towards American institutions and values was readily apparent. The United Methodist church produced a study guide in 1975 that argued "Profit, military might, and alliances with power interests in the world" had made the United States "the hub of a vast network of 'economic plunder.' " In 1979, an NCC task force concluded that the American legal system is designed "to suppress non-violent political dissent, to cope with social problems, and to provide cheap labor." During that year, Methodist Bishop Dale White responded to the seizure of American hostages in Iran by noting that "all of us really, are hostages. . . to a vast political economic system of the cruelty structures which are preordaining that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer."

While churches and academic institutions were becoming more ideologically polarized and alienated from American political and economic institutions, attendance at many of the major seminaries shot up. From 1964 to 1973, enrollment at Harvard Divinity School increased by a third, and other institutions posted similar gains. War protesters sought refuge in the draft's education exemption clause, and other young men and women enrolled in search of values they felt were lacking elsewhere in American society. Thus, many current pastors and denominational leaders spent their formative years in seminary at the height of the social unrest of the 1960s and retain much of the world view that they developed during this period. A recent poll revealed that over half of the pastors of mainline denominations believe that the basic institutions of the United States need a complete overhaul.[4]

The Pulpit and the Pew

DURING THE late 1960s and early 1970s, many mainline churches underwent significant restructuring in which the central church organs were strengthened. Liberals, who were generally more adept at church politics, obtained almost all of the key managerial appointments.

As a result, conservative mainstream churches are being led by liberal activist clergy. Opinion surveys document the growing political gap between pulpit and pew. The majority of mainline Protestant leaders have consistently voted Democratic in presidential elections: 80 percent voted for Humphrey in 1968, 74 percent voted for McGovern in 1972, and 79 percent voted for Carter in 1976. The 1980 election provides a particularly useful point of comparison. While 72

[4]Robert Lerner, Stanley Rothman, and S. Robert Lichter, "Christian Religious Elites," *Public Opinion* 11, no. 6 (March/April 1989): 56.

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percent of mainline clergy voted for Carter, 69 percent of all Episcopalians voted for Reagan, as did 67 percent of all Presbyterians, 56 percent of all Lutherans, and 53 percent of all Methodists.[5] One recent survey of seventeen Washington mainline church representatives revealed that ten placed themselves either at the same place as, or to the left of, Ted Kennedy; four placed themselves to the right of Kennedy; and three declined to answer the question.[6]

Many liberal seminaries and denominations preach a political orthodoxy of a particular left-wing variant. Nowhere was this peculiar witness of mainline church leaders more evident than the March 1990 meeting of the World Council of Churches in Seoul, attended by liberal theologians and social activists from both North and South. The delegates from Eastern Europe received only tepid support for their recent democratic revolutions. Stony silence greeted the only participants—a Russian Orthodox leader from Moscow and a Hungarian theologian—who suggested that market economics had virtues as well as vices.

Many pastors would argue that because theirs is a prophetic role, they should not be bound by the atavistic norms and prejudices of their parishioners. Ministers are indeed called upon to provide both solace and leadership to their flocks—to "afflict the comfortable and comfort the afflicted." Like Burkean representatives, they owe their charges not only their industry but their judgement.

Yet it is disingenuous for national religious bodies or the leaders who represent them to purport to speak as one voice when their membership would not support them or is deeply divided over a critical issue. To do so compromises the authenticity of the church's witness and in essence dooms it to irrelevance. As a leading historian of American Protestantism noted, "Everyone knows that when the mainline churches take a position, it is only six people in a room on Riverside Drive [the headquarters of the NCC and several mainline denominations in New York]."[7]

There is no tradition of infallibility within the Protestant church. In both the Old and New Testaments, many of the prophets were false. Although leaders of the former mainstream churches speak passionately, and sometimes eloquently, they bear witness to ideologies and traditions that most American Christians rightly reject. Anti-Americanism is not a useful paradigm for U.S. policymakers who turn to the church for moral guidance. Pacifism is a noble heritage and unquestionably based on selected biblical principles. But it is by no means the only authoritative Christian voice and, as an absolutist philosophy, it is not very useful for statesmen who must craft policy in a fallen world. Peace is clearly an important biblical goal, and Christians should be slow to respond to cries for the use of force. Yet peace must be tempered with justice, which in turn must be evaluated in a more balanced and objective fashion than has recently been the case with many Protestant peace and justice committees. Until mainline denominations are willing to undertake this task, we may be wise to heed Jeremiah's warning against false prophets who cry " 'peace, peace' when there is no peace."□

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[5]See Lerner, Rothman, and Lichter, p. 56. Data on denominational voting is from the University of Michigan's 1980 National Election Survey, cited in A. James Reichley, *Religion In American Public Life* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 273.

[6]See Reichley, p. 276.

[7]Martin Marty, interview with A. James Reichley, February 19, 1982. See Reichley, p. 280.

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Fault Lines and Steeples

The Divided Loyalties of Europe

Max Beloff

IN A FAMOUS passage in a speech to the House of Commons in 1922, Winston Churchill characterized the aftermath of the Great War:

> Great Empires have been overturned. The whole map of Europe has been changed. The position of countries has been violently altered. The modes of thought of men, the whole outlook on affairs, the grouping of parties, all have encountered violent and tremendous changes in the deluge of the world; but as the deluge of the waters subsides and the waters fall short, we see the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone emerging once again.

Churchill's purpose was to call attention to what he saw as the unique persistence of the antagonism between Catholic and Protestant in Northern Ireland, which had been going on since the original colonization of Ulster by Englishmen and Scots in the seventeenth century. As Churchill himself would have been fully aware, a similar metaphor would have been apt to describe the parallel emergence in Central and Eastern Europe of many historical local antagonisms, given new scope by the collapse of the Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman Empires. And, as colonial secretary, he had been dealing in the Middle East with conflicts among peoples to whom references to biblical times, to the Arab Conquests, or to the Crusades were perfectly natural, and in no sense mere antiquities. Fermanagh and Tyrone were not exceptions—they were typical. Human history is like that.

Churchill's powerful metaphor has thus renewed itself in my mind as we have witnessed in the last few years the collapse of the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe, and may be about to witness the collapse of the Soviet successor to the empire of the Romanovs. For the young it is all very strange; to those whose memories go back beyond 1939 it is all very familiar. It may be more familiar to Europeans than to Americans. Americans have tended to see the collapse of Soviet power and the threat to the unity of the Soviet Empire in terms of a victory of free-market economics and liberal democracy over collectivist economics and single-party rule. Europeans find the demonstration of national rivalries both within the Soviet Union itself and along its Western periphery as a dominant factor in the situation. In this respect Americans risk renewing the disillusion that followed from accepting Woodrow Wilson's belief that Europeans could be taught to live in pleasant harmony. Wisdom consists in facing reality.

Europe's history has been shaped very largely by its geographical position as a promontory of the Old World landmass. Its population reflects movements of peoples, mostly from east to west, over the centuries. They

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were encouraged by climatic changes and demographic pressure, and were from time to time obstructed or diverted by political and military power, as with Rome. There have also been some movements in the reverse direction—notably the eastward thrust of German colonization, warlike or peaceful, from the high Middle Ages to the eighteenth-century settlement of the "Volga Germans," now in the process of repatriation to a country with whom only the slenderest ties remain. There were also the north-south movements of the Scandinavian peoples, largely by sea, but sometimes down the Russian river systems. A Frenchified element among them—the Normans—carried their conquests further into the Mediterranean world. Finally, and of particular relevance today, there was the northward thrust of Muslim peoples—Arabs conquering the Iberian peninsula and narrowly failing to establish themselves north of the Pyrenees; and later, the Turkish push into the Balkans and parts of Central Europe, establishing an empire of long duration.

SINCE THE conditions for settlement and the ability of existing populations to fight off invaders were very unequally distributed, the ethnic and linguistic map is inevitably a checkered one with many unexpected anomalies. The primal legacy was indeed linguistic; more than any other factor it is language that keeps Europe divided. By the Middle Ages, the main linguistic groups of modern Europe were already perceptible: a Celtic group confined to the northwestern periphery and in retreat; a Latin or Romance bloc extending from the Atlantic to the Rhine Valley and into the Italian and Spanish peninsulas, with an isolated offshoot in Romania; a Germanic-Scandinavian group occupying most of central Europe; a Slavic group including all the lands to the east of the Germans, with its offshoot in the Balkan peninsula where it had to contend, as it still does, with Greek and Albanian.

These broad divisions, each of which in modern times has given rise to specific languages, have within them embedded islets of totally different speech families—Basque, Magyar, Finnish, and the languages of the Baltic peasant peoples. English itself is hard to classify, since it is a unique amalgam of Germanic and Romance roots. (Perhaps the English—and Americans—are to be forgiven for their belief that if you have English you do not need any other language.)

By the later Middle Ages, some of the centers of political power fashioned by an interplay of dynastic and tribal considerations have made their appearance; England, France, the German Holy Roman Empire (something less than a state and with no natural capital), Castille, Poland, Bohemia, Muscovy are visible. In some cases geography gives protection to a territorial entity—Bohemia, for example, and what became Spain; but in the great plains stretching across Northern Europe from the Elbe to the Urals, no such protection exists. The Poles have been part of European history from very early times, but not continuously in the same location. If one looks at the maps that illustrate Adam Zamoiski's admirable history, *The Polish Way*, one can see the shift in boundaries through successive centuries, with the weight of the kingdom in the early Middle Ages lying well to the west of what later became the nucleus of the inter-war Polish state. In 1466, it possessed not only a broad outlet to the Baltic but stretched far to the west of Poznan; in the south the principality of Moldavia brought it to the shores of the Black Sea. The Polish-Lithuanian kingdom that was the victim of the eighteenth-century partitions was a country of vast extent. When Poland regained its independence after World War I, it failed to recover everything; and after World War II, Stalin deprived it of the territories it had recovered from Russia and compensated it with territories seized from Germany, thereby shifting it bodily to the west. The result is that the map of Poland today looks more like that of the earliest Poland than that of Poland as it was known between the wars or prior to the partitions.

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The shifting nature of the political map of Europe means that many nationalities may not be content merely with the self-determination that has been recovered in Eastern and Central Europe as a result of the Russian retreat. Several can look back at a history of great power status, by the standards of the time in question. Visiting the newly established museum of Czech history in the Hradschin in Prague, for example, one must come to the conclusion that Czech youths, for whom the display is obviously intended, are being deliberately given a rather expansive idea of the Czech past.

LANGUAGE, though a primary factor in Europe's divisions, is not the only one. The second set of fault lines is that which has been drawn by religious differences which sometimes coincide with the linguistic ones and sometimes do not. The first great religious divide is that between the Eastern and Western churches: broadly speaking, between those peoples who received their Christianity from Rome directly or through Celtic or German intermediaries, and those in the East and Southeast to whom it came through Constantinople (Byzantium). This religious divide was enhanced by the question of the script in which the various languages came to be written. Slavs within the Eastern Orthodox fold use the Cyrillic script in which Russian is written; Slavs who became Catholics (Poles for instance) use the Latin script. The second fault line is that within Western Christendom itself—that drawn by the Protestant Reformation.

In both cases the original conversion was normally decisive. But political conquests led to attempts by the conquerors to force their own religious adherence onto the conquered. The current struggle in the Soviet Ukraine between the Orthodox church and the Uniates who accept papal authority reflects the seventeenth-century incorporation of the western Ukraine into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Again, if the Czechs had not been defeated by the Hapsburg monarchy, Bohemia and Moravia might have become part of Protestant Europe. Now that past is still alive. While the Catholic church has played an important role in the recent revival of Czech nationhood, there is some degree of suspicion of clerical domination which may go back to the Hussite dissent of the fifteenth century. The feeling is clearly very different from that in Slovakia with its quite different past. And this helps to explain the difficulties felt in trying to find a proper formula for a united "Czechoslovakia." But one must not oversimplify. In Romania we have a religious-linguistic anomaly where a country of Latin speech is nevertheless Orthodox in religion. In Transylvania, the Romanians confront the formally dominant Magyars, both Catholic and Protestant, as well as other minorities.

The duration and completeness of change resulting from war have varied. The Reconquista (completed only at the end of the fifteenth century) formally ended the presence of Islam in Spain; but when the Turks retreated from the Balkans they left sizable Muslim elements. In Western Europe the "wars of religion" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries gave Catholicism the upper hand in France, but divided Germany between Catholic and Protestant states—a division that had to be taken into account in plotting the course of German reunification. Protestant Anglo-Saxons in the last century believed that Protestantism was particularly suited to courageous sea-going mercantile peoples. It was the theme of the American historian John Lothrop Motley's many volumes on the Dutch struggle for independence from Spain. Yet few would now hold that such affinities were decisive. Protestantism's southward advance was limited by the military considerations arising from the geographical configuration of the Low Countries. The political boundary between modern Holland and modern Belgium follows neither the linguistic nor the religious divide.

As with language so with religion: England is the odd man out. The Anglican settlement has been seen as both Catholic and

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Protestant, and what was essentially a state church could not expect adherents on the Continent. Its destiny has proved to be an extra-European one. On the whole, despite talk of reunion, Protestantism has had the upper hand and has many vehicles outside the established church. It is therefore not curious that the "Carolingian" streak among the founders of the European Community—the Catholic statesmen, Adenauer, Schuman, and de Gasperi—never appealed to the British.

BESIDES LANGUAGE and religion, three other elements have to be taken into account in trying to unravel the complexities of Europe's internal conflicts: class, commerce, and ideology. Economic development has always been at an uneven pace, and this has produced startlingly different patterns of class relationships. While in Western Europe feudalism and serfdom were on the decline from the late Middle Ages, in Eastern Europe things went the other way. In Poland and Russia serfdom became increasingly ingrained in the early Modern period, when Eastern Europe functioned as a granary and purveyor of raw materials to nascent Western industrialism. Modern industrial capitalism profited by the freer labor market to secure a head start in the West, which still endures.

Conquest and patterns of settlement created an overlap between national and class divisions. In the late Czarist Empire, the western provinces acquired in the partitions of Poland were peopled by a Polish nobility ruling over a Russian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian peasantry. In Galicia, a Polish landed class ruled over a Ukrainian peasantry; when the Poles rebelled in 1848–49, their Hapsburg monarchs incited their peasantry to attack them. German penetration into the Baltic gave rise to a landowning class, the "Baltic Barons," who supplied many important figures in the military and civil services of the Russian czars, right down to the Revolution of 1917. Similar alignments of class and national divisions could be found in the lands once belonging to the Hungarian crown; and at the other end of Europe in what is now the Irish Republic, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the entrenchment of the "ascendancy," a Protestant landlord class ruling over an indigenous Catholic peasantry.

Commerce (and later mining and heavy industry) also made it hard to divide Europe between homogeneous nation-states. It would seem to be an almost universal rule that ports and other trading centers attract groups of foreign residents. This was true even of Western Europe—one thinks of the Hanseatic merchants in late medieval London or of the Jews of Amsterdam. But what was occasional and of modest size in Western Europe—and therefore rarely a source of political complications—was almost the rule in the East. In Eastern Europe the towns rarely recruited themselves wholly or even predominantly from the neighboring countryside. If it was a local center of administration, a town would largely be inhabited by members of the ruling nationality—Russians in the Czarist Empire, Germans in much of the Hapsburg Empire. If it was a center of commerce, there would be Germans or Jews or others alien in language or even religion from the native substratum.

Frederick Jackson Turner succeeded in making the moving frontier so emblematic of American history that it is all too tempting to believe that, while North America was being settled, Europe's population was fixed in place. Nothing could be further from the truth. Always the movement of people went on—some attracted by prospects of trade or employment; others by the deliberate fruit of political planning, like Bismarck's settlement of German farmers in the once (and now again) Polish province of Poznan. Wars accelerated movements and produced new ones such as those which accompanied the ebb and flow of battle on the eastern front in World War I, or the subsequent flight of Russians from revolution and civil war. Indeed, until quite recently the moving frontier of the United States might best be seen as an overspill of movements within Europe itself.

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World War II saw some drastic tidying up of the European map. Hitler eliminated the vast majority of Europe's Jews and most of the rest found refuge thereafter in Israel or the United States. The victorious Allies brought about further movements—Poles moving west in front of the Russians and themselves expelling the Germans from Pomerania, Poznan, and Silesia; the Russians eliminating Germans from East Prussia, the Czechs expelling Sudeten Germans. The acceptance of the new frontiers, at least for the time being, did not halt the process. Persecution and discrimination in the Soviet Union, violence and counter-violence in the Balkans have all tended to make people conclude they would feel easier among their own kith and kin, however many generations they have been separated from them. It has, however, not been a question of leaving lands or cities vacant. We must assume that when the Russians call what used to be the city of Konigsberg "Kaliningrad" they have in fact replaced East Prussians with Russians. We know that while the Germans no longer figure in the Baltic states and while Danzig—a historic German city—is now the Polish city of Gdansk, Russians have been settled in large numbers in Latvia and to a lesser extent in the other Baltic states. Over the years, the names of many other cities have been changed to reflect the presence of new political rulers—Pressburg is now Bratislava, Laibach is Lublijana, Lemberg is Lvov (or, as the Ukrainians would prefer, Lviv).

WE SHOULD not make too much of these things, but we should not forget them either. Peoples do forget them. A striking example of this has been the reaction to the claims for independence of the three Baltic states. In looking at the issues raised, how many outsiders have reflected on the fact that Estonia and Latvia had no independent statehood at any time in the past except for the two decades previous to their annexation by Stalin in 1940? And while Lithuania had an historic past, its most important period had been as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, not on its own. In the inter-war period it was a smaller Lithuania, and Vilnius, now claimed as its capital, had been successfully annexed by Poland. Kaunas (Kovno), its capital between the wars, and Vilnius (Vilna) were in the past very largely Jewish cities and have certainly played a more important role in Jewish culture than in the essentially peasant culture of Lithuania.

Commerce has done more than dictate the location of cities and who inhabits them. It also carves out routes by which ideas migrate. For most of Europe's history, trade routes followed either the coastlines or the river valleys. Railways also followed the river systems. The links thus forged may be different from those imposed by the politically dominant powers of a particular time. The possibilities of this approach have been fully exploited in the remarkable book, *The Danube*, by Claudio Magris. Written originally in Italian by a professor at the University of Trieste whose academic subject is German literature, the work is itself symbolic. For Trieste was the outlet to the sea for the Hapsburg Empire in which the Danube provided a vital thread. Now as the northern parts of Yugoslavia—Slovenia and Croatia—feel ideologically and economically drawn again towards Central Europe and away from their links with Serbia, this past once more becomes relevant. Nor must one forget that the Dalmatian coast has memories and memorials of a Venetian as well as Roman past. Whose sea is the Adriatic? Can it be a bond between the peoples of its littoral? Even such considerations do not complete the picture of unsolved national problems now exploding in the Balkans as totalitarian governments fall—Albanians caught between Serbs and Greeks; the ultimate fate of the Macedonians. No map is final.

One cannot omit the different degrees to which modern secular ideologies have supplanted or combined with religious or national adherence. Most European ideologies, including democracy and socialism, can be traced to the impact of the French Revolu-

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tion. From its legacy many different lessons could be drawn. In many countries, the national and socialistic elements came to the fore; in one sense the Russian Revolution did no more than carry the message to its extreme. But communism's theoretical universalism was alien to the feelings of the rest of Europe. The true inheritors of 1789 were the national socialists and fascists who, in the Europe of the 1930s, could be found under various local guises from the Iberian peninsula in the West to Romania in the East, with Germany and Italy as alternative models. Britain yet again appears as an exception—being very little affected by the Continent's ideological struggles and carrying on a commitment to its own form of bourgeois democracy. And thus there is yet another reason why in Britain the rhetoric of a united Western Europe has had less appeal than among its neighbors.

Soviet power in Eastern and part of Central Europe, the sudden collapse of which marks the beginning of the present phase in the history of the Continent, struck ideological roots in an uneven fashion, as the course of events subsequent to the withdrawal of that power have made plain. As the heady months of 1989 recede we can see how premature was the assumption that communism was in total retreat and that any form of collectivist economic and social policies had no future. Those peoples who had always been part of or open to the West—Poles, Czechs, East Germans, Hungarians—have tried to resume their impeded march toward democracy. Even in these countries, the mental wrench of dispensing with an all-powerful state apparatus is proving almost as much of an obstacle as that of finding and holding a new place in the world economy. In Romania and in the Balkans, it is not even clear that the attempt is being made—Slovenia and Croatia are the exceptions that prove the rule. As for the Soviet Union itself, one needed to be a Western innocent to believe that what Mikhail Gorbachev meant by perestroika was the abandonment of the communist core of his beliefs.

For all these reasons, the talk of a "common European home" must be looked at with some degree of skepticism; far more immediate are the dangers stemming from the freedom of the states that have rediscovered their independence to pursue ancestral claims and ancestral hatred. It is of course difficult from case to case to be certain how seriously to take a particular danger. Clearly rhetoric may sometimes be adopted for purely domestic purposes. For instance, the revival of the anti-Semitism of earlier periods in Poland and Romania might lead one to believe that this must be so. There can be no material significance in anti-semitism in a country like Poland with hardly any Jews, or Romania with only an insignificant minority.

WESTERN Europeans should not be quick to criticize their Eastern neighbors. They are also prone to allow ideological rhetoric to substitute for concrete achievement. I have heard a Belgian cabinet minister proclaim that a "United States of Europe" is a must, while dismissing the idea that the existence of nine different languages among the present twelve members of the Community could present any problem—and this was the representative of a country which has had successive governmental and even constitutional crises because of its inability to cope with a mere two languages. While Corsica is in a state of latent insurrections, while Northern Italy rebels against the diversion of its productive wealth to the corrupt economic and social fiefdoms of Rome and the South, is there not a case for saying that existing national unities are already being stretched and that it is unwise to believe that those who cannot manage these more local problems will do better at a higher level?

It is true that the American Founding Fathers brought it off—but they had the embryo of a nation to bring to birth. Europe is not a nation. The dreary steeples are still there. Can Americans then afford to say that all this has no meaning or lesson for them? In principle there is no reason to believe that the reasons for the cohesion of peoples or their

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rivalries are peculiar to any one continent. Indeed, if one were looking for an illustration of the capacity of language and religion to make for a national group's survival, francophone Canada would provide an obvious example—the more striking in that its sense of identity has persisted into a period of partial secularization. So far the United States itself offers no true parallel. But if one's concern is with the American national interest, I would advise looking carefully at the language statistics of the Southwest. European experience tends to make one skeptical about the duration of treaty settlements—is Guadalupe Hidalgo a necessary exception to the general rule?□

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America on Their Minds

H.J. Kaplan

THE SUBJECT of Franco-American relations is "vast," in the Gaullian usage of the word, and for most Americans vastly boring. When the interminable General said "vast," pointing his huge beak downward at his interlocutor and dropping his voice an octave to produce his famous *gouaille*, or mocking tone, he meant that the subject or problem in question was insoluble, or long since dismissed from his august consideration, which came to the same thing; and that in any event it was idiotic of you to bring the matter up. On this issue (and it was by no means the only one) the allegedly anti-American French leader and the American people were profoundly attuned to each other.

That was a long and benighted time ago. In those days, well into the 1970s, in fact, our State Department and Congress regularly and conscientiously enquired into the solidity and quality of our relations with the Western Europeans, which were generally quite good, and in particular with the French, which were problematic, to say the least. We even ran "morale surveys," as they were called, to measure how we were faring in the Cold War competition with the Soviets for European public opinion. From all of which it transpired that the French, no less than the other Europeans, saw themselves as incorrigibly part of "the free world," even if it curled their lips to use the term, and stubbornly preferred its way of life, even when—especially when—they voted to strengthen the parliamentary and social influence of Soviet agents in their country. Here was an apparent paradox to furrow the brows of our leadership and our pundits in Washington. There was even a political flap from time to time, as during the Kennedy-Nixon presidential campaign in 1960, when one of these morale surveys was inadvertently leaked (by me, alas) to the little band of famished newsmen which hung around the American embassy in Bonn.

Still, I cannot recall that this sort of thing ever aroused much interest in the United States outside what is now called the Beltway. To be sure, there has always been a hard core of francophiles among us, artists and writers, professors, gourmets, not to mention the Order of the Cincinnati and the high society ladies who organize festivities to raise money for the restoration of Versailles, where the golden legend of our Eternal Alliance began: Franklin and Vergennes, Washington and Lafayette; and the fashion buffs, of course, and those who make pilgrimages to Giverny for Monet's water lilies, to Deauville for the races, to Cannes for the film festival, *et tout et tout*. But these are elite elements. For the rest, with the exception of brief periods of

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contention on trade policy, say, or on the role of NATO outside Europe, I think it fair to say that the French have enjoyed (or suffered from) a sort of benign neglect in America; and that this state of affairs promises, in the foreseeable future, to endure.

In short, since the departure of de Gaulle, and *a fortiori* since the Soviet Empire has begun to crumble, we Americans have become increasingly "Gaullian" on the issue of Franco-American relations, i.e., increasingly bored. Whereas the French, in case you haven't noticed, the arrogant, witty, and oh so intelligent French, are now suddenly in the position of the General's interlocutors—they can't stop bringing the matter up.

For this last there are good and obvious reasons—and they all lead the French inexorably back to the old suspicion, first voiced by Tocqueville, that our Revolution might have something to tell them about their future; even more, perhaps, than 1789 and All That. Why? Because they have finally made their entry into the modern world, decolonized, adopted a constitution of "presidential" format, like ours, kicked the Marxist habit, if not yet quite the habit of thinking of politics in the grandiose *Welt-historisch* manner they picked up from the Germans. And this above all: they have discovered economic growth, the heaven and hell of it, and in the process been *mediatised*, as they like to say, and become enamored of gadgets and popular culture. Precisely what Georges Duhamel[1] and François Mauriac and so many others—the traditionalist Academy and the avant-garde forming a popular front on this issue—warned would happen if the French turned away from their glorious traditions and went whoring after those strange American gods.

The upshot of all this is that our most ancient ally is greatly, indeed strangely, preoccupied with us at the moment, principally because of our cultural presence, which has increased exponentially since World War II. So, on one side, we have the makings of a famous romance. But there is a hitch, alas, as in the old Jewish joke about the matchmaker who eloquently persuades the tailor's son to marry Rothschild's daughter. Well, that's half the job done, he says, leaving the tailor's shop. The fact is that the current French passion for America and things American is unrequited. Not because we have taken it into our heads to dislike the French, but—worse—because we haven't. And the odd thing about this imbalance, this unrequited passion, is that it seems—at least at this moment of writing—hardly resented by my normally prideful and sarcastic French friends, unless their resentment be simmering away somewhere beneath the surface, beyond the range of my aging antennae, which I rather doubt.

To be sure, the phenomenon is sometimes ironically noted, as when someone produces an opinion poll showing that only 2 percent of the American people can name the French prime minister (the estimable Rocard) or that 3 percent think that it matters whether the French approve or disapprove our policy in Central America. But this sort of thing has come to be accepted as a fact of nature, as it were, a consequence of relative size and power and of the incuriosity and imperious ignorance of detail which, in the French historical memory, is the very privilege, precisely, of size and power. Just as we, on our side, have come to take it for granted when we cross the Atlantic and observe how assiduously the descendants of Racine and Couperin, of Rabelais and Voltaire, follow the adventures of Bill Cosby and Roseanne on their television sets, spend their time and treasure on our films, books, records, toys, designer jeans, and gadgets, so that it is no longer surprising to encounter Parisians who (thanks to the extraordinary erudition of certain French broadcasters) know more about our popular culture, especially about our films and our popular music, than we do, if

[1]Author of a famous best-selling journey through America called *Scènes de la Vie Future*. Published in 1929–30, it horrified French readers with lurid visions of what lay in store for them when they adopted vulgar and efficient American ways.

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only because we do not share—how could we?—their unrequited passion for ourselves.

The foregoing lucubrations might well have occurred to anyone who, having spent half his adult life in France, returns to Paris and finds the children of his friends besotted by our sitcoms and computer games, filled with Hollywood lore and eager to tell him who was on the drums when Johnny Hodges and Duke Ellington did "Back To Back" and "Side By Side." There's precedent for this sort of thing, of course, since nothing comes from nothing, unless it be God; and I am suddenly reminded of a bony-faced old man with curiously Mongolian eyes whom we found hiding in Tunis in 1943, when the Germans gave up in North Africa. His name was André Gide. He was brought to Algiers, where I was working in Psychological Warfare, and his first question to me was about Dashiel Hammett. How was he? And where? And was he not our greatest writer of prose? And then, too, we had Sartre and a swarm of sub-Sartreans touting Dos Passos, Faulkner, and Hemingway right after the war. But all that was still in the realm of High Culture, even if it was informed—in accordance with the Sartrean or some other ideology—with adversarial intent. To be anti-American then—and then was the time, if ever—was hardly to be out of step with American art and literature!

But my purpose is not to summarize five decades of French cultural fashion in five lines. It is rather to suggest, if you have an interest in the evolution of France as a society and a culture, and in the Europe of which it is an indispensable part; if you believe (as I do) that all this is of some relevance to our own future, that you forthwith lay hands on and read a book published by MacMillan in London last summer and a few months ago by St. Martin's Press in this country, to wit: *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception*.[2] At 258 pages, index included, it is a slim and tightly packed collection of essays by some twenty scholars, mostly French but including Robert Paxton, the historian of Vichy France; Theodore Zeldin of St. Antony's College, Oxford, the author of a monumental history (in the currently fashionable French sociological manner) of nineteenth-century France, and more recently of the unmonumental but more readable *The French*; and various other foreign observers such as the late Michael Harrison of the Geneva Institute of Advanced International Studies and Ezra Suleiman of Princeton.

THIS EXCELLENT opus is the English (and only minimally updated) version of a volume published in 1986 by Hachette in Paris with a significantly different title: *L'Amerique dans les Têtes, Un Siècle de Fascinations et d'Aversions*. The French texts were competently translated by Gerald Turner, and both volumes were edited by three senior fellows of the CERI, the international studies group of the French National Political Science Foundation, which in December 1984 organized the colloquium and elicited the texts that form the content of this book. The English title promises an account of anti-Americanism as a political phenomenon, and the book richly delivers on this score, tracing the development of Gaullist attitudes on one hand—essentially reassertions of old-fashioned French nationalism, i.e., of the political, cultural, and commercial interests of *la Grande Nation* against the barbaric new superpowers—and, on the other hand, of the communist, fellow-traveling, and neutralist attitudes, i.e., the World According to the Left-Wing French Intellectual: a twice-told tale which is brilliantly recapitulated here in essays by Denis Lacorne, Diane Pinto, Marie-Christine Granjon, Pascal Ory, and Michel Winock.

The two tendencies are quite distinct in their surface manifestations—form, tone, and sensibility—and yet more often complementary than contradictory in their substance; indeed, they are often represented by the same person at different stages of his or her career. Within the broad geopolitical frame-

[2]New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. 258 pp., $39.95.

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work which gives coherence and continuity to the thinking of Charles de Gaulle himself, it was always possible to accommodate a certain simplified or "vulgar" form of Marxism—the only one, as Raymond Aron acidly pointed out in *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, that French literary people ever bothered to pick up. The result is often a massive and, on the whole, amusing mental confusion, as exemplified by Parisian gurus like Régis Debray, erstwhile comrade-in-arms of Che Guevara, later a counselor to François Mitterrand, and most recently author of an encomium to General de Gaulle; or, better still, like Jean-Marie Benoist, a former French cultural attaché to Great Britain and professor at the Collège de France, who, according to Denis Lacorne and Jacques Rupnick in their introductory essay:

> Several years before his lightning conversion to Reaganism. . . had no qualms in decrying "the twin monolithic tyrannies of uniformity . . . Woodstock and the jeans uniform on one side; the Gulags on the other," before going on to draw a striking parallel between the said Gulags and the American media: "Almost obscenely symmetrical in their hegemonic ambitions and in the mirror-image absolutism of their lust for power, the two great empires . . . employ different methods (to share out the planet between themselves. . . . "

Etc., *ad nauseam*. Which provides our authors with a lovely pretext for quoting Pierre Hassner to the effect that

> France is the only country where it is possible to say *absolutely anything*, so long as it is said in a manner which is sufficiently systematic or romantic, apodictic or apocalyptic, best of all if one can manage to combine both, even if one has said precisely the opposite, but in the same style, just a few years or even months previously.

Insofar as *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism* is an exercise in current history, I know of no better summary of the pilgrim's progress which the French intelligentsia accomplished so articulately, passionately—and, at times, so hilariously—in the years following World War II. These were the "simultaneously elitist and revolutionary years," to quote Diana Pinto, when the only good Americans were those summoned before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, to be followed by the sudden burst of activity in the social sciences in the 1960s and the early 1970s, with Levi-Strauss, Foucault, Lacan, and the new historians, not to speak of their literary or cinematic counterparts, all ending up in the blind alley of Deconstructionism. It was during this latter period that French intellectual attitudes towards America became less peremptorily hostile, more quizzical, as the story of the Gulag began to come out, and we, on our side, became at once more real and more complex to the French: mired in Vietnam, struggling through the civil rights movement, and offering the extraordinary spectacle of a "counter-culture," allied with an oddly mindless nativist leftism that seemed to leave Marx, or any identifiable European model, far behind. All this culminated in the Great Revelation of the late 1970s and 1980s with the simultaneous collapse of the Soviet Union's image in France and the onset of an entire set of new and now favorable (indeed enthusiastic) attitudes towards America, the market economy, and the so-called "formal," "bourgeois" liberties once so contemptuously dismissed. It was in the first fine flush of this new dispensation that the senior fellows of the CERI organized their symposium and conceived the volume they called *L'Amérique dans les Têtes*.

The original French title means literally "America in our heads," "on our minds," like that song we used to sing about Georgia; and despite many interesting excursions into economics, juridical questions, sociology, and history, this is the central theme of the book: America-mania, obsession, the French fascination with America as myth and reality, the vehicle and symbol of the modernity which was so profoundly altering a society that had slumbered like Sleeping Beauty during and between the two world wars and now, having been wakened by Ernest Hemingway and well and truly kissed, was beginning what

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came to be called *les trente glorieuses*, the thirty glorious postwar years during which real per capita income would be multiplied by a factor of four or five and tens of millions of French country people would pour into the cities. All this coincided with the return to metropolitan France of more than a million overseas French, soon to be followed by hundreds of thousands of others—Arabs, Berbers, and southern Europeans—in search of work. And meanwhile, of course, there was the threat from the East, troop movements in Prague and around Berlin, and a whole new (and still rather shapeless) Europe slouching towards Brussels to be born.

With so much change and the resistance inevitably provoked by change, it should not surprise us that the French, brought up in the conviction that there was something called Civilization to which they had acquired proprietary rights, were by no means unanimously prepared to celebrate what was going on. Terms like "modernity" or "the future" were actually terms of opprobrium for many conservative Frenchman, while the so-called progressives insisted that we Americans (being capitalism incarnate) had no claim to them at all. So anti-Americanism had solid roots and antecedents on both sides of the French political spectrum; and it did indeed Rise and Fall and probably—in other forms and on other occasions—will do so again.

The colloquium of December 1984 was held, as it happens, at a moment of particularly fervid America-mania, when the first disastrous years of Mitterrand Socialism, followed by a hasty retreat to Mitterrand Capitalism, together with Afghanistan and the Soviet climb-down on the Pershing missiles, and various other factors stemming from the so-called "Solzhenitsyn effect," including the subsequent gradual de-Marxification of the media and the schools, all combined to make the French—even the previously anti-American intellectuals—feel that they had been misled (largely by *our* intellectuals) into imagining that Reagan and his administration were dimwitted, to put it mildly. Instead, with that celebrated *démesure*, or excessiveness, which since the Chanson de Roland (the national epic) has been the accepted French tragic flaw, they decided that Reagan was a genius. But the truth of the matter is that these political judgements, ephemeral even during the Cold War, are now bound to be rather more so. The America-mania so frequently evoked in *L'Amérique dans les Têtes* had already abated somewhat by the time I got to read *The Rise and Fall*. Which indicates once again that the latter title unduly narrows the focus of a work which is essentially about how the French are adapting on all levels to the modern world.

Let me be clear that none of the above is meant to suggest that a purely political hostility to America and its foreign policy, sometimes in a subterranean form, has never played a role of any importance in our relations with the French, *viz.* Henry Kissinger's tragicomic misadventures with a little man named Jobert, who deftly deflated Henry's best-laid plans for a "Year of Europe" in 1973; or more seriously, when the Mitterrand government refused to allow American warplanes to fly through French airspace to strike back at one of the more blatantly terroristic Arab leaders. This form of anti-Americanism may again become important in the post-Cold War Europe which so far we can barely discern.

In fact, it would not be unreasonable to argue that political anti-Americanism had its positive side in that it helped spur our policy-makers, almost half a century ago, not only to conceive the famous European Recovery Program but also to "sell" it to Congress and the American public, and to get it so quickly underway. My older readers, at least, will have understood that these dark allusions are to what Dean Acheson called the Creation, our postwar containment policy, which involved not only constructing a barrier against the Soviets in Europe and elsewhere but also seeing to the economic and financial health of the free world. The Europeans, of course, were essential to this enterprise, but they were absorbed in the task of clearing away the rubble and feeding their children.

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THUS IT WAS that during the months and years after V-E Day, when I served for some time in our Paris embassy before formally submitting to tonsure and taking my vows to the Foreign Service, we spent a good deal of worry and thought on anti-Americanism, then *le dernier cri* in Paris, a multi-faceted phenomenon that seems to have sprung up as soon as the huzzahs had died down. We were not always of one mind about the immediate or eventual importance of this unpleasantness, our group being composed of distinguished Old French Hands as well as some newly hatched ones like myself; but we were bound to take it seriously because the State Department, with the press already nipping at its heels, had acknowledged that it was endemic in Western Europe, and especially virulent in France. So the so-called Psychological Services which had been dismantled as hastily as our infantry divisions in 1946, were whacked together again—a year or so later, if memory serves—as Information and Cultural Services, not to mention the unmentionable, the CIA. Never mind that their function was far from clearly defined. As a nation, we were on record as having "a decent respect for the opinion of mankind," as Jefferson had unforgettably put it in the Declaration, and as a people, we were notoriously sensitive to hostility. We liked to be liked.

Or did we really?

Let me bracket that question for the moment and say merely this: in the Paris embassy and in the Foreign Service generally, we were sensitive to hostility and aspired to be liked. So much so, in fact, that our French friends were constantly advising us to keep cool and take a leaf from the English, who couldn't care less what others thought of them, and for whom in any case, as a local journalist reminded me, "the wogs begin in Calais." This was none other than Pierre Daninos, who had lived through much of the war in London. He was amused by the fact that his compatriots, when they did not irrationally hate the English, irrationally admired them, racism and all, whereas *our* (i.e., American) racism was merely barbaric, devoid of eccentricity and charm. Pierre Daninos was soon thereafter to write a humorous and immensely successful book about a mythical Major Thompson, and became too rich and busy to waste his time hanging around our press attache's office, but his real subject, of course, was the French, and it was from him, quite early on, and from some of his colleagues in the local press—highly overqualified people by our standards—that I learned that French anti-Americanism was *sui generis* and quite unlike the normally phobic relations of the Europeans to each other. It was of a different nature, deeper, more integral to their intimate self-image, as opposed to what they merely thought, at this moment or that, about this or that; and in this respect, if in no other, it was comparable to anti-Semitism, a phenomenon unto itself.

But this was not the phenomenon that showed up in the opinion polls and interested the State Department, because it gave them no figures to brandish on Capitol Hill. That was the stuff of politics, born of the Cold War and bound to die with it. The other, the deeper, the more lasting phenomenon was neither "anti" nor "pro" nor anything so simple. It had to do, although we did not know it then, with something like what the French now refer to as their identity problem.

This is nothing more—nor less—than the old French meditation on what it means, or should mean, to be French. It has gone on and will go on, God willing, for a very long time. And the fact that it currently takes the form, so brilliantly adumbrated by this little volume of essays, of a meditation on what America means to the French should give us pause—even if, as the French put it, our own heads are somewhere else. Sooner or later, it seems to me, we are going to have to sit down and do our own meditating on what France (and Europe) means to us.□

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

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Showing His Age

Frank Johnson

Noel Annan, *Our Age: Portrait of a Generation* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1990). 470 pp., £20.

ARTHUR BALFOUR is quoted as saying of Winston Churchill's *World Crisis* that Winston had written an autobiography and called it a history of the world. In *Our Age: Portrait of a Generation*, Lord Annan has written an autobiography and called it a history of his age. His subject concerns the most influential British thinkers, writers, dons, and civil servants, born around the same time as himself (1916). That is, those who, between 1945 and Mrs. Thatcher's election in 1979, secured positions from which they could run the country. Either that, or they influenced and cowed the politicians who were supposed to be running it.

Until Annan began to see some good in Mrs. Thatcher, their beliefs, tastes, and prejudices were his. This is because he was one of them. He uses the term "Our Age" throughout. Our Age did this, Our Age thought that. He means the few hundred people like himself, at the summit, and the few hundred thousand lower down, perhaps solely consisting of the readers of what John Osborne's Jimmy Porter called the "posh" Sunday newspapers, who approved of what the summiteers were doing. Lord Annan is too modest to say it, but his autobiography really is a history of his age—or rather, of the people who ended up in charge of his age. It is like a history of postwar America consisting only of the thoughts and actions of the most vocal people living inside the Beltway and on the island of Manhattan.

The book is therefore the opposite of the history-writing in which Our Age—which hereafter I shall refer to as His Age—supposes itself to believe. The book is about people—famous people at that. Yet one of the endless series of fads which influenced His Age was the French *annales* school of historiography. Its ideas are the subject of one of Annan's many skillful precis. In that school, famous people do not seem to be important at all. History is instead about large numbers of unfamous people whose lives are ruled, not by the famous, but by anonymous forces. What happened would have happened anyway. Mercifully, and if Annan is anything to go by, the people comprising His Age turn out to be like most of the rest of us. Whatever school of historiography they may embrace for public consumption, they think famous people are important and interesting. They enjoy a good gossip, particularly about other people's sex lives. Not that the sex lives are always like those of *most* other people. Of Lowes Dickinson, the Cambridge Hellenist and advocate of a more rational international order, Annan tells us: "Dickinson's private papers, edited in 1973 by Denis Proctor, the last of his loves, give a moving account of the frustration and anguish of unrequited love, all the more difficult to satisfy physically as he found sexual satisfaction only through being trampled on." We are meant to think: poor chap! We are certainly not meant to think that Dickinson's inability to find re-

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quited love was because his demands were a little unreasonable. Annan's Age was sophisticated about these matters.

But, then, Annan himself seems to have been born sophisticated, or was educated that way. From an upper-middle-class London family, he was sent not to one of the traditionalist public—that is, private—schools such as Eton or Harrow, but to Stowe, which was private but not traditionalist. Stowe had a famously "enlightened" headmaster, Roxburgh, whose biography Annan was to write. Roxburgh rejected the team games and heartiness of the rival establishments. He thought it his duty to "civilize" his charges rather than toughen them or make them into empire builders. He succeeded in the case of Annan, who must be one of the most civilized men—without the quotation marks and with no pejorative overtones intended—ever to administer universities and sit on committees (the two great activities of Annan's later life). But for every Annan, the school must have turned out many a know-all and sneerer at the tastes of the bourgeoisie. If you are told by your headmaster that you are being made civilized, the likelihood is that you will grow up thinking that the rest of your fellow citizens are barbarians who need to be civilized too.

THIS IS the problem about Annan, or rather Annan in relation to His Age: the man is so much better than His Age. He is at all the good parties in London, Oxford, and Cambridge, as are plenty of His Age. But the extra expansiveness of his manner suggests that he really wants to know what the other person is thinking across the canapés and champagne. He booms, but he also listens. This willingness to listen to opposing views, unusual among the magnificoes of British social administration, is in a way his weakness. As we shall see, he is not sure that His Age got it right after all. He thinks there was some good in Mrs. Thatcher's onslaught on it. For that reason, his book is regarded by some of London-Oxbridge's more bigoted liberals as having about it an element of the Quisling.

From Stowe, the young Annan read history at King's College, Cambridge, and studied law for a short time. Then the war came and he was drafted into intelligence. In a passage in *Our Age* explaining how it came about that several communist spies, such as Kim Philby, could be employed by British intelligence, he explains:

> The truth was that in the hectic days after war was declared there was not much time to vet anyone—certainly not in 1940. I myself was compulsorily commissioned into the Intelligence Corps because I had admitted to knowing some French and German. A civilian friend of my father's, who advised Kenneth Strong, the colonel at the head of the German section of intelligence in the War Office, on railway capacities in Europe recommended me to him as someone suitable to monitor German troop movements. No more bizarre recommendation could have been made, but all through the army in 1940 the ignorant were being told to learn. No one vetted me and within a week I was piecing together the reports of agents in the Balkans and the early stutterings of Ultra. [Anthony] Blunt was indeed rejected but in the confusion of 1940 got into MI5.

Actually, Annan reached the heart of British wartime power: the War Cabinet Office. After the war, he spent a year in Germany with the British Control Commission. The proximity of the Russians made him one of the earliest liberal Cold Warriors. He retained an interest in Germany, eventually acquiring a German wife. He might have noticed that in the decade between 1945 and 1955, West Germany recovered more quickly than Britain, even though it had adopted an economic system rejected by His Age—the free market. His own country, meanwhile, had adopted the Welfare State which His Age had prescribed without taking the precaution of producing the wealth to pay for it. But it was a long time—not until Mrs. Thatcher—before anyone of His Age began to display any confidence in capitalism or lack of confidence in the Welfare State.

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From Germany, he returned to King's and spent the next twenty years there. The history of ideas was his subject. No one in Britain this century had been so good at linking the ideas to the people who held them. In *Leslie Stephen: His Thought and Character in Relation to His Time*, he wrote the life of Virginia Woolf's father. But it is much more than that. On a smaller scale, this book, together with a later essay on the Victorian intellectual aristocracy, do for Victorian times what *Our Age* does for Annan's own.

King's was the college of John Maynard Keynes and E.M. Forster, and the postwar Annan—having the requisite charm and advanced views—became part of late Bloomsbury. He was also popular in his college. In 1956, though not yet forty, he was elected to provost when the previous incumbent died suddenly. Thus he joined the administrative wing of His Age. Unlike most progressive scholars, he was good at running things and a master committee man. In the early 1960s he thought that the ruling Conservative Party were old-fashioned Tories, that the country was riddled by class consciousness, that the universities should teach more science, and that there was much sexual repression. (For some inexplicable reason, such is the nature of political packages, the sort of people who thought the country did not spend enough on scientific education also tended to think that it should reform the laws on homosexuality, abortion, and theatrical censorship.) Annan's were the views of elite educational administrators. The Northern, classless, meritocrat Harold Wilson played on such feelings—except those concerning sexual liberation, in which he had no interest—in order to receive the endorsement of Annan's Age as the candidate of the advanced and the educated, an endorsement which did not long survive Wilson's accession to power.

Annan was thought to be dependably Labour, as at the time he was. After Wilson brought the party back to power in 1964, it having been thirteen years in opposition, Annan received a peerage. Soon he became one of what in Britain are known as "the great and the good"—the liberal-minded, formerly the conservative-minded, who fill committees, chair inquiries, and serve on the boards of artistic institutions such as the state opera companies and the National Gallery. In other words, the Establishment.

BEFORE WILSON, the Great and the Good and the Establishment had been Whiggish-Conservative or at least traditionalist. The term "the Establishment," as we know it, was invented, or at least popularized, by the British journalist Henry Fairlie in the mid–1950s, when Annan's Age was not yet in charge. Shorn of its nuances, Fairlie's argument was that stuffy traditionalists got all the best jobs, such as prime minister, archbishop of Canterbury, governor of the Bank of England, director general of the BBC, and editor of *The Times* (which in the mid–1950s could still plausibly be regarded as the Establishment's notice board). According to Fairlie, they protected one another and those who thought like them, and were—in some vague way—responsible for the country's decline. Wilson's Labour Party exploited this tale. When he was eventually given the chance to form a government, Wilson changed little in the way of the economy. He simply continued the interventionism of Harold Macmillan in the last phase of the Conservatives' thirteen years. But, unwittingly, Wilson did change the Establishment. His electoral victories in 1964 and 1966 meant that there was now a Commons majority for abolition of capital punishment, legalization of homosexuality, easier abortion, and easier divorce. These policies became associated, in the Conservative mind, with Roy Jenkins—the first home secretary in history to be an admired figure in the London *salons*. The Whiggish wing of the old Establishment had long supported such causes, but were restrained by the Tory wing and by the Conservative majority in the Commons.

The Wilson government also presided over more egalitarianism in state schooling and the near-hegemony of progressive teach-

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ing methods—pupils being encouraged to "express themselves" rather than learn by rote. Add to all this the 1960s "youth culture" and we can see that it would have been difficult for any Establishment of the middle-aged and elderly to retain much mystery or grandeur. Shorn of its influence over both the classroom and the bedroom, the old Establishment found itself presiding over nothing established. Different kinds of people therefore became archbishops of Canterbury and chairmen of committees. The new Establishment was anxious to make it clear that it was not at all stuffy, that it thought "youth" had much to teach it, rather than the other way around. *The Times*' music critic wrote an article reverentially analyzing the Beatles' harmonic structure. Another critic said they were the greatest song writers since Schubert. *The Times* was worried about whether the anti-drug abuse laws were being too harshly enforced in a case involving Mr. Mick Jagger (he was acquitted).

The Bloomsbury or the Higher Academic Bohemia of the previous day—the world in which Annan had been brought up—became the Establishment of the new day. We can be sure that Annan knew this was going on, that his hour—and that of his friends—had come. For he is quite a student of Establishments:

> Our Age was preternaturally critical of. . . the Establishment—the network of people and institutions with power and influence who rule the country. . . . The Establishment is always keen to move things along a little, make small adjustments to the way things are run, but opposes major change. It has strong links, some would say is identical with the *bien pensants* who regard themselves as the guardians of morality and manners.

As Annan reached his prime, the *bien pensants* changed the morality and manners. So the Establishment changed too. Naturally, he was in the thick of it. This apotheosis is the bigger theme of his book. But always he remembers that it was a matter of people. If you are no *annalist*, he has chosen the only readable method. G.M. Trevelyan was mocked, especially by the *annalists*, for describing his *Social History of England* as "history with the politics left out." But it seems a fair enough description of social history. Otherwise, one type of historiography must always be subsumed in another. Everything becomes part of everything else, and distinctions are lost. Annan's is history with the anonymous forces left out. Naturally, many of the influential people of His Age thought that they were the embodiment of anonymous social forces. But all the time Annan shows that a certain view or taste prevailed because of the force of a certain personality: a Keynes, a Cyril Connolly, a Bertrand Russell, and in the end a Margaret Thatcher, who tried to overthrow much of what His Age had done, and partly succeeded.

ANNAN'S thinkers were not acting in a vacuum. Their thoughts, in one generation, were the actions of the politicians and civil servants in the next. A well-known passage by Keynes, one of the heroes of His Age, has been proved right, not least as it applied to the influence of Keynes himself:

> The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believed themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.

Annan may only have written about the thinkers, and the doers they influenced. But the effect of their actions on the rest of us in Britain can be traced to them far more easily than it can to any anonymous social force. Never was a country so governed by the ideas of some defunct economists and political philosophers, except the Soviet Union. Annan has written a work of the higher gossip about the people who propagated those ideas, but it is also the best history yet written of the Britain from Attlee to Thatcher.

The story he tells, perhaps without al-

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ways realizing that he is telling it, is of how the advanced thoughts of, say, a Bloomsbury country house weekend in the 1920s—about work, sex, politics, life—first scandalized the people running the country and were eventually encouraged to spread to every public housing estate, so that the upholders of the traditional "repressive" order are now in the minority, and are more repressed than repressing. Admittedly, Annan does not see it this way. He thinks that, on the whole, it is good that the average proletarian Briton of today has views which are quite like those of Virginia Woolf or E.M. Forster—on sex and on the social order, if not on literature. But Annan is fair. Constantly, he admits what His Age thought was a good idea in theory—such as egalitarianism in education—proved not so good in practice.

He mentions, for example, the "new towns" built in the countryside to liberate people from the slums. At first, all the great and the good, accustomed as they were to assuming that they had the right to plan other people's lives, assumed that they were a good idea. Of one of these towns, Milton Keynes—halfway between London and Birmingham—Annan writes that, as the years passed, it was

> criticized not for its understanding but for its neglect of how people lived. . . . People complained that cosiness has vanished. The drab street in an old town with its pub and corner shop in which families gossiped was superior to the town based on research that showed how people were likely to live. The revolt against planning began.

One of his last chapters is called "Our Vision of Life Rejected." It is a reference to Mrs. Thatcher. She arrived, and rejected His Age. "It was she who led the hissing as Our Age made its exit from the stage." Furthermore,

> Our Age believed in government by discussion. Out of discussion came a policy, a policy which was further modified by more discussion. Bargains and trade-offs were not considered signs of weakness, they were considered sensible compromises. If agreement could not be reached, the dissenters must not be alienated. Margaret Thatcher thought this nonsense. . . .

Inevitably, "the educated classes were dismayed that she rejected their interpretation of politics." But the reader senses that Annan knows that someone such as she had to come along in the end. He even defends her over the Falklands when the rest of His Age was raging against her:

> Sensible men in 1982 knew that Galtieri and the other thugs were no reincarnation of Hitler any more than Nasser had been. But sensible men often neglect something that cannot be measured which is of immense importance to any country in peace as well as in war. National morale. De Gaulle restored France's morale after Algeria: that decent, sensible, uncorrupt politician, Mendes-France, could not have done so. No statesman was ever more criticized by intellectuals than Adenauer: yet by refusing to do what sensible men thought right—to grovel in repentance for the bestialities committed by his countrymen during the war—he won a settlement first with the West and then with the Soviet Union. Even more galling for sensible men was the sight of Ronald Reagan, a man with the slimmest of pretensions to statesmanship, rallying the United States when Americans were shaken by the debacle of Vietnam, the shame of Nixon's resignation and the humiliations inflicted by Carter's moralistic foreign policy.

For that passage alone, he has probably by now been expelled from His Age. But, on almost his last page, he asks whether Mrs. Thatcher really turned the country round. (His book was published just before her fall.) "Margaret Thatcher was even more the prisoner of her ideology than the socialists she despised," he decides. Actually, she was the prisoner of politics—of such things as her longevity and the number of enemies so embattled a figure was bound to make, and also of the return of inflation, which was a denial of her ideology.

With the accession of John Major, whose entire life has been passed in Annan's Age,

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we now have a return to a consensus. But it is not the one which Mrs. Thatcher challenged. Like most British politicians of all parties, Mr. Major is a Jenko-Thatcherite. He agrees with Mrs. Thatcher that the state should have as little to do as possible with the economy, and with Roy Jenkins that the state should have as little to do as possible with morals. There are dangers in that consensus, as in the old. Adam Smith did not think that freedom in economics would best work without its being accompanied by a suitable morality. Otherwise, before the *Wealth of Nations*, he would not have written his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*.

Half of what Annan's Age believed—the directed economy—remains rejected by Major's Age, thanks to Mrs. Thatcher. But the young Annan, his friends and mentors, also dreamt of an undirected morality. To paraphrase Khrushchev, Annan's Age said we will Bloomsbury you. And it has.□

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A Morality Tale

Martin Krygier

John Clark and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Moral Collapse of Communism: Poland as a Cautionary Tale* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1990). 431 pp., $24.95.

NO ONE PREDICTED the sudden and epidemic collapse of communism in 1989. Many are now trying to explain it. The importance of this book, what makes it stand out from most of the dozens of other works on the communist experience in Eastern Europe now appearing, is that it has an overarching and arresting theme that, properly understood, points to such an explanation.

That theme is encapsulated in the book's title: the collapse of communism is, essentially and profoundly, a *moral* collapse. Stated as baldly as that, the proposition might seem both banal and empty of explanatory power. But as it is elaborated and explored by Clark and Wildavsky—in a style that is always sophisticated and often mordant and witty—it is novel and illuminating, casting light not only on the reasons for the failure of the communist regimes but on the prospects for progress in the postcommunist period.

A natural first reaction to predictive failure is to search for particulars of which one was unaware or which were overlooked. Many social scientists have been led to search for a host of such particulars, usually political and economic ones. How misleading were Soviet statistics? How divided were communist leaders? How run down were East German factories? How deeply diseased are distributive systems in the East? What is it that markets know that central planners cannot?

It is important to get these tangible matters right, but the house-of-cards collapse of communism suggests that deeper things were awry. After all, communist leaders still had armies, police, and secret police, and whatever else collapsed, these still carried loaded guns. Why on the whole, and particularly in Poland, were they not called upon to use them? And why did attempts to use them as of old—in Romania, for example—backfire so badly?

It may be that our explanatory difficulties lie not in specifics but in something more general and enveloping. We lack, or are uncomfortable with, the idiom appropriate to one of the most important ways in which social orders can succeed or fail—morally. Clark and Wildavsky maintain that the collapse of communism was not simply a product of despotism, poor institutions, the senselessness of comprehensive planning, the absence of markets, or contradictions between forces and relations of production. All these played a part, many of them are linked, and in this wide-ranging work Clark and Wildavsky discuss them all. They were all, however, connected to a more distinctive and profound failure of communism—its moral failure. They contributed to it, but it, equally, to them.

The language of morals, of course, has often figured in people's *evaluation* of communism, with supporters attributing virtues to it and opponents frequently using moral cate-

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gories to condemn its regimes. What seemed appropriate for praise or blame, however, has rarely been accepted as apt for explanation. Tough-minded analysis of the fate of nations and economies has seldom been conducted in the idiom of morals. And almost no social scientist (aside from the Pope) has ventured to suggest that key, causally significant weaknesses of communist regimes might have to do with their immorality. That is what Clark and Wildavsky successfully suggest, and therein lies the novelty and force of their work.

WHAT DOES *it mean to be* "demoralized"? The word is usefully ambiguous, suggesting both loss of morale and corruption of morals. Within the range and interconnection of its several meanings lie some of the key disabilities of communist political economies.

In its most usual sense, to be demoralized means that morale is gone. This is patently true of the Communist Parties in most of Central and Eastern Europe, preeminently Poland. Long before they lost office their morale was shattered. No one believed them or believed in them. Worse still, they no longer believed, or believed in, themselves.

Moreover, anyone who has spent time in a communist country knows that it was not only leaders who were demoralized. Meeting all those denizens of "abnormal" societies and dreamers about "normal" ones—all those queuers, fixers, finaglers, currency changers; tired, sad, unwell, hopeless, perpetual shoppers in perpetually empty shops; shabby inhabitants of smelly, filthy, identical, scruffy apartment blocks; non-workers in non-jobs—one became aware of a pervasive demoralization, a kind of overwhelming slackness of social muscle, which was much more disturbing and inescapable than the fate of a few corrupt and incompetent communists.

Of course the two sorts of demoralization are closely linked. For in all communist political economies (CPEs) only one institution stands to take credit or blame: the party-state which insinuated itself everywhere, sought to control everyone, and so was held responsible for everything. These two entities—state and society—symbiotically shared and fed each other's demoralization, with the consequence well described by Clark and Wildavsky:

> Both those who lied about its operating norms and those who were lied to are disgusted because in all CPEs the system breeds similar effects, either hostility or disbelief. When these hollow states no longer exist in the hearts and minds of their citizens, when someone pushes on them, they collapse. . . . [W]hen push comes to shove no one pushes back. The collapse of communism is, above all, a moral collapse.

And here we have the other sense in which state and society are demoralized: they are not only low in morale, they are low in ordinary morals as well. Again the most obvious manifestation of this is in the state: it is full of lies. Public language is totally fraudulent. The interaction between virtually every level in a command economy is built on lies. Clark and Wildavsky discuss the pathologies of "planned" economies in detail, and they make it clear that such economies would not work even if everyone told the truth. But no one does, and that in and of itself makes planning impossible:

> It may appear laughable to talk about plans as embodying moral relations. Nevertheless, without being grounded in the common morality, no plan can be worthwhile. Those who provide data must be trying to be accurate, or there is no point in hearing from them; those who use data must be honest in how they present them, or there is no point in doing anything. Those who send instructions must believe these can be carried out; otherwise why bother? When plans are tissues of lies, however, lies of such different sizes and shapes that it is not even possible to detect a consistent bias, the main effect of the plan is to inculcate lying in all who participate in it. . . . [T]he patterns of mutual falsification have made plans useless to everyone.

Lying is only part of the story. Stealing and dealing are also endemic, for they must be. The public economy is short of everything,

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makes nothing of quality (except for military use or occasionally for export), maintains nothing, repairs nothing. The "black" economy makes up the slack. Everyone needs it, everyone uses it. Everyone is alienated from the state, but the state employs everyone and owns everything, so the state is plundered. It is a world in which "criminality in regard to the political economy first becomes normal, then normative."

THE CONSEQUENCES of these linked forms of demoralization, Clark and Wildavsky suggest, are profound. In personal life they lead to self-contempt. We are not talking about some members of a society who choose (or are forced) to be criminals, but of a society as a whole which cannot help but be criminal. Between the often intensely moral aspects of life among family and intimates, and the intense amorality of dealings in the world, there appears to be neither continuity nor contradiction—no connection really—and no space for a normatively stabilized and regulated "civil society."

More deeply still and extending the insight of the great French sociologist Emile Durkheim, the authors argue that the necessary criminality of public life in CPEs robs the economy of indispensable normative sources of trust and predictability, without which routine and mutually beneficial cooperation among strangers cannot occur.

> Every economy is not only a *political economy* that specifies and expresses a pattern of power relations; it is also a *moral economy* that expresses and shapes ideas about how people ought to relate to each other. No system of law, no type of contract is sufficient to sustain productive economic relations without the desire on the part of the interested parties to act honestly toward each other. . . . [In CPEs however, people] must assume that, unless they are dealing with a member of their family or a trusted acquaintance, they are dealing with someone who is not to be trusted. They will tailor their behavior to their expectations. Bad moral behavior drives out good.

There is nothing pious, sanctimonious, or preachy in this point; it is really about the social and economic *utility* of morality. And, if anything, Clark and Wildavsky understate the case; for eloquent as they are on the past costs of communist immorality, they do not really explore its future consequences. Yet these consequences may turn out to be decisive.

At the moment, elites in the East are (somewhat anxiously) keen to build democratic political institutions and free economic markets. This is also what Clark and Wildavsky advise, because the only successful civil societies we know have both, societies without either are unsuccessful, and there are no known alternatives.

However, if, as this book argues, CPEs have been profoundly demoralized and morally corrupted, and if a successful political economy has normative, moral—one might say civilizational—prerequisites, then post-CPEs appear to lie in a normative gap unlikely to be filled quickly or easily. This is all the more so since no one, including Clark and Wildavsky, has much to say about how to fill it.

In a critique of Hayek's *Constitution of Liberty*, Raymond Aron observes that "If society is to be free it must first exist." Many enthusiasts for free markets have ignored this. They have much more to say about how a society should operate than about its conditions of existence, since most theorizing about free societies has occurred in robust civil societies, where the question did not arise. Some free societies, particularly in the West, exist as a result of spontaneous growth over centuries; some—like Japan—because of successful grafts onto, and partial but organic transformation of, existing societies; some—as in parts of Latin America—because real societies with real markets have been freed from despotic rule. But who knows how the normative conditions of civil society can be generated from this social and moral wreckage, and who is attending to these problems? How do you create an independent, interconnected society from more or

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less pulverized atoms, as exist in Romania, or the normative bases of civil society from the demoralized CPEs that Clark and Wildavsky describe, whose most distinctive achievement was the corrosion of social linkage and its normative underpinnings? These are questions presently without answers.

One would, then, like to hear a lot more from Clark and Wildavsky on how to overcome the moral *consequences* of communism. They do not really confront the task of linking or continuing the moral implications of their diagnosis into their largely political and economic prescriptions. Perhaps democratic institutions and markets will generate their own prerequisites, but that is a bootstraps operation of no small dimensions.

When dissidents in communist states stressed the importance of (re-)constructing civil society in the space between state and private affairs—a space which communists had invaded and in large part extinguished—they thought in basically political terms. Certainly their achievements were primarily political: they established political bodies and linkages outside and against the state. And they dominated these bodies: Solidarity, almost the only independent organization in Eastern Europe, was not pluralist. In 1989 the focus of attack in Poland—the communist leadership—collapsed, and the most distinguished elites of "self-organization" took over the existing state. The society itself was again left without leaders. Again as before, the society had few crystallized interest groups, few organic channels or institutions for articulating and pressing interests, few "normal" horizontal linkages, and an anomic public sphere with few norms of non-intimate interpersonal behavior other than the deformed ones that Clark and Wildavsky describe. It did have many complaints—all directed, as before and at the same time, to and against the state.

The new government began a primarily economic "revolution from above"—highly market-oriented—with some real achievements, considerable costs, and negligible social consultation or involvement. Meanwhile Poles went on trying to survive as before, with less money, higher prices, and a falling standard of living. Since no one seems to be attending to much else—for example social organization or even cooperative consultation—it is not clear what might undo or defuse the widespread social despair, distrust, and hostile dependence upon the state, inherited from the preceding regime. But it is clear that it can be exploited.

CLARK AND Wildavsky are much too intelligent to be confident about anything to do with the future of Poland. In particular they express justified concern that a restless population in straitened circumstances might fail to recognize the difference between a good new government which promises much but delivers little and a bad old government which promised much but delivered little. However, they conclude optimistically with a quotation from Czeslaw Milosz. Asked what Poles might have learned after forty years of communism, Milosz replied, "Resistance to stupidities." Even that is uncertain.

In the presidential elections of November-December 1990—the first democratic test of an honorable and well-intentioned government, bequeathed a calamitous inheritance, and in office for only a year—Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the Solidarity prime minister and government leader, was humiliated. He gained 18 percent of votes cast, behind Lech Walesa whose program was simply himself in a hurry (no small thing, of course, but not enough and maybe too much). At least that was a plausible contest. More distressing was the appeal of an obscure blow-in from Canada whom no one knew and who had nothing to offer except that he claimed to be rich. He gained a quarter of the vote, twice.

In the course of the past year and particularly in the campaign, all sorts of primitive emotions and attachments surfaced—including anti-Semitic ones in this land without Jews—and many extraordinary things were said. It was as if a rather confused, angry, hungry, and still sleepy Rip van Winkle—on

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whom a nasty and debilitating experiment had been conducted between times—had suddenly awakened after fifty years (for the war cannot be forgotten). Asked his opinion of current affairs and told that, now that he was awake and free he should get on with things, he hankers after old symbols but finds everything daunting, as indeed it is. It is enough to make anyone nervous, flail about, and want a firm if unpredictable hand. It is not, however, an ideal recipe for democracy or what Max Weber called "sober, bourgeois capitalism."

That having been said, any pessimism should be measured and restrained. In hard times and places, pessimists always have more than enough evidence for their views; and optimists easily look unrealistic. Poland has been such a place for a long time, but in recent years the well-founded predictions of pessimists have repeatedly come undone, while the utopian aspirations of optimists have repeatedly been realized—partly because they believed in them. And many of those optimists are still at work in Poland today. The country has suffered hugely over the last fifty years. It has also accomplished mightily over the last fourteen. The suffering has been political, economic, and moral. The accomplishments have been political and heroically moral. They have not yet been economic or mundanely moral. Yet in the long haul they need to be both, and at the same time.□

WHAT IN THE NAME OF GORBACHEV IS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION?



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How Gorbachev Saved Reagan, Bush, and the World

William C. Bodie

Sidney Blumenthal, *Pledging Allegiance—The Last Campaign of the Cold War* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990). 386 pp., $22.95.

IN MID–1989 a senior editor at a major New York publishing house was asked about the relative merits of several upcoming volumes on the 1988 U.S. presidential election. His firm, which had published political chronicles in the past, declined to bid on books about the Bush-Dukakis contest. "Television coverage has made the Teddy White approach to these campaigns obsolete," he remarked. "These days, to sell an election book, you really need a gimmick."

It is indeed hard to imagine today's publishing barons, or journalism students, buying into Theodore White's *Making of the President* series, with its careful reportage, modest prose, and quaint respect for American political institutions. For some time, would-be campaign historians have sought other pegs—or gimmicks—on which to hang their tales. To the *Nightline* generation, even Joe McGinniss' treatment of Republican "handlers" in the 1968 Nixon-Humphrey race or Timothy Crouse's angle on press coverage of the 1972 election may seem archaic. With *Pledging Allegiance*, Sidney Blumenthal hopes to revive the genre by wedding electoral politics to another large theme—in this case, no less than the history of the Cold War itself.

Readers interested in the campaign's prosaic details—primary results, campaign strategies, vote counts—will be disappointed. Such minutiae as the results of the Democratic primary in New York, for example, are not mentioned. Instead, the dust jacket boasts that, "Blumenthal takes the reader behind the public facade of American politics." This is achieved, in the author's words, by relating the election to "the largest event in the world"—the end of the Cold War. Blumenthal is nothing if not a big thinker.

Blumenthal, who covered the 1984 campaign for the *New Republic* before serving as a *Washington Post* political reporter, is perhaps best known for his acerbic distaste for the conservative "counter-establishment" that sprouted in Washington during the Reagan years. But in his new book, the usually acidic Blumenthal reveals a decidedly warmer side with his near adolescent infatuation with Mikhail Gorbachev—a figure variously credited by the author with "saving" Ronald Reagan's presidency, sparing George Bush from exposure in the Iran-*contra* scandal, and "creating the preconditions for the revival of liberalism" in America (all this, and destroying communism in Russia and liberating Eastern Europe, too).

The thesis of *Pledging Allegiance* is that while Gorbachev was remaking the world and destroying old "shibboleths and taboos," the political class of the United States was behaving like a dysfunctional family, playing out destructively familiar roles, and unable to

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deal with new therapies. Blumenthal believes the Cold War—which he alternately refers to as a "metaphysical system" and an "epistemological system"—has shaped and deformed American political life for the past four decades. Anyone who challenges the comfortable mantras of "Cold War Conservatism" is "speaking the unspeakable" and banished from the political mainstream. In an ironic Cold War coda, Blumenthal presents Ronald Reagan, whose "politics involved a massive misapplication of memory," as the one voice of "reality" in the political vacuum of 1988 (though only after Gorbachev helped him shed all the vestiges of Reaganism).

Although Chapter One is entitled "A Long Twilight Struggle" after the JFK speech which marked the "zenith" of the Cold War, Blumenthal shows little interest in examining the U.S.-Soviet rivalry as anything other than an exercise in psychotherapy. On Washington's reaction to the emerging competition in the 1940s, for example, he is satisfied to recount Walter Lippmann's rationalization of the Red Army's occupation of Eastern Europe. We read nothing of Stalin's imposition of communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe, his "two camp" thesis, the infiltration of labor movements in the West, or Soviet involvement in the Greek civil war. The Baltic states may exist in the paranoid celebration of Captive Nations Day, but nowhere else. The Korean War, it appears, was important only because it created an "overheated political atmosphere" in which liberals "obscured their inherent realism even from themselves."

One does find the occasional hasty critique of Moscow—"the Soviets provoked voyages to the brink over Berlin and Cuba," "there was a Soviet buildup in the 1970s"—but they are few, and always followed by an exculpatory "but." "Cold War" is used exclusively to identify all manner of American ills and malefactors, with Richard Nixon as the archetypal figure. "The Cold War," Blumenthal asserts with a confident flourish, "was Nixon's reason for being."

Pledging Allegiance begins with a neatly revised history of the Institute of the United States and Canada, an organization that serves the propaganda interests of the Politburo. For Blumenthal, however, "The task of the institute's experts was to comprehend America and to communicate their views to the Central Committee and the Soviet president." For such purposes they "had been granted a remarkable freedom," even though "some of them were lying, perhaps even without knowing they were doing so." Under Gorbachev, though, "These Soviets, who formerly thought of themselves only as experts or Communists, have taken on the mentality of citizens."

As for the leader and his works, Blumenthal is likewise tolerant: "Though Gorbachev did not immediately bring dishwashers into the average Russian's kitchen, his policies did something more important. The heart of totalitarianism was now stone dead." In its place there appeared an order we might even learn from. A Soviet official is quoted approvingly: "We are only just coming to democracy, just discovering its virtues. But, in some ways, Russia might be more liberal, in terms of discussing alternatives." And when Ronald Reagan himself was wounded by scandal, his "deliverance came through a *deus ex machina*, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, who was determined to end the Cold War." Dissenting views—say, from citizens of Lithuania, or any of the republics—are absent from this account.

INDEED, Blumenthal's primary focus is how the U.S. political culture was found wanting when it came to purging itself of Cold War demons. In the Reagan era, of course, these demons were ascendant, especially as conservatives "raised tens of millions of dollars and achieved control over a host of foundations." He postulates something called the Movement State, in which conservative zealots "embedded" in Washington prevent us from recognizing our problems. This Movement State led to the Iran-*contra* scandal and the establishment's whitewash of it, abetted by the cowed press

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corps. The Tower Board was composed of the Washington "establishment. The powers that were, are and will be. . . . Power, as they understood it, neither began with [Reagan's] election nor would end with it." Howard Baker, brought in to clean up the mess in the White House, had "been the ranking Republican on the Watergate committee, where his job was to protect the party from scandal." Nowhere do we learn the identity of his employers. Nor is the "Iran" end of the scandal considered, since the lesser "*contra*" end fits far more neatly into Blumenthal's Cold War matrix.

His views on the press during this period may surprise some readers, for he was a member of Washington's elite press at the time. He paints his colleagues as more compliant than vigilant, more confused than enlightened, ratifiers rather than inquisitors. During the Iran-*contra* hearings, our "political press corps were like critics who did not know if they were reviewing Samuel Beckett, David Mamet, or Neil Simon." Little improvement is detected on the campaign trail; of the candidacy of Richard Gephardt, Blumenthal notes that "the press, reflecting the Washington opinion making elites, refused to accept his candidacy as genuine." A campaign book by a team of *Newsweek* scribes is dismissed as "less a book than a corporate product—Teddy White as an assembly line." He is especially critical of those "objectivist" reporters who disavowed any conscious biases: "In an election notable for its manipulativeness, the reporters who believed their 'straight' craft insulated them were the most manipulated figures in political society. Thus the press, too, played its role in the Cold War drama of 1988." Again, the reader is left to wonder about the identity of this drama's producer.

As with so many works of contemporary non-fiction, *Pledging Allegiance* takes leap after speculative leap into the minds of its principals. Thus Gorbachev, listening to Ronald Reagan's utopian view of nuclear disarmament, "came to understand this vision. . . . [and] emerged as Reagan's ultimate handler." After Iran-*contra* broke, "When Reagan sank to his lowest point, Gorbachev, with an eye cocked to the ticking clock, began furiously rewriting." Even Reagan's mind is open to Blumenthal's reading, as in this novel interpretation of the 1985 Geneva summit:

> He explained that he had glimpsed a new age in which nuclear weapons were banished and the two superpowers truly cooperated. He had seen, perhaps, the 1951 movie *The Day the Earth Stood Still*, in which an alien threatens destruction of the planet if all nuclear weapons are not done away with. Perhaps Reagan did not have the movie in mind—who knows?

Who, indeed? One suspects that this reference tells us more about how Blumenthal's mind works than Reagan's.

As for the campaign itself, we learn almost nothing new about Bush or Dukakis. Bush is portrayed as the dutiful establishmentarian son of a series of demanding Dads: father Prescott Bush, mentor Richard Nixon, and benefactor Ronald Reagan. Dukakis is sketched predictably as the bloodless technocrat whose refusal to adopt a full-throated liberalism in the campaign made him "Bush's chief co-conspirator in perpetuating the Cold War drama." The only figures who seem to engage his sympathies are Gary Hart and Mario Cuomo. Yet here, too, consistency is not one of the author's virtues. Thus Hart, whose windy perorations comparing himself to Gorbachev are fondly received by Blumenthal, "set up a think tank, The Center for New Democracy," which "became a policy and speechwriting shop, in the service of his immediate political needs." But woe unto conservative Pierre duPont, whose " 'new ideas' had been gleaned by his staffers, who raced through the conservative think tanks in Washington, picking up the most extreme economic proposals." Governor Cuomo, praised for going *mano a mano* with Richard Perle and Elliott Abrams, "brought a physical audacity to politics." Bush adviser Roger Ailes, however, is taken to task for similarly instructing "his candidates to invade the men-

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tal and, if possible, the physical space of their opponents."

The book's most intriguing pages are those devoted to the curious schisms among the foreign policy advisers in the two campaigns. On the Democratic side, the disparate forces for good (and sources for the author) are portrayed as underdogs struggling against the cabal of "Cold War mandarins" at Harvard's Kennedy School. This group, Blumenthal charges—save the "influential" professor Robert Reich—kept Dukakis from accepting the wisdom contained in Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.[1] On the GOP side, Blumenthal discovers an alleged split between former Henry Kissinger aides such as Brent Scowcroft, always "following the latest Kissinger ukase," and Bush's wily political partner, James Baker, himself slow to counter the Kissingerians until his eyes were opened by—whom else?—Eduard Shevardnadze.

In a 386-page book about the 1988 presidential election, this is all the author has to say about the result: "On election day, November 8, George Bush won the presidency, 54 to 46 percent, with 426 votes in the Electoral College to 112. The degradation of political debate produced the lowest voter turnout since 1924." There is nothing on such mundane things as how close the vote was in key states, on how the tickets fared in various regions, on how the vice presidential candidates helped or hurt the tickets. It is not merely that Blumenthal is bored with the election (though he is); more than that, he is anxious to describe the events of 1989 as Gorbachev's triumph and Bush's awkward acquiescence. The intimidation of the Baltic by Moscow in 1989 is absent, as is any other fact embarrassing to Gorbachev. And why not? As Blumenthal explains, "After Tiananmen Square, the course of repression, if it were ever a real option for Gorbachev, was decisively ruled out."

This book proudly repackages the "revisionist" view of the origins of the Cold War, which holds that the U.S. bears the brunt of the historical blame for the onset of hostile relations between the superpowers. This thesis has not stood the test of rigorous scholarship or the release of archival evidence from Soviet sources. But even the revisionists tried to explain what the "Cold War" was about: the division of Europe, strategic competition, alternate views of social relations, and so on. Blumenthal has no such explanation; nor does he seem to feel the need for one.

Certainly the 1988 election was not among this country's most edifying. Neither candidate will be remembered for his oratorical resonance or strategic vision. Both were negative campaigners. Neither expressed certainty about the permanence of Gorbachev's reforms, a decision which now appears to be quite sensible. However one judges their competing foreign policy views, it is unfair to adduce, as Blumenthal does, psychological impediments for a reticence that was actually the product of a cautious and careful reading of available evidence.

Because of the author's selective approach to a conceptually daunting topic, this book fails as an account of either the 1988 election or the end of the Cold War. What interest it has derives from its illumination of how certain leftist polemicists have coped with communism's collapse. Behind the foggy musings on metaphysics and world historical events that are meant to elevate "mere" political reportage, there is the same readiness to see events in the Soviet Union from the point of view of the ruler rather than the ruled that has often stained much left-of-center thinking in the past. But once that has become clear, the book is tedious going, leaving one yearning for the appearance of a new Teddy White—or even the old Hunter S. Thompson.□

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[1]Blumenthal plugs Kennedy's book repeatedly, a favor returned by Professor Kennedy with a blurb in the publisher's advertisement for *Pledging Allegiance*: "Beautifully done, ironic, learned, and with a strong argument." Similar logrolling occurs with James Chace, who is flattered in the Acknowledgments and flattering on the back cover.

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Northern Exposure

The Strategic Consequences of Perestroika

Alvin H. Bernstein

SOVIET COMMANDOS were killing citizens in the Baltic republics last January, in part because the old military thinking and the groups whose interests are served by it are alive and well in Gorbachev's newly packaged Soviet state. The Soviet military has always been hypersensitive about its vulnerability on the northern flank. Recent radical changes in the European security structure play to such fear and heighten anxiety about the Baltic states' demands for independence, as well as about the implications of those demands for the military's future. If we wish to understand what is happening now on the borders of the Soviet Union, and where it might eventually lead (or be led), we have to answer an unwelcome question: If the Cold War is over, why do we still feel a chill wind?

The old geostrategic views that drove foreign policy before Gorbachev are still influencing policy now. Had there been a war in Europe in pre-perestroika days, the Soviets would have fought a fierce holding action on the northern flank (what the Soviets called the Northwestern Theater of Operations, or TVD) in order to ensure a decisive defeat of NATO forces on the Central Front in West Germany (the Western TVD). Victory would have had to have come quickly, before the conflict went nuclear or the Warsaw Pact's economy broke under the strain of protracted war.

The creation of forces necessary for such ambitious war plans provoked a counter build-up in the West and led to an arms race in the 1980s which, as we know, the Soviet economy could not sustain and from which Mikhail Gorbachev sought to escape. It also produced a counter maritime strategy for the region that drove Soviet military planners to distraction. U.S. naval and naval air forces, by deploying to northern waters, would threaten the USSR itself and so prevent the Soviets from concentrating on the Central Front. Superior U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, meanwhile, would imperil the Soviets' most survivable nuclear retaliatory strike force—their valued fleet of ballistic submarines (SSBNs).

In Gorbachev's new world, such military calculations were supposed to become obsolete. NATO's defensive might would dissipate because the West would believe that the USSR was becoming a democracy. Many Western observers, however, have been more impressed by the centrifugal forces unleashed by perestroika, the dilapidated state of the Soviet economy, and the effective dissolution of the Warsaw Pact military alliance, than by professions of incipient liberalism.

Alvin H. Bernstein is the director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. The views expressed here are entirely his own and do not represent those of the National Defense University or any other government agency.

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

Real changes in Soviet concepts of security, needless to say, emerged in stages. Even after Gorbachev promised the United Nations, on December 7, 1988, that he would unilaterally withdraw six tank divisions from Central Europe, the Soviet General Staff continued to think it could conduct a successful preemptive attack on Western Europe. It assumed, however, that it could march the Red Army through friendly Eastern European nations—an assumption that promptly crumbled along with the six puppet regimes in Central Europe.

NOW, AS THE possible area for conflict in Europe shifts from West Germany's eastern border toward the Polish-Soviet frontier, thereby demolishing the Central Front strategy, the Soviet military appears to be hatching fresh plans and advocating concomitant diplomatic tactics. The geostrategic importance to the Soviet Union of the Scandinavian and Baltic countries will increase as the protective layers of Central Europe—the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations—fall away. The northern region will come to be viewed as essential to stopping Canadian and American forces from crossing the Atlantic. From the perspective of the Soviet General Staff, these forces, once in Europe, would no longer simply reinforce the Central Front, but would be able to march through the now-friendly countries of Western and perhaps even Central Europe to the Soviet frontier.

Such a view of the new strategic imperatives would explain recent Soviet initiatives for mutual naval disarmament. These will probably seek to remove U.S. carrier forces from Northern Europe, establish the northern waters as an ASW-free zone, terminate U.S. access to early-warning facilities at Thule in Greenland, and close the NATO base at Keflavik, Iceland. The goal may be less to enhance global stability than to limit NATO's future capacity to reinforce its rapidly thin-

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ning Western forces. It is worth noting that the Soviets are still modernizing their forces in the Baltic and in the Leningrad Military District.

The issue is whether the Soviets are genuinely willing to construct a new, inclusive European security structure that will lock a democratized East into Europe, or are simply in the process of transferring the Iron Curtain from what was the inter-German border to the Polish-Soviet frontier. If the possible area for conflict in Europe merely moves east and north, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania may replace the German Democratic Republic as the probable center of crisis in the 1990s. This could result in a Europe less stable than the one we knew during the Cold War.

The Soviet General Staff understands that the geostrategic importance of the Baltic states has increased. This has occurred at the very moment when the demand for freedom, stimulated by the spectacle of political pluralism in the Warsaw Pact nations, is making Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania far more volatile than the GDR ever was. Since massive troop reductions will decrease NATO's ability to affect a crisis, we can expect the Soviets to be less inhibited about resorting to coercive diplomacy, or even some sort of preemptive action. They might try to seal off access to the area in a crisis, confident that the risks of a Western military response have decreased to an acceptable level. That such an action might eventually lead to combat between Soviet and, say, Swedish forces has been discussed in the Swedish press. Depending on how such a crisis developed and on the status of the Baltic states at the time, such "defensive" actions could include incursions into the territories of neighboring states like Poland or Finland.

This new reality would bring with it, for the first time, the possibility of regional rather than theater conflict in Europe, as events in the Baltic region in January clearly demonstrated. The Soviet security specialist Sergei Karaganov may well have been worried about this when, last spring, he warned the West against repeating the mistakes made at the end of the World War I. Just as the West failed to create "a just Europe" then, he said, so the present period of change could lead "to realignments, prolonged instability, or even to a complete reversal—not to the relatively stable 'two-camp' system, but rather to something again transitional, such as the Versailles system."

The Baltic states are pursuing a strategy of forcing Gorbachev to grant them the autonomy they desire or lose the international benefits of perestroika. The Soviets now have a choice, but security concerns and the effect real perestroika will have on some interest groups within the Soviet military will make Moscow's leaders reluctant to give the republics their way.

The Soviets could resolve the security problem. It hinges on the future status of the Kaliningrad base and the nature of the security relationship between the Baltic states and the central Soviet government. The Kaliningrad region, although located on the Baltic coast and surrounded by Lithuania, Byelorussia, and Poland, is politically part of the Russian Republic, not the Baltic states. The militarization of the Kaliningrad region after World War II allowed the defense of Leningrad to move from the Gulf of Finland into the Baltic Sea, thus transforming Finland from a front-line state to a flank. Just as this change induced the USSR to give Finland domestic autonomy in the 1950s, so now the maintenance or expansion of the formidable military and naval facilities at Kaliningrad could allow for the finlandization of the Baltic in the 1990s. This is the solution to the Soviet security problem.

The military forces around Kaliningrad would keep all independent Baltic states between two heavily militarized regions: Kaliningrad and Leningrad. Lithuania has already promised to grant the Soviet government a corridor to Kaliningrad through its territory as the price for independence. The Estonian minister of state, Raivo Vare, also acknowledges that "without taking into consideration the legitimate security interests of the Soviet

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Union there will be no independence for Estonia." The head legal adviser to the Estonian Supreme Council has agreed that Estonia will accept an independence treaty that provides the Soviets with military bases for some length of time. The idea of finlandizing these countries goes back to Yuri Andropov, who appreciated the superiority of Soviet-Finnish relations to those between the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. He saw this approach as the most reliable way of meeting the legitimate security requirements of the Soviet Union in the Baltic while promoting stability in the Nordic region.

Without such a solution NATO and Soviet planners will have to prepare for the kind of periodic upheaval in the Baltic states that we have seen during the past forty-five years in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. Now, however, NATO would have more difficulty managing the reaction to these upheavals in contiguous Western states, and the Baltic people will prove more intransigent than their Warsaw Pact counterparts. Soviet analyst Andrei Piontkowsky warned last January that his country would probably have to endure at least one more "vale of tears" on its road to democratization.

The resurgence of what the Latvian government refers to as the "reactionary circles in the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet armed forces" constitutes the most immediate threat not only to European stability but, ironically, to the survival of the Soviet Union. Boris Yeltsin rightly observed that the present counter-offensive by the old line will be a blow to the slender possibility that a majority of the fifteen republics will sign Gorbachev's new treaty redefining the terms of union. The union of these republics can continue only if its component parts are allowed to function in a loose confederation. If the reactionaries prevail and try to impose tight control, the union will splinter amid internal strife. The world might then witness the violent break-up of a multinational state possessing tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. A chill wind indeed.□

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Of Bishops and Redskins

James Bowman

IN WHAT SENSE of the word, as traditionally understood, is the United States of America a nation? By chance, I went to see Kevin Costner's hit film, *Dances With Wolves*, on the same day last autumn that the American Catholic bishops resolved to instruct President Bush in his conduct of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. It struck me then that there was a connection between these two manifestations of moralizing, and the parallel was further underscored by the run of the film coinciding with the build-up to the war, and then with the war itself.

Neither the bishop's statement nor Costner's film addresses directly the question of American nationhood, but both adopt a point of view which is at once typically American and in opposition to any specifically American approach to the world. That is, both endeavor to convince us that if indeed the United States is a nation, it is a nation unlike any other; a collection of disembodied souls owing loyalty to no other place or people but only to an idea of universal justice. It is a nation, in short, of anti-nationalists. How very American!

In addressing President Bush, for example, Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk of Cinicinnati, the president of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, wrote: "As U.S. citizens, we are concerned how our nation can best protect human life and human rights and secure a peaceful and just resolution to the crisis." As U.S. citizens? What has their citizenship got to do with such avowedly non-national or supra-national goals as these? "We hope and pray that these reflections," the archbishop continued, "will strengthen our nation's determination to pursue true justice through peaceful means."

The assumption here is clear. To Archbishop Pilarczyk the national purpose and the national interest of Americans are, or ought to be, identical with the purposes and interests of God—or of some universal man whose sole concern is, as he puts it in his opening paragraph, "to preserve human life and human rights." Although he acknowledges in the letter that the church admits the possibility of a "just war," it is hard to imagine any nation in the real world that would fight it.

If Pilarczyk were just some other-worldly cleric there would be no need to go on about this. But his strength lies in the fact that he speaks not for the Catholic church in America, but for a peculiar Americanism in the Catholic church. For how much different is his point of view from that of Secretary of State Baker's when he said to the troops in Saudi Arabia that they were there not to defend American interests but American *values*?

This is a long, long way from home, but I think that most Americans are home wherever our principles are. And that's really what this crisis

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> is all about. It's about the defense of the values that made the United States of America the finest and greatest country in the world.

That these "values" are for the most part the very ones of which the archbishop would approve was attested by President Bush himself in the opening of the State of the Union address:

> What is at stake is more than one small country, it is a big idea: a new world order where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind—peace and security, freedom and the rule of law.

In statements like these, Bush and Baker join Pilarczyk and a very great number of their fellow countrymen as members of the Kevin Costner school of moralists—that is, those who start from the assumption that neither they nor those whom they address are themselves encumbered by any national, local, or cultural identity not of their own choosing. In *Dances With Wolves*, Costner plays a Civil War soldier who goes off to the frontier and decides that, rather than fight the Indians, he would prefer to be one. This is not seen as treachery to his country but as loyalty to a higher, God-like standard of what a man ought to be.

His character, Lieutenant John Dunbar, becomes a hero of the Civil War not by his enthusiasm for his cause or his eagerness to take the fight to the enemy but, apparently, through a failed suicide attempt. When, as a reward for his valor, he is permitted to choose his own posting, he asks to go to the frontier "before it's gone." Already (and rather incongruously for the time) he puts a higher value on the wild things of nature than on the civilization of which he is a part, and the rest of the film consists of a kind of *cultural* suicide—a deliberate choice of exclusion from the people to whom, by birth and breeding, he belongs.

Of course, the film takes care to make us believe in that choice: the lonely frontier is beautiful and beautifully photographed; the Indians are all warm, funny, gentle, noble, and handsome people while the only representatives of civilization, the white soldiers, are sneaky, vicious, illiterate, homicidal, ugly, and anti-intellectual. But Americans are predisposed to believe in it. Not only is eighteenth-century romanticism about the noble savage still plausible to us, but as a nation our most devoutly held article of faith is that it is possible for us to remake our lives in any way we choose. That is part of what the frontier is about: making a new start, assuming a new identity.

The right to "the pursuit of happiness" upon which the republic was founded has as its practical corollary a kind of absolute individualism which has the power to annihilate more traditional group loyalties. That view of the world as a loose aggregation of social atoms rather than a complex of permanent racial or tribal, religious or economic relationships was both cause and consequence of the influx to America of vast numbers of immigrants from more traditional societies. They all came looking for that same new start unencumbered by the past; they were all furiously pursuing that same individual vision of happiness.

Paradoxically, it often proves to be the case that the more individual our aspirations, the more they tend to focus on the attractions of *belonging* somewhere, preferably among those with a strongly pronounced group identity. Thus Lieutenant Dunbar's transformation into a Sioux warrior called Dances With Wolves is led along by the feelings of communality that life among the Indians gives rise to: "the only words that came to mind were 'family' or 'harmony,' " he tells us.

This transformation is the result of a personal choice of what we in the late twentieth century have streamlined into the single word "lifestyle." But the very idea of "lifestyle" is alien to the primitives whose own seems so attractive. For the Sioux there was only one style of life. And it is precisely this limitation of choice that makes their nomadic existence preferable to the possibilities, which are also the uncertainties, of civilization. "As I heard my Sioux name being called over and over," Dunbar tells us in a voice-over, "I knew for the first time who I really was."

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Dunbar's going native falls into what is by now a common pattern of Hollywood's sentimentalizing about the American Indians—perhaps as a self-imposed penance for its years of treating them as cinematic cannon fodder. Yet this, in turn, is part of a larger American pattern of sentimentality. Americans of Irish descent, for example, are the main financial support of the Irish Republican Army, even though they have no desire to live in the country they profess to love. Their Irishness is merely one of thousands of American badges of identity. Like the maker's logo so prominently displayed on sportswear, it offers the wearer public identification with an approved group for a moderate price—moderate at least in comparison with the cost of those more traditional sorts of belonging which demand of us a serious commitment or the adoption of a whole way of life.

Even American patriotism is heavily sentimental. The flag is also a fashionable logo. Our loyalty to the land which has underwritten the pursuit of happiness is not reinforced by any of the more usual accoutrements of nationhood, such as race or culture, in a land committed to "multi-racialism" and "multiculturalism." Such national loyalty as Americans have tends to express itself in abstract terms like "democracy" or "freedom" which, insofar as they elicit a genuine commitment, are transferrable and do not tie us to the geographical entity known as the United States of America.

The audience in whose company I watched *Dances With Wolves* cheered when the soldiers of their country were massacred by Indians—not because it was an especially unpatriotic audience but because its capacity for self-identification with them was limited by the soldiers' unsympathetic human and individual qualities. In the same way, because the Indians were individually sympathetic, the audience had no more difficulty than the hero in making an emotional self-identification with them which owed nothing to nation, race, culture, or tradition.

When Emerson said that man is a god in ruins, one of the things he meant was that this kind of spiritual rootlessness was predicated of the divine. We may strive to emulate divinity by cutting ourselves off from such merely local and accidental connections to our fellow human beings as will interfere with our participation in the true and the good wherever we may find it. This view of the world has always been axiomatic to Americans—so much so that we forget the ruins. We now all but take it for granted that we can and should look at human life on earth, with all its conflicts and contradictions, *sub specie aeternitatis*—not as men who are strapped to a particular social and intellectual distorting lens but with the clear-sightedness of gods.

THE CATHOLIC bishops who so generously offered their advice to President Bush on how to transcend his American perspective and make war like a god—punishing only the guilty and allowing even them every chance to redeem themselves—were speaking, paradoxically, less as representatives of the church universal than as this kind of rather provincial American universalist. In fact, the more self-consciously American (and Protestant) National Council of Churches went even further: "As Christians in the U.S.," it resolved, "we must witness against weak resignation to the illogical pursuit of militarism and war."

Illogical? What is illogical about war in defense of one's national interest? The assumption of illogicality is based on the prior assumption that nationhood is an irrelevance to the very high-minded and moral things that really matter. It is a merely sentimental attachment, a flag upon the sleeve (which were far better replaced by a UN flag anyway) of those who, if they must fight at all, are supposed to be fighting for a disinterested world justice and against not a particular instance of aggression but the very principle of aggression in pursuit of national aggrandizement. Therein lies the NCC's "illogicality": how can we oppose Iraq's war-making on behalf of its national interest by making war on behalf of *our* national interest?

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The answer, of course, is a very simple one: because we are us and not them, because their national interest is not ours but theirs; and when the two come in conflict we are on the side not of theirs but of ours. Unfortunately, it is not an answer with which many in America feel comfortable, which is why George Bush dropped his other rationales and concentrated only on his "new world order" once the war had started. He knew that when Americans go to war, it is (rhetorically at least) for the sake not of America as a country among other countries, but for that of one of our universalist principles—to oppose the evils of Nazism or militarism or communism or to make the world safe for democracy. They would feel guilty if they thought they were only making the world safe for Americans.

Before the war, the administration's groping for a good reason to make war on Iraq alternated between one or another moral, internationalist principle—to punish "naked aggression" or enforce UN resolutions or establish a "new world order" or prevent a mad dictator from endangering the world with nuclear weapons—and more selfish, nationalist ends. Shortly after he invoked "American values" in Saudi Arabia, Secretary of State Baker said (in Bermuda and not among the troops), "to bring it down to the average American citizen, let me say that means jobs. If you want to sum it up in one word, it's jobs." The war protesters, of course, later took that idea up in the refrain: "No blood for oil."

Baker's invocation of the narrowly conceived national interest as any nation might understand it looks like evidence of the hypocrisy that foreigners often accuse Americans of. But in the context of the whole history of America's definition of its national interest, it is not necessarily easy to tell which justification is the public pose and which is the real motivator. My guess is that Baker, for the moment anyway, thought that "jobs" would sell better with the public than the noble internationalism that had been tried hitherto and to which he was more genuinely committed. It was if anything a kind of reverse hypocrisy. But I doubt if either Bush or Baker was ever clear in his own mind about which of the two reasons for war had priority.

Something of the same confusion becomes apparent in *Dances With Wolves* when the renegade lieutenant tells the audience one of the things he means by finding out who he really is among the alien Sioux. He says that, as a soldier in the Union Army, he had never felt particularly inspired by the just cause he was fighting for, but that, as an Indian, it made perfect sense to him to fight and kill marauders from other tribes in order to protect the winter food store.

Maybe Secretary Baker's remarks about "jobs" was an implicit recognition of the limits to which the popular imagination can be stretched on behalf of noble principles. But the principles are never left long out of use because they are part of American's conception of their country—which is everybody's country, the universalist's homeland, rather as the Dallas Cowboys used to advertise themselves, for reasons that were never very clear to me, as "America's team." How could that be? How could they be distinctively Dallas', play against Washington or New York or Philadelphia, and call themselves America's team? Because it is in the nature of American particularism to aspire to the universal.□

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

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